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Abstract 
This dissertation analyzes the development of post-war social stability in northern 
Uganda. Relying on data from fieldwork and 91 in-depth interviews in three rural 
villages, I analyze what facilitates and what hinders the transitional process. I develop an 
analysis of how the war and displacement affected unity by bringing broad social changes 
and shifts to daily patterns of interactions. I consider how local catalysts of conflict 
emerge from the transitional period, potentially blocking the transition to stability and 
devolving communities into renewed cycles of violence and instability. I also analyze the 
role of formal transitional justice mechanisms in local communities, looking particularly 
at how social context affects the diffusion of global discourses of transitional justice to 
the local level. I develop a model of the post-war transition from fragile coexistence to 
social stability that integrates local informal processes, formal transitional justice 
mechanisms, and emergent conflicts. 
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  Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
Before the war, people had everything, but today we are trying to recover. 
A person recovering is not the same as a person who has never suffered. 
(Stellah Acan, Interview #46) 
 
 
• 2006 • 
 
Joyce is 13 years old and living in the outskirts of Gulu town. Most of her life had been 
spent in Awach IDP camp, but after her father was killed in an ambush, she fled with her 
mother and sister to Gulu, so her mother could look for work. They also hope that in the 
larger town Joyce will be safer from the LRA, who has recently abducted several boys 
and girls around Joyce’s age, her friends from the camp. Joyce hasn’t been in school in 
years, with no money, but also no functioning school nearby. Her mother seems to be 
scraping by, though sometimes she doesn’t come home all night long, and Joyce lies 
alone in the dark, listening intently for any sounds of alarm or attack. 
 
Patrick is living in Ajulu-Patiko IDP camp, where his large tracts of land are, 
fortuitously, in the area immediately surrounding the camp. Throughout most of the 
period of displacement, Patrick’s family has been able to cultivate their land, also 
frequently hiring other people for labor and renting out land to surrounding families who 
want to grow small vegetable gardens. Patrick’s wife has been working with a European 
NGO that is mobilizing groups of women to save their money together. She has been able 
to save small amounts of money, and Patrick appreciates her contributions to helping pay 
their children’s school fees, feeling fortunate for their ability to make do in these difficult 
times. 
 
Okello is trying to keep his large family—his sons, their wives, their children—together 
in Coo Pe IDP camp. He was an elected leader in their village, but now there are 
appointed camp leaders, so his leadership responsibilities have diminished, though he 
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still does what he can to help organize life in the camp, despite chaotic and constantly 
changing conditions. His wife is known for her brew of the local alcohol, selling it to 
bring in some income, but recently has been taking too much herself. It was devastating 
to all of them when two of their children were abducted in 1999. Now, combined with the 
trauma of the massacre in their village camp two years ago, she seems to try anything to 
dull the pain. They survive day to day on food rations from the WFP, not having farmed 
their own land in years. 
 
• 2011 • 
 
At 18, Joyce still dreams of getting enough money to go back to school, but now she 
works at a bar in Awach, bringing beers and “sack-its” of grain alcohol to middle-aged 
men with blurry eyes and wandering hands. After her mother began staying with another 
man a few years ago, Joyce’s life became difficult, as an outsider who didn’t belong 
among the new man’s children. She moved back to her father’s home village, near 
Awach, but didn’t find a place that felt like home. Her aunts were busy caring for their 
own children and Joyce didn’t know any of the neighbors. In the trading centre, however, 
she found a job in the beer hall, and the woman who owns it lets her sleep in the back 
room. To Joyce, she belongs here as much as she belongs anywhere. 
 
With his farming operations expanding, Patrick is regularly selling bulk products to 
markets in Gulu and Kampala. He has found he is also able to navigate the forms and 
handshakes necessary to access resources brought by rebuilding programs, receiving 
assistance to start a pig farming operation and a grinding mill. His wife has continued 
with the savings group, and their system of savings and loans is now a considerable 
resource. In an effort to help his extended family as well, he has gone into business with 
his brother, opening a convenience store in Anyadwe trading centre. Despite his 
successes, Patrick has been troubled by a dispute over the boundary of his land; he has 
been cultivating the land for well over a decade, but a family returned last year with 
claims the land belonged to their grandfather. As the case languishes in court, Patrick is 
becoming increasingly frustrated and agitated. 
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Back on the land of his father and grandfather in Lukodi, Okello has been busy 
reestablishing their long-ago destroyed farm lands and huts. Gone are the cattle, village 
celebrations, and easy life he remembers from before the war. Despite this, he is thankful 
to be home. He rejoiced the day one of his sons returned from the bush, after nearly 10 
years, but worries at the storms that seem to brew in his eyes and the ways some of the 
neighbors look at him. Okello hopes to one day gather the resources to perform a 
cleansing of evil spirits. Today, one of Okello’s grandchildren is sick and Okello’s wife is 
frantic to find money for the doctor, pressuring Okello to ask for help from an American 
NGO worker he knows. Okello sometimes works with an NGO that is trying to promote 
reconciliation in Lukodi, though he often feels overwhelmed at the task, finding it difficult 
to even meet his own family’s immediate needs. 
 
 
In just five short years, life has changed dramatically for the people of northern Uganda. 
For over two decades, people lived in the crossfire of a brutal war, with their daily 
energies focused on survival and carving out creative strategies to exist in extremely 
difficult surroundings (Finnström 2008). When the violence subsided, long-displaced 
people returned to their home communities en masse to rebuild. While being at home is 
certainly a positive step, there is still a long road ahead, reconstructing not only 
infrastructure, but also social relationships, institutions, and practices. 
 
Orienting Research Questions 
Violence is often cyclical, with deep social roots. In the fragile context of a post-war 
society, preventing a return to violent conflict is of utmost concern. To safeguard the 
development of lasting peace, transitional societies need to develop deep social stability, 
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beginning at the local level. A central concern of this project—one shared with sociology 
as a discipline—was to understand what binds individuals together in community and 
what blocks unity, instead contributing to division and tension. Understanding the 
construction of solidarity and division is a tall order, but it is particularly imperative 
when considering a society in which people have experienced widespread violence and 
conflict. Such cultural trauma (Alexander et al. 2004) fundamentally damages the very 
foundation of social life, complicating the analysis of community and solidarity in the 
aftermath of war, displacement, and human rights violations.  
 The overarching question that motivated this research was: What facilitates and 
what hinders the transition from war to social stability? There are numerous institutional 
responses to this question, but I argue that beyond the formal mechanisms promoted by 
governments or organizations, the way survivors relate to one another every day in their 
own communities has a direct and lasting impact on if and how people deal with the 
legacy of violence and understand their collective future. Within this broad question, I 
addressed three interrelated lines of inquiry.  
 First, how do ordinary social interactions contribute to or detract from the 
transitional process? This first contribution is an analysis of 1) how every day 
interactions can facilitate the transition from war to deeper peace and stability, and 2) 
what daily barriers to unity develop in post-war communities. To do this, I looked 
carefully at the impact of the war and displacement on unity. In what ways are people in 
post-war communities united? How has the war impacted their social interactions and 
organization? After a prolonged period of war and displacement, what broad social 
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changes influence survivors’ daily lives? In this new context, are people interacting with 
one another in ways that deepen unity and stability, or do they find that relationships are 
mired in tensions? I developed an analysis of how ordinary interactions contribute to and 
detract from unity in a post-war context. 
Second, what major barriers to stability emerge from the particularities of the 
local social context? It is essential to understand which catalysts can spark renewed 
cycles of violence and instability, and how they operate. Continuing the focus on the role 
of daily interactions, I asked how local struggles over power and belonging contribute to 
these catalysts or barriers. Then, in the face of significant local challenges to the 
development of post-war stability, what methods or social institutions are available to 
address these conflicts? Are they effective in helping survivors overcome emergent 
barriers and conflicts, allowing communities to continue with a positive transition? I 
considered local catalysts that can spark violent conflict and how they are barriers to 
unity and stability. 
Third, are transitional justice mechanisms resonate in local communities and do 
they make felt contributions to the transition? I considered if the global discourses that 
permeate transitional justice mechanisms are relevant in local communities. If they are 
not, why not? How does social context matter for the development of local discourses 
about the role of formal institutional mechanisms? I analyzed what blocks the translation 
of global discourses into local vernaculars (Levitt and Merry 2009). What happens when 
there are not effective local translators? How do transitional justice mechanisms fit into 
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local institutional arrangements? I analyzed the ways formal institutions—transitional 
justice mechanisms—are experienced by survivors in transitional contexts. 
In order to more fully reveal the role of informal daily social interactions in a 
transition, I addressed these questions in multiple communities. From this comparison, I 
asked how the transitional process varies between post-war communities situated in the 
same macro context. How much do local specificities matter in shaping the transitional 
process? Even with similar transitional justice experiences, will some communities have 
more successful transitions than others? 
My dissertation addressed all of these questions for the specific case of post-war 
and post-displacement northern Uganda. To take seriously the role of local social context 
in the transitional process, an in-depth case study was an appropriate method. I focused 
on one case, but argued throughout that there are elements or insights that are likely to 
operate similarly in other transitional societies, and I developed a model that can be 
applied more broadly. 
 
Structure of the Dissertation 
In the following section, I present my key findings, which will be developed and 
supported in detail in the remaining chapters. Chapter Two details my theoretical 
framework, Chapter Three provides key historical background to the study, and Chapter 
Four is a discussion of my methodology and data. Chapters Five through Seven present 
my findings. Finally, Chapter Eight is a concluding discussion. 
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In Chapter Two I review theories of the development of violence, socio-legal 
scholarship, transitional justice literature, interdisciplinary insights from post-conflict 
research, and sociology of culture and group interaction, and I introduce my model of the 
post-war transition from fragile coexistence to stability. I argue that the transition is both 
facilitated and hindered by the involvement of transitional justice mechanisms and more 
informal processes of daily social interactions in post-war communities. I conceptualize a 
stable society as one in which people value community, social justice, non-violence, and 
interdependence.  
 Chapter Three provides historical and contextual background specific to northern 
Uganda and the research fieldsites. My research analyzes the resettlement and 
reconstructive trajectories of three recently resettled neighboring villages. Chapter Four 
details the data and methodology. First, I discuss my positionality and its associated 
implications for fieldwork. The second half of Chapter Four outlines my methods of data 
collection, discussing the technical aspects of sampling, recruiting, and conducting 
interviews during my eleven months of field research. Chapter Four concludes with an 
overview of the socio-demographic characteristics of interview respondents, who were 
most commonly married or cohabitating Catholic farmers with low levels of formal 
education. 
 In Chapter Five, I analyze how the experiences of war and displacement affected 
unity in the three fieldsites, unpacking how ordinary social interactions contribute to and 
also detract from cohesion and solidarity. While there were a minority of respondents 
who perceived that the war actually improved trust and unity by forcing people to rely on 
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one another, for the majority of respondents, the war deeply undercut communal life. I 
argue that social life since resettlement has undergone a fundamental reorganization and, 
in many ways, it has been weakened. Most respondents reported low levels of trust 
among neighbors, saying they trusted only a select few, and that they are particularly 
hesitant to trust young people. Respondents talked of weak, fragmented, and insincere 
unity, of a substantively different type than unity before the war. They frequently 
described relationships characterized by greed, jealousy, struggles over resources, and 
conflicts. I argue that this challenge or barrier to deep unity has occurred because of three 
alterations to daily social interactions. First, the post-war period has seen shifts in 
historically important cultural customs, including a devaluing of traditional communal 
practices, a loss of local leaders’ authority, and a decline in rituals that connect the 
spiritual and social worlds. Second, communal agricultural work is practiced less often, 
by fewer people, and in different forms than it was prior to displacement. Third, village 
life is increasingly organized on the basis of membership in small groups, rather than as 
members of the broader village community. Many such groups were formed to obtain 
resources from post-war NGO and government programs, and continue to operate as 
locations of unity and social support, thus introducing new dimensions of inclusion and 
exclusion to village life. 
Throughout the chapter, I develop analyses of four broad social changes ushered 
in by the war and displacement, which help to explain the observed shifts in social 
interactions. First, there has been a crisis of leadership, as a generation of chiefs and 
elders passed away during the war and post-war leaders have not emerged with the same 
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degree of authority. Second, there was a gap in the socialization of a generation of youth, 
those that spent their formative years in camps, rather than in peaceful villages. Now, in 
many ways, this generation is not well-equipped for “normal” life. Third, the war ushered 
in new economic arrangements, deepened poverty, and increased inequality. While in the 
camps, with the influx of outside resources and the lack of agricultural activity, wage 
labor and non-agricultural businesses grew. People lost wealth and livelihoods because of 
the war, but some were better positioned to capitalize on the new economic realities. 
Finally, during and in the wake of displacement, NGO and government programs played 
a substantial role in the region, instituting a wide range of far-reaching programs with 
diverse consequences in residents’ lives. 
Chapter Six is an in-depth analysis of land conflict, which is one particularly 
formidable barrier to post-war unity and stability, emerging from within the local 
transitional context. I begin with a discussion of the centrality of land in northern 
Uganda, arguing that conflicts over land are so contentious because of the prominent role 
of land in making social identity. Not only is land essential for physical survival, but it is 
a marker of belonging in a community, a way of distinguishing the boundaries of who 
belongs and who does not. The post-war context adds additional complexity, as land is 
newly monetized and perceived as the only valuable asset remaining to help people 
rebuild their lives. Whereas land in the past was seen as being used (not owned) 
communally, there is a growing emphasis on individual ownership. Post-displacement 
land ownership and boundaries are difficult to determine, as people have been away for 
many years and elders with memories of boundaries and local histories are often not 
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present. Accounting for these elements of social context allows a rich analysis of why 
land conflict presents such a risk of violence and instability. 
Disputes over land were extremely prevalent in all three fieldsites, with 
respondents commonly describing them as both the most common and the most serious 
types of conflicts in their communities. Some disputes emerged from the chaotic situation 
of such a massive and rapid resettlement. Others, however, more directly highlighted 
power inequalities and exploitation of vulnerable community members. According to 
many respondents, land conflicts make unity extremely difficult, if not impossible. 
Parties of a land dispute do not interact with one another, instead harboring deep 
bitterness. Even among those not active in a particular dispute, respondents explained that 
people look at one another with distrust because of tensions over land. Dispute resolution 
mechanisms are not well equipped to address this issue, both because of its magnitude 
and because it is a new form of social conflict emerging from the transition. Respondents 
strongly favored the local, community-based dispute resolution system, rather than the 
state-based courts, which are perceived as too far removed from local specificity and too 
vulnerable to manipulation by those with power. However, in practice, the local system 
faces substantial problems and has not been able to definitively address land conflict. 
I conceptualize disputes over land as a type of emergent conflict that arises 
because of the broad social changes brought by the post-war transition (Miall 2007). I 
describe the transitional period as a time of dramatic social change, with new economic, 
social, cultural, institutional, and interpersonal arrangements. Emergent conflicts develop 
as a result of these changes, as a consequence of the transition, and have the potential to 
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block the transition to stability and devolve a society into renewed violence and 
instability. I argue that it imperative to develop the capacity of social institutions to meet 
the new demands of the emergent conflict and help communities accommodate or adapt 
to the social changes brought by the transition. 
Chapter Seven discusses another barrier to post-war reconstruction: the 
ineffective translation of transitional justice mechanisms into locally relevant forms. I 
analyze how residents of northern Uganda encounter and evaluate the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), an international institution designed to promote justice and 
accountability in the aftermath of egregious human rights violations. The ICC represents 
the culmination of decades of work on the part of advocacy networks and international 
organizations to promote a particular global discourse and set of values: those of human 
rights, rule of law, democracy, accountability, and justice. For many, the ICC is a global 
agent that is able to transmit these universalized discourses and values to a variety of 
local contexts. For this to be done effectively, there needs to be a process of translation to 
make the global form and ideas locally relevant (Merry 2006). The ICC has an outreach 
unit that is tasked with—and claims to be effective at—communicating the principles and 
ideals of the Court to affected communities, resulting in both increased knowledge of and 
support for the ICC and its activities. 
One of the three fieldsites in my research, Lukodi, had an exceptionally high level 
of exposure to the ICC and its outreach activities, and the ICC had explicitly claimed its 
efforts were successful in Lukodi. In comparing Lukodi to the other fieldsites, however, I 
found the story to be more complex. First, even after outreach activities, knowledge about 
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the ICC remained low and unevenly distributed throughout the population. Second, there 
was significant nuance in people’s perceptions of the ICC’s impact, with people most 
likely to describe “potential” benefits but to also have substantial critiques and report 
negative impacts. Finally, most importantly, I found that those with more knowledge of 
the ICC were more likely to be critical of the ICC and its involvement in Uganda. Even 
after concerted outreach initiatives, the community discourse about the ICC did not 
reflect the positive perceptions and harmony of interests the Court expects. Rather, local 
residents had significant critiques and did not perceive the ICC as resonate with their 
lived experiences, their attempts to deal with their collective past, or their efforts to 
imagine a peaceful future. 
Previous work has developed cases of how global principles are successfully 
translated into local vernaculars. Using this case, however, I developed a model that 
identifies how local social context complicates the translation, or vernacularization, 
process. I argue that vernacularization has not happened effectively for four reasons: 1) a 
mismatch between the cultural schema of the ICC and that of the local population; 2) the 
people in Uganda classifying the situation more complexly than as a legal dispute; 3) 
diverse social locations making some segments of the population less likely or able to 
understand and support the ICC; and 4) the absence of key local elites to serve as 
translators or advocates for the ICC. Additionally, I see significant problems with the 
institutional fit of the ICC in northern Uganda. The ICC is poorly received because of: 1) 
a recent influx of post-war international organizations that people perceive as 
disconnected from local realities; 2) negative experiences with local courts and resultant 
  13 
perceptions that courts are not effective means of dispute resolution; and 3) the 
contradiction between the ICC and the locally popular national legislation that grants 
amnesty to all returned combatants. Together, these problems with vernacularization and 
institutional fit led to a unique local discourse about the ICC that did not reflect the global 
discourse promoted by international actors. 
Finally, Chapter Eight is a concluding discussion that unites the findings from the 
entire project and returns directly to the broad questions orienting this research. After 
deeply considering the answers to questions about what facilitates and what blocks the 
transitional process in post-war northern Uganda, in this chapter I discuss how findings 
from this case are relevant to other societies transitioning from war to peace. I discuss the 
academic contributions of this work, as well as some implications for those directly 
engaged in the process of building peace after violent conflict. 
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Chapter Two 
Transitioning to Stability: A Theoretical Framework 
 
Ojok kwe ciro ki cet iot pa maro 
You will get it in a long way, 
turning many corners before you arrive. 
 
This dissertation was motivated by the overarching task of understanding how 
communities transition sustainably from a period of war and violence to a time of social 
stability. This chapter sets up the theoretical framework for the project. I situate my 
project at the intersection of multiple fields, particularly scholarship on transitional 
justice, post-conflict reconciliation, law, culture, international organizations, and social 
interaction. I examine insights from previous work on what contributes to unity and 
solidarity, as well as what blocks unity and leads to violent conflict. While this chapter 
sketches the basic framework and outlines conversations to which the dissertation 
contributes, the analyses in subsequent chapters also utilize scholarship directly relevant 
to each topic area. 
 The chapter opens with a discussion of how violence emerges, focusing 
particularly on scholarship about micro-level processes that lead to widespread conflict. 
Next, I discuss two legal challenges to conflict resolution that are salient in many post-
colonial contexts: a legal pluralism that contributes to ambiguity and tensions in dispute 
resolution, and a form of legal consciousness in which people do not perceive law as a 
useful tool to resolve their problems. Next, I discuss transitional justice literature, which 
is the primary scholarship that addresses post-conflict transitions and how societies 
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rebuild after widespread violence. Most such work focuses on how institutional 
mechanisms facilitate the transition. Next, I discuss a small, emerging area that focuses 
on post-conflict social reconstruction at the community level. This recent work calls for 
increased analysis of how to move from fragile coexistence to a deeper peace, and also 
brings attention to the need for sociological contributions. In order to make such a 
contribution, I next turn to key sociological insights on what brings people together in 
community, contributing to unity and collective identity. In this section, I discuss sources 
of social solidarity, the formation and impact of boundaries, interactions that occur in 
social groups, and the construction of collective memory. The chapter closes with an 
introduction to my model of the post-war process of social reconstruction, with a focus 
on the mechanisms that help transition from fragility to stability. 
 
Conflict and Violence 
Although I primarily focused on what brings people together and furthers the 
development of unity, it was first helpful to understand what divides people and causes 
conflicts to escalate to violence. In the past century, traditional interstate warfare has 
decreased and intrastate conflicts have been on the rise, suggesting an increasing need for 
understanding the local roots of violence. These conflicts often involve groups competing 
for power or wealth, targeting civilian populations in the process, thus resulting in a 
massive breakdown in social structures (Fletcher and Weinstein 2002).  
There are several key theories about the development of violence. Most such 
research focuses on state or macro- and societal-level causes of violence, conflict, and 
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war. Scholars most frequently study how violence is caused by the type and strength of 
the government (Harff 2003; Hironaka 2005; Mann 2005; Rummel 1996; Tilly 2006), 
colonial histories (Levene 2005; Mamdani 2001), ideologies promoted by elites or 
government leaders (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2009; Weitz 2009), and economic 
conditions (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). For example, Tilly (2006) argued that 
the ways that groups express their collective claims—whether through collective 
violence, revolution, or social movements—depends on the interaction between the form 
of the state (its degree of democratization) and the capacities of the state (its ability to 
extract and use resources effectively). In this model, countries like Uganda—low 
capacity, democratic regimes—are most likely to experience collective violence and have 
zones of instability and lawlessness (Tilly 2006:210). Such macro considerations are 
certainly relevant, but I argue that it is also necessary to develop theories of micro 
processes that contribute to fueling large-scale violence. 
 
Micro-Level Interactions with Macro Processes 
There is some work on the development of violence that considers how macro processes 
interact with local-level social practices. For example, John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-
Richmond (2008, 2009) developed a collective action theory to describe the development 
of genocidal violence in Sudan. At the macro-level, the Darfur region had intense 
competition for resources and the Government of Sudan promoted ideologies against 
black African people groups. These factors reified socially-constructed identities and 
created perceived distinctions between “us” and “them.” At the micro-level, this 
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translated into racial intent in the perpetration of individual acts of violence. The 
combination of these individual actions was the collective action of genocide in Darfur 
(Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008, 2009). Such work illustrates the valuable 
contributions that a sociological perspective can make to understanding mass violence. 
Gregory Stanton (1998) developed a widely used model of eight stages of 
genocide. Although it is not explicitly articulated, each of these stages implies a dynamic 
interaction between macro processes or elite actions with micro-level social interactions. 
The first stage is classification, which involves developing categories of “us” and “them” 
that line up with elements of social difference. Second, symbolization is giving a name or 
symbol to line up with the classification system (such as the yellow star for Jews). Third, 
dehumanization is a process of denying the humanity of at least one of the groups. 
Fourth, organization begins to establish a system to perpetrate genocide. Fifth, 
polarization starts to separate the groups, silencing moderate views and amplifying 
extremists. Sixth, in the preparation stage, victims are identified and separated on the 
basis of their identity. In the seventh stage, extermination, genocide actually occurs. 
Finally, denial is a stage of genocide, as perpetrators cover their tracks and deny their 
crimes. Stanton is an anthropologist, and he developed this model in his work as the 
founder and president of Genocide Watch, so the model is understandably oriented 
towards policy and prevention. Social science is needed to understand why these stages 
occur, to determine if the stages are necessary for genocides to happen or merely 
descriptive of some genocides. Additionally, this model is specifying the development of 
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genocide, but the development of broader forms of conflict and mass violence are likely 
to unfold differently. 
The interplay of macro and micro processes is also seen in some work on 
“ethnic,” or ethnicized, conflict.1 Andreas Wimmer (2008) and Mahmood Mamdani 
(1996, 2004) theorize about the social construction of ethnicity as a salient boundary 
distinguishing between groups, incorporating the micro-dynamics of group making, but 
also the role of ethnicity in political maneuvering and institutions. Mamdani theorizes 
about the formation of ethnic identities specifically in postcolonial Africa, seeing 
ethnicity as a political identity that was imposed by colonial administrations and legal 
structures. While there were precolonial culturally symbolic differences, Mamdani argues 
that ethnicity as a political identity was a colonial creation. After independence, ethnic 
divisions were reinforced by postcolonial law and the state, and ethnic categories 
continued to be used to promote policies of “divide and rule” (Mamdani 1996). Wimmer 
(2008) argues that ethnic groups are constructed by a dynamic interaction of actors’ 
boundary making strategies, the situational constraints (such as those of institutions or 
networks), and the process of social negotiation about the boundary, such as whether the 
interaction surrounding the boundary is characterized by conflict, consensus, or 
compromise. These contributions highlight how macro and micro social processes 
interact in the social construction of ethnic identity and boundaries. 
                                                 
1 Many of these conflicts are characterized as “ethnic conflicts,” though there is debate about this 
characterization and this label is often applied inappropriately (Brubaker and Laitin 1998; Hironaka 2005). 
As Brubaker and Laitin explain, “Ethnicity is not the ultimate, irreducible source of violent conflict in such 
cases. Rather, conflicts driven by struggles for power between challengers and incumbents are newly 
ethnicized, newly framed in ethnic terms” (Brubaker and Laitin 1998:425). Thus, while the label “ethnic 
conflict” is often inappropriately used, many wars and violence, particularly in post-colonial Africa, are 
ethnicized. 
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Like much of Africa, Uganda had a system of indirect rule that influenced the 
regional ethnic identities underlying the contemporary northern conflict. While much 
violence in post-colonial Africa is described as rooted in “ancient tribal hatreds,” 
recognizing the social construction of ethnicity illustrates the role of social processes in 
shaping group identities, relationships, and conflicts. It also suggests the importance of 
understanding the roots of boundary-making and group-creation. In post-war situations, 
particularly, reified divisions between groups are cause for concern. 
Within a national context, there are certain systems of ethnic group relations that 
make violent conflict more likely. For example, Horowitz (1985) argues that in systems 
where the hierarchy of ethnic groups is not clearly known or enforced, relations are more 
volatile and, thus, ethnic conflict is more likely. Additionally, conflict is more likely 
when ethnic groups are large and centralized. In societies with unranked, centralized 
ethnic systems, conflict is likely to arise as groups try to affirm their worth compared to 
other groups and assert the legitimacy of their claims for political inclusion and power 
(particularly by groups that were disadvantaged by colonial administrations). This leads 
to a politics of ethnic entitlement that is a source of ethnicized conflict (Horowitz 1985). 
Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) claim the breakout of civil violence is not related to 
the existence of ethnic groups, per say, but is affected by state-level ethnic politics. They 
find the likelihood of armed ethnic violence increases in states that have many ethnic 
divisions among elites in the central government and also in states where a greater 
proportion of the population does not have a representative of their ethnic group in a 
position of state power.  
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Other scholars unpack how interactions between the state and the international 
community affect ethnicized conflicts. Olzak (2006), for example, explains levels of 
ethnicized violence by looking at the core or periphery status of the state, its integration 
into a global culture that increasingly values human rights, and the degree to which the 
state is politically inclusive towards minority groups. Hironaka (2005) analyzes why civil 
wars—typically characterized as ethnic conflicts—have become both more common and 
longer lasting. For her, these conflicts are perpetuated by the international community 
supporting weak states, despite their inability to resolve political discontent or 
insurgencies. Ethnicity contributes to violent conflict because the weak state does not 
have strong political institutions, so people mobilize around other salient social identities 
(Hironaka 2005). 
 
Local Development of Violence 
While many theories of war and violence focus on how conflict develops at the national 
or regional level, a few theorists argue that the local level is equally—or more—
important in understanding the development of violence. Stathis Kalyvas (2006) makes a 
key distinction between violence and war, unpacking the concept of how violence 
develops at the local level, aggregating and intensifying to war. He argues there is a logic 
to violence, and that this “selective violence” is produced not only by political actors, but 
also by individual citizens seizing opportunities they find in the midst of their difficult or 
chaotic situations; that is, the macro situation creates opportunities for some to 
accomplish their objectives through violence. Violence develops not haphazardly and not 
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only at the elite level, but it occurs in particular micro social situations for justifiable 
reasons, in pursuit of understandable goals, such as information or security. The micro-
dynamics of violence contribute to the development of war at the macro-level. 
Specifically, in conflict environments, micro social antagonisms (such as disputes over 
land) contribute to the development of regional or national tensions. 
 Séverine Autesserre (2008, 2010) developed an in-depth case study of Uganda’s 
neighbor, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where violent conflict has been on-
going for decades, despite intensive peace-building efforts. She argued that the 
international community has problematically focused on regional or national issues in 
their approaches, and that peace-building has not paid due attention to the root of the 
violence, which, she argues, is local disputes over power and land. When local problems 
are neglected, they worsen and deepen, fragmenting and decentralizing even further. 
Local tensions are not often given the attention they merit, but Autesserre argues that 
they are a critical source of instability. Local disputes—particularly over land—are not 
long confined to the local level, but dangerously fuel broader violence, conflicts, and war 
at the national and regional levels. My project contributes to this neglected area of 
scholarship, seeking to understand the social roots of violence and war, and the role of 
local-level individual agency in the development of conflicts. 
 
Challenges to Dispute Resolution 
While the emergence of conflicts or disputes is perhaps unavoidable in social life, 
effective dispute resolution mechanisms are necessary to prevent situations’ escalation to 
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violence. Problematically, there are two important legal dimensions that specifically 
weaken dispute resolution in many post-colonial contexts: first, a system of legal 
pluralism that creates complications and tensions in dispute resolution, and second, a 
system in which law is not necessarily seen as an effective tool for dealing with complex 
situations. Both of these issues make legal systems less useful for people to resolve their 
disputes, thus increasing the likelihood of using alternative forms of dispute resolution, 
such as force or violence, and creating a potential barrier to peaceful resettlement after 
violence. 
 
Post-Colonial Legal Pluralism 
Legal pluralism is the coexistence of multiple legal orders in a particular social space. 
While pluralism is a phenomenon present in many different contexts, it is particularly 
prevalent in post-colonial nations. In the era of global conquest and imperialism, as 
empires constructed layers of sovereignty, they continually negotiated to what degree 
they would recognize the legal orders of conquered peoples (Benton 2012). In British 
African colonies (including Uganda), colonial authorities promoted “traditional” dispute 
resolution and legal authorities, but as subordinate to and subject to the rulings of 
colonial courts (Mamdani 1996). Law was used in the colonial system to impose and 
reify cultural differences, particularly through policies of indirect rule. Indirect rule 
meant that tribes (what we now call ethnic groups) all had separate legal systems, varied 
sets of “customary laws” that were administered by distinct “native authorities,” while a 
modern state based on common law was set up to govern non-native races. Customary 
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law exaggerated and reinforced cultural differences that were presumed to be based on a 
pure, unchanging tradition, now legally enforced, with the colonial state privileging a 
single institution—the chiefship—as the customary authority (Mamdani 1996, 2004). 
During this period and beyond, as the obsession with defining “civilization” grew, legal 
pluralism came to be associated with states not as “advanced” in the development 
process; from this perspective, legal pluralism signified a nation-state that did not have 
complete control or authority over its territories (Benton 2012). 
 Legal pluralists look at how, in practical terms, certain legal orders assert 
authority over others and develop a hegemonic presence. For some, the dominant legal 
order is the state (Melissaris 2004; Tamanaha, Sage, and Woolcock 2012). For others, 
identifying a particular dominant authority is more complex. For example, Benjamin 
(2008) finds management of natural resources in Mali is balanced between the central 
government, the local governments, and community institutions. This arrangement, 
however, has resulted in modern legal institutions being superimposed on community 
institutions, both destabilizing local governments’ authority and crippling the 
performance of customary institutions (Benjamin 2008). As this illustrates, there are 
often conflicts between the institutions and actors in the various layers of pluralistic 
systems. In northern Uganda, disputes involving physical violence are referred to the 
state-based courts, bypassing the community dispute resolution systems. For many 
residents, however, the formal court system actually builds resentment between disputing 
parties and is not able to determine acceptably nuanced judgments about guilt and 
responsibility. Despite the greater salience of community dispute resolution for local 
  24 
residents, the state system is able to assert its greater authority in Uganda’s pluralist 
system. 
Although these power dynamics are essential to recognize, there also can be an 
interpenetration of legalities (Melissaris 2004). Boundaries between legal orders are 
porous and are open to “cross-fertilizations” or “cross-contaminations” (de Sousa Santos 
2006); community courts or traditional authorities may adapt their practices to fit the 
context of state law, and state legal orders can be likewise modified to incorporate 
contributions from local-level courts and authorities. There is evidence of this occurring 
in northern Uganda, as in some cases the state-based courts refer cases back to the 
community level, citing their unwillingness to hear the case until they can incorporate 
local authorities’ decision or perspective. 
 As legal actors, individuals have varying agency to navigate between multiple 
legal orders, employing strategies that utilize a hybrid of legal systems, ideally ultimately 
choosing the forum in which they perceive they have the greatest possibility of success 
(Benton 2012). In their lived experience, people constantly cross boundaries of legal 
systems, and the dichotomies set up by scholars often are less salient in people’s lives 
(Kamau 2009). However, depending on social location, some people have a greater 
ability to navigate plural legal systems; for example, women experience legal pluralism 
differently than men, resulting in either greater opportunities or constraints (Kamau 2009; 
Manji 1999). Some social groups have greater agency to navigate a pluralistic system, 
setting up the potential for power discrepancies and dissatisfaction of certain groups. I 
found that economic resources, education, and language skills greatly impacted residents’ 
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ability to successfully bring land cases to court, disproportionately privileging certain 
social groups in their ability to ultimately prevail in land disputes. 
 
Legal Consciousness 
The concept of legal consciousness is central to understanding the relationship between 
everyday interactions and the perpetuation of, resistance to, and utilization of legal norms 
and structures. My study contributes a not often studied perspective on legal 
consciousness in an African context, including how ordinary people utilize the law in 
resolving local disputes and how transitional justice mechanisms are actually experienced 
by individual survivors and their communities. Additionally, I contribute new 
understandings of how people experience international criminal law. Most studies of 
legal consciousness analyze how people interact with legal systems that are in greater 
proximity to their everyday lives, but I considered relationships to an international legal 
system, which is significantly farther removed from the local context, investigating if and 
how international law was seen as relevant, in need of modification, or resisted. 
Studies of legal consciousness illuminate the presence of law in society, including 
the way people understand and use the law and what they see as the “normal” ways of 
doing things, revealing the deep social power of law to govern everyday lives (Silbey 
2005). For the most part, law is hegemonic; it is taken for granted and virtually invisible. 
People do not see the influence of law because it is routinized and is part of taken for 
granted expectations of how society operates. In rural Uganda however, this is often not 
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the case, and in post-war contexts, particularly, the rule of law is constantly re-negotiated 
and contested. 
Legal consciousness typically refers to a reciprocal process, a back and forth 
between meanings and social structures, as social structures shape everyday lives and 
human agents shape social structures. As people ascribe various meanings to law, these 
meanings become institutionalized and, in turn, shape the very systems that constrain 
future meaning-making (Silbey 2008). International legal institutions, however, are less 
adaptable and not likely to be shaped by non-elite, local-level agents; I map out the 
relationship between law and its local meanings in a situation where legal consciousness 
is not a reciprocal process. 
Ewick and Silbey (1998) developed three distinct schemas of legal consciousness. 
First, “before the law” is when law is seen as separate and independent from society; 
here, people see themselves as supplicants before the law. Second, “with the law” is 
when law is seen as a game and people are players. Law is instrumental and people are 
able to put the law to use to help further their goals and resolve problems. Third, in 
“against the law,” people see the law as arbitrary and constructed to advantage those in 
powerful positions. In this case, people see themselves as resisters to the law. In 
Uganda’s post-colonial legal context, the “with the law” conception is not the dominant 
form, and, instead, “before the law” is much more powerful. Law is not viewed as 
particularly relevant to daily life, and is not commonly employed as a tool to resolve 
disputes. As I argue, this has significant implications for both how people experience 
international criminal justice and how they resolve local-level disputes. 
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Although there are particular sets of laws governing a society, groups of people 
may experience law in quite variable ways, and law in action may have unique 
consequences for different groups of people. Problematically, law (on the books and in its 
application) often serves to reproduce inequality and the ability of individuals to contest 
legal hegemony varies according to social position. Those with greater resources are able 
to contest the law more effectively, whereas those with fewer resources are more likely to 
defer or submit to legal rules and procedures (Ewick and Silbey 1998). Law may also be 
used to encode hierarchies and distinctions between groups of people, “insiders” and 
“outsiders” (for example, see Greenhouse, Yngvesson, and Engel 1994), particularly as 
certain social groups have the resources and social capital to navigate legal systems more 
easily than others. A central task of this scholarship is to explain why people continue to 
defer to a legal system that does not treat all equally, instead reproducing inequality.  
 In societies forced to rebuild from the ground up after violent conflict, how is law 
understood and utilized, and how does this vary depending on social location? Do people 
highly value legal structures in such a way that helps to re-establish the rule of law? Do 
they resist certain elements of law, such as amnesty laws that command perpetrators of 
atrocity be pardoned and welcomed back into society? How do they negotiate some of the 
more complex or ambiguous legal areas, such as resolving land disputes in areas where 
people are resettling? Which groups or individuals have more or less agency in 
negotiating (or forming) the newly re-established legal terrain?  
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Transitional Justice, International Law, and Human Rights 
After considering the development of violence and challenges to dispute resolution in 
post-colonial contexts, I now turn to rebuilding after violent conflict. Transitional justice 
scholarship is the primary literature substantively addressing the unique social challenges 
facing post-conflict communities. In its narrowest sense, transitional justice refers to the 
legal strategies that a nation uses to move from an undemocratic regime to a democracy. 
There is also body of literature that addresses more broadly how a society comes to terms 
with a violent past and moves on to a peaceful future (Osiel 1997; Teitel 2000). In the 
recent history2 of transitions to democracy beginning in the mid-1900s, a variety of 
mechanisms have been used, including criminal trials, truth commissions, amnesties, 
vetting or lustration, reparations, and memorialization. These different mechanisms 
further varied conceptions of justice in transitional periods, such as the promotion of 
criminal justice in trials, historical justice in truth-seeking, or administrative justice in 
vetting (Teitel 2000).  
 The Ugandan war and its aftermath are affected by the rising global concern with 
transitional justice and promotion of human rights. Legal structures have been developed 
to deal with violent conflict and restore peace around the world, and many studies have 
addressed their effectiveness. I briefly describe the strengths and weaknesses of the types 
of mechanisms used in the Ugandan context, then synthesize three relevant debates that 
characterize the transitional justice literature. 
 
                                                 
2 In this section, I focus on transitional justice in the 20th century and beyond, while admittedly neglecting 
the history of transitional justice dating back to 5th century BCE Athens (Elster 2006). 
  29 
Transitional Justice Mechanisms 
First, trials are perhaps the most commonly used and most commonly debated transitional 
justice mechanism. In the transitional justice literature, this includes domestic (such as 
the Argentine trial of the juntas), foreign (the potential of which was famously illustrated 
by Pinochet’s extradition to Spain), international (such as the ICC, ICTR, or ICTY), or 
hybrid (such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone) courts that try individuals for human 
rights violations. These different types of courts vary in proximity to and involvement of 
the affected population, but the underlying goal of all is to determine individual guilt for 
human rights abuses. Most human rights trials raise similar debates. For example, it is 
unclear to what extent human rights trials deter future abuses, if at all (Snyder and 
Vinjamuri 2003). Some argue trials do not effectively promote the development of 
democracy but Sikkink and Walling (2007) find, in Latin America at least, that domestic 
trials do not undermine democracy and usually improve human rights. Additionally, 
trying individuals under the contested notion of universal jurisdiction raises issues of 
balancing national sovereignty and respect for human rights. In the case of Uganda, the 
ICC has warrants for the arrests of top LRA commanders and there has been one attempt 
at a national war crimes trial. 
 Second, amnesties offer official immunity from prosecution for certain 
individuals or groups with the goal of promoting cessation of violence. Opponents 
caution that amnesty can contribute to impunity because it prevents persecutions and 
stops current investigations (Amnesty International 1995), and some argue this places 
amnesties in direct opposition to the anti-impunity norm promoted in the international 
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human rights community and pursued in trials (Pensky 2008). Despite these substantial 
critiques, arguments for amnesty include: (1) peace may not be achieved without amnesty 
because those in power will be unlikely to surrender without it; (2) rigorous punishment 
of all perpetrators may actually maintain the differences or divisions that led to the 
conflict initially; (3) promoting compromise and forgiveness can help quiet vengeance; 
and (4) courts have limited resources and, thus, should focus on the most egregious 
impunity (Mallinder 2007). Generally, scholars who favor amnesty (such as Snyder and 
Vinjamuri 2003) do not do so unconditionally, but advocate combining amnesties with 
alternative forms of justice, such as truth commissions or reparations (Mallinder 2007; 
Teitel 2000). Uganda passed a blanket Amnesty Act in 2000, allowing tens of thousands 
to return home free of prosecution. 
 Third, reparations refer to compensation offered to victims of abuse. Reparations 
can occur in a variety of forms, including material (cash, property, education, 
employment) or non-material (disclosing truth, publicly recognizing wrong, restoring 
reputations). The overall goal is to “compensate” for damage done, which of course 
raises the question of whether this is appropriate or even possible (Lutz 1995). 
Reparations privilege the victim’s perspective, perhaps more so than the other 
mechanisms (Martin-Baro 1995). While there is general consensus in international law 
that victims ought to be compensated, there is little agreement on how to implement such 
programs (Lutz 1995). Survivors’ groups and their associated NGOs in northern Uganda 
are advocating for reparation programs. 
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 Fourth, memorialization initiatives include establishing sites or events dedicated 
to telling the story of what happened, acknowledging wrongs, and publicly remembering 
victims of violence or human rights abuses. Governments and NGOs both promote the 
development of museums, monuments, days of remembrance, or mass graves. 
Memorialization is an exercise in establishing a historical record, and so such efforts are 
often politicized and fraught with struggles over which versions of history will be 
memorialized as the “official” narrative. In some particularly divisive contexts, such as 
the former Yugoslavia, memorials stand incomplete as parties disagree on how to 
represent the history of the violence. Several NGOs in northern Uganda are pursuing 
memorialization initiatives, particularly in communities that experienced massacres. 
 Finally, there are two mechanisms that are common elsewhere, but are not being 
used in northern Uganda. First, truth commissions are tasked with investigating and 
acknowledging abuses. The benefits of truth commissions are numerous (Borer 2006; 
Hayner 2001), but Uganda does not currently have a trust commission for the 
contemporary LRA conflict. Second, vetting or “purging” a new government of those 
who collaborated with a past regime has commonly been used in former Communist 
states in Europe (Schwartz 1995). Despite alleged abuses committed by the Government 
of Uganda and its army, there is no proposed plan for vetting. 
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Central Debates in Transitional Justice 
There are three key debates that emerge from the transitional justice literature and help 
guide my analysis of transitional justice—and particularly responses to the ICC—in 
northern Uganda. 
First, truth and peace versus justice was the dominant debate characterizing 
transitional justice scholarship in the 1990s, roughly coinciding empirically with a debate 
between the effectiveness of truth commissions versus trials. Since its rise in the late 20th 
century, the human rights community has focused heavily on the fight against impunity, 
advocating trials for those accused of human rights violations (Kritz 1995; Teitel 2000). 
At the same time, there are those who question the appropriateness of applying 
systematic prosecutions in all cases, especially in particularly sensitive or complex 
situations, instead favoring amnesty or truth commissions.  
This debate is on-going, though with an increasing recognition that it is not an 
either/or scenario, but an act of balancing and integrating truth/peace and justice, 
resulting in more varied combinations of mechanisms. There is recognition that these 
values do not line up neatly with particular mechanisms, but can actually be pursued 
simultaneously, particularly at the various levels of intervention—local, national, and 
international (Roht-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena 2006)—allowing many nations to pursue 
both truth and justice simultaneously (Sikkink and Walling 2007). Scholars and 
practitioners increasingly call for consideration of the needs of the community affected 
by the violence in developing the most appropriate combination of truth and justice for 
each case (Minow 2008).  
  33 
In Uganda, the involvement of the ICC was fraught with political controversy as 
the arrest warrants were released as promising peace negotiations were on-going. The 
tension between peace and justice is felt strongly by people in affected communities, and 
they particularly struggle to make sense of the direct contradiction between the ICC and 
the national amnesty. 
The second key debate is between retributive and restorative approaches to 
transitional justice. Retributive justice is the ideal sought by the conventional Western-
style criminal justice system, advocating punishment of perpetrators in proportion to the 
crimes committed. Restorative justice3 refers to an ideological commitment to restoring 
the harm done to relationships between perpetrators, victims, and the larger community. 
For even the most staunch restorative justice advocates, there is debate about whether 
restorative techniques are best suited as a supplement to or replacement of a retributive 
model (Menkel-Meadow 2007).  
Restorative justice scholarship emerged out of practice, when, starting in the 
1970s, social workers, community activists, psychologists, and some legal professionals 
began implementing programs focused on victim-offender mediation. A newer, smaller 
body of work argues that restorative justice is relevant for war crimes, political crimes, 
and various other forms of international violence, too (Braithwaite 2002). Restorative 
justice typically underlies truth commissions (Avruch and Vejarano 2001; Hayner 2001; 
Llewellyn and Howse 1999; Minow 1998; Tutu 1999), but has also played a key role in 
traditional or indigenous practices adapted for use in post-conflict situations (Avruch and 
                                                 
3 Restorative justice practices have a long history, dating back to ancient legal codes in many societies 
(Braithwaite 2002; Van Ness 1993); for the sake of brevity, I discuss more recent applications here.  
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Vejarano 2001; Bolocan 2004; Honeyman et al. 2004). Restorative justice may be 
particularly relevant for communities dealing with widespread violence because it is 
forward-looking, concerned with rebuilding relationships and empowering affected 
communities (Gibson 2004; Menkel-Meadow 2007), thus involving a range of people 
affected by the conflict. It is empowering in taking the power to control how conflict is 
addressed out of the hands of the state and giving it to those actually affected by the 
conflict (Christie 1977), but it does assume there is a coherent community that can be 
repaired, and there is a danger that it may empower unequally. Restorative justice puts 
faith in human capabilities to forgive and transform what was broken by the conflict, 
though critics claim that humans are not able to completely remove their vengeful 
motivations, and that requiring victims to be compassionate towards those who caused 
them harm is asking too much (Acorn 2004). 
I found that the people of northern Uganda do have a broad conception of justice, 
seeing multiple layers and degrees of responsibility. They described a long narrative of 
collective victimization, for which it is not possible to adequately determine a few “most 
responsible.” Furthermore, I found strong capacities and desires for reconciliation, as 
people in affected communities argued that justice can be “over-emphasized.” This put 
them in direct contradiction with the discourse and practices of the ICC, and I analyzed 
the roots and consequences of this tension. 
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A third and final key debate is that of international mechanisms versus local 
mechanisms, based on traditions4 unique to a particular society. Practices or mechanisms 
that have roots in the societies where the conflict or abuse occurred have been 
increasingly recognized as able to make valuable contributions to holistic transitional 
justice (Huyse and Salter 2008). International and local justice mechanisms may pursue 
the same objective, but employ different means. In recent years, there has been increased 
focus on both levels, with the formation of the ICC and the increasing utilization of 
tradition-based approaches in places like Rwanda and Uganda. International mechanisms 
are typically characterized as formal, rational-legalistic strategies initiated and controlled 
by state institutions or inter-governmental organizations (exemplified by the ICC), while 
local mechanisms are informal, ritualistic-communal strategies initiated and controlled by 
the community (Huyse 2008).  
Traditional justice mechanisms often use a different type of rationality than the 
logic of a criminal law system. In a trial, for example, the verdict is either “guilty” or “not 
guilty,” and there are clear rules established to reach this outcome. In violent conflicts, 
however, there are often more gray areas in which guilt and innocence are mixed in a 
broader social historical narrative (Huyse 2008; Jardim 2012; Pendas 2006). This is 
particularly the case in situations like northern Uganda, where abuses have been 
perpetuated by both sides of the conflict, where there is a long history of events leading 
                                                 
4 Thinking critically about terminology is necessary here. Huyse (2008) notes that “traditional” has 
Eurocentric connotations, and implies practices embedded in static political, economic, and social 
circumstances. Non-European “traditional” institutions, like those in any other society, are dynamic and 
change in response to context; particularly, they have been shaped by experiences of colonialism, 
modernization, and civil wars, so how appropriate is the “traditional” label? We need to be sensitive to 
think about “traditional” practices in a non-ethnocentric way. Despite these challenges, it is difficult to 
determine an alternative, more appropriate term. At times, I use the term “local” to refer to these practices. 
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to the current conflict, and, especially, where many of the perpetrators have been victims 
of abuse themselves. Furthermore, the communal nature of traditional justice mechanisms 
allows for both guilt and victimhood to be seen as collective (Huyse 2008), an idea which 
is reflected in the Acholi culture of northern Uganda. 
Local mechanisms are often equated with restorative justice in academic and 
NGO circles, while international mechanisms are seen as retributive. While local 
mechanisms are often concerned with restoring community relationships, there are also 
retributive elements in many local systems, without which a society may find it difficult 
to maintain public confidence in its social values. While retribution can be an important 
element in local justice, it is often different than the retribution found in a state 
courtroom. For example, judgments may be reached by a group of collaborating leaders, 
after extensive discussion, and the retribution is often linked to other social controls, such 
as compensation and reconciliation (Hovil and Quinn 2005). Retribution is also usually a 
final effort to resolve the conflict, after other methods (such as mediation) fail.   
 
Human Rights and International Criminal Law 
Since the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in the wake of the 
atrocities of World War II, the conception of “human rights” has continued to gain 
traction in international and domestic arenas. As corresponding developments, 
international criminal law and non-state advocacy actors (particularly INGOs) have 
developed to protect the new conception of human rights.   
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Human rights and transitional justice are comfortable bedfellows, with their goals, 
discourses, and institutions overlapping and mutually reinforcing. Transitional justice 
efforts are most often framed and evaluated in terms of their ability to promote and 
protect human rights. Both human rights and transitional justice heavily rely on legal 
discourses to justify and standardize their goals across multiple contexts, and legal 
institutions are often the tools used both by proponents of transitional justice and human 
rights advocates. The rise of international criminal courts or tribunals, such as the ICTY, 
ICTR, and the ICC, represent for many the culmination of both transitional justice and 
human rights efforts in the 20th century. Human rights discourse is used as justification 
for transitional justice, and gave rise to the development of transitional justice 
mechanisms. 
The global emergence of human rights also is intimately related to the rise to 
prominence of INGOs. As relatively recent global actors, INGOs have developed in part 
to support the enforcement of international human rights norms and protect and advocate 
for the human rights of individuals and communities. INGOs have become influential, in 
part because of their effective networking abilities [see Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) 
description of transnational advocacy networks (TANs)] and also because they are often 
seen as moral agents, driven by values (Clark 2001; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Willetts 
1996), which increases their perceived legitimacy. The big INGOs now have influence in 
the U.N. system (Willetts 1996), in helping shape international law (Clark 2001), and in 
holding states accountable to human rights commitments and abuses (Cohen 2001; 
Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998). 
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INGOs have become powerful actors in northern Uganda, both during the war and 
in the post-war period. In many ways, INGOs are more tangibly present in local 
communities than the Ugandan state, with programs addressing education, agricultural 
activities, gender-based violence, reintegration of amnesty recipients, infrastructure 
development, trauma counseling, and everything in between. Many of these programs 
explicitly or implicitly draw upon a human rights framework. Their interventions have 
significant consequences in the lives of residents, not only in terms of the intended results 
of their programs, but also in unintended consequences that shape local social 
relationships, institutions, and organization. 
 Human rights is a global discourse, often perceived as able to transcend variance 
in context and appeal broadly to the human experience. Somers and Roberts (2008) call 
for sociology to take human rights seriously, because “human rights have now become 
the lingua franca of global politics” (390) and human rights discourse is utilized 
extensively and effectively by poor and oppressed people in their struggle for justice 
(Freeman 2002). However, as human rights principles and related transitional justice 
mechanisms gain clout internationally, there is no guarantee that they will be translated 
into local contexts effectively (Merry 2006). Certainly, many critics have argued that 
human rights are essentially Western ideology, that do not account for the variance of 
beliefs, values, and practices of cultures around the world, with some claiming universal 
human rights are a guise for cultural imperialism (see discussion in Freeman 2002). Some 
argue that the overly legal approach of many human rights advocates can actually 
obscure an appreciation for unique ways of dealing with human rights abuses that emerge 
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from various cultural traditions, thus putting distance between human rights advocates in 
the global North and the very people they desire to help (Meyerstein 2007).  
Merry (2006) offered one way forward. She argued that culture (not as 
immutable, but as a historical product of contestation and change) and political dynamics 
must be taken into account, but that the core principles of human rights law (such as 
individualism, autonomy, and equality) must survive the translation or 
“vernacularization” process. My research contributes a nuanced analysis of the process of 
translating the global human rights discourse—as promoted by the ICC—into a local 
discourse about justice and accountability. 
 
Post-Conflict Community Reconciliation 
This section discusses scholarship that is closely linked to transitional justice, but more 
consciously focused on social rebuilding processes in local communities. As transitional 
justice mechanisms are implemented to help deal with past atrocities, how do ordinary 
people begin to live beside one another again? 
Although there is no widely accepted—or empirically validated (Biro et al. 
2004)—definition of “reconciliation,” there are a number of useful conceptualizations. 
Most importantly, that reconciliation is a process, rather than a static state, and that 
reconciliation includes a vision of a collective future. Daly and Sarkin-Hughes (2007) 
argue it is about figuring out a way to effectively deal with the past, which will be 
necessarily tailored to each case, taking into account the nature of the abuses, the 
transition, and the cultural particularities of the post-transition society. Reconciliation 
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uses a forward-looking orientation to deal with the past, in order to promote a new vision 
of life together. Longman et al. (2004) define reconciliation as a process of developing a 
shared vision of the future, establishing social ties, promoting rights, rule of law, and 
tolerance, and adopting non-violent conflict management. 
Reconciliation involves deep processes that promote unity, beyond coexistence or 
cohabitation. Ingelaere (2008) describes a difference between thin and thick 
reconciliation. Whereas thin reconciliation refers to living beside one another out of 
necessity, thick reconciliation refers to interpersonal healing and meaningful social 
connections. Stover and Weinstein (2004) conceptualize “social reconstruction” or 
“reclamation” (as more broad than reconciliation) as a process that incorporates identity, 
culture, memory, and history, and that “reaffirms and develops a society and its 
institutions based on shared values and human rights” (Stover and Weinstein 2004:5). 
Building community after widespread societal violence is a complex social process of 
repair and there are middle stages in this process in which people are living together 
without violence, yet without a deeper peace and stability. 
Two books were particularly useful in developing my thinking about post-conflict 
reconciliation. First, Erin Daly and Jeremy Sarkin-Hughes (2007) urge an analytical 
framework that considers: context (what is unique about Uganda?), multiple levels 
(what’s happening at the interpersonal, community, national, and international levels?), 
process (how has this particular transition occurred?), agents and mechanisms of change 
(who or what brings stability?), conceptual relationships (how are truth, justice, and 
forgiveness related?), and social structure (how do the political and economic systems 
  41 
matter?). A central dynamic, highlighted by Daly and Sarkin-Hughes and which 
motivated my research, is how to transfer the “peace” or fragile coexistence, often 
decided by elites, to the level of actual neighbors who must then live together and form 
community. Daly and Sarkin-Hughes suggest the importance of rituals, indirect 
reconciliation projects (such as building houses), more direct reconciliation efforts, 
dealing with perpetrators, responding to displaced people, demilitarization, reintegration, 
and creating a new history or meta-narrative.  
Second, Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein (2004) edited a volume of 
interdisciplinary studies about post-conflict social reconstruction “from the ground up” in 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, with several particularly relevant findings. First, that 
post-war reconstruction involves a fundamental redefinition of both physical and social 
space. Corkalo et al. (2004) found that, rather than going back to “the way it was before,” 
people formed a new “normal,” with different customs, manners, livelihoods, cultural 
activities, language, social norms, and even different demographic structures to the 
community. Second, that daily social contact matters. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Croatia, Biro et al. (2004) found support for a contact hypothesis, that positive daily 
experiences and friendships with members of opposing groups are associated with 
survivors being ready and willing to reconcile. Finally, social identity formation is an 
essential process. Weinstein and Stover (2004) argue that an analysis of reconciliation 
needs to explore how individual identity is shaped by group processes, creating a sense of 
individual self in context. Identities that unify groups are based on a common view of 
history, a shared memory. In this way, identity and memory are reciprocal, each 
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influencing the other, and an analysis that accounts explicitly for both will go far in 
understanding reconciliation after violent conflict. 
I conceptualized reconciliation as a forward-looking process of social 
reconstruction, with the process being generally “complete” when people exist with a 
sense of community, based on relationships of interdependence that cross social 
boundaries, in an environment where social justice is valued, and conflicts are resolved 
non-violently (Longman et al. 2004). This small area of scholarship made two 
contributions that were essential to my project. One, it emphasizes that the post-war 
reconstruction period is a transition, and there is a fragile and temporary middle stage 
where people live together but do not yet have a deeper sense of community. Second, it 
implicitly points to needed contributions from sociologists, who are equipped with tools 
to help understand processes of identity construction, group interactions, and the 
development of social solidarity. The next section considers these areas. 
 
Unity and Collective Identity 
After opening this chapter with explanations of the development of violence and a 
discussion of how violence can be addressed, I now turn to the contrasting processes of 
bringing people together in a community. Throughout, I am interested in cultural 
dynamics and explanations, taking seriously the task of understanding ways of life in 
post-war communities, including ways of thinking, acting, making meaning, and relating 
to the broader environment. After atrocity, people must engage in redefining the 
foundation of their communal life, and questions of solidarity become essential. What 
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will hold people together and help them develop a sense of belonging? What types of 
boundaries emerge to define the identity of the community? How do group interactions 
contribute to solidarity, and also to tensions? These are questions that sociology has been 
addressing since its inception as a discipline, and can be a real contribution from the 
discipline to the field of transitional justice. My research revealed responses to these 
questions. For example, I found that culture, as rooted in shared traditional practices, 
matters significantly for collective identity. Communal work was also essential in 
building trust and interdependence. I identify new types of boundaries arising in the post-
war context, as newly formed small groups increase belonging, but also exclusion. People 
were also contesting the symbolic boundaries of their community in new ways, through 
disputes over land rights. This section introduces key concepts and theoretical 
frameworks on solidarity, boundaries, group interaction, and collective memory. 
 
The Basis of Solidarity 
Beginning with Durkheim and continuing through contemporary theory (Hartmann and 
Gerteis 2005), the primary distinction in types of social solidarity is between “thick” 
solidarity based on shared substantive values and “thin” solidarity based on shared rules 
or norms. 
Thick, mechanical solidarity is rooted in similarity, shared substantive bonds, 
practices, and commitments. People are held together by moral ties, reinforced by shared 
values and understanding; these states of consciousness are sacred and deeply held. When 
the collective consciousness is injured, there are sanctions in place to re-assert that the 
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collective consciousness still exists (the government, then, becomes the protector of this 
collective consciousness). Durkheim was concerned that mechanical solidarity was 
declining under modernity, but there are also other challenges to collective 
consciousness. A period of mass violence and war is an assault to the collective 
consciousness, as deeply held shared values are violated and communal social practices 
are damaged; this is a key finding of my research, elaborated in Chapter Five. 
Organic solidarity, on the other hand, is based on the interdependencies that arise 
from difference (for Durkheim, from the advanced division of labor). Organic solidarity 
depends upon individual consciousness and specialization. Durkheim argues that, with 
organic solidarity, the individual is not linked directly to society, but depends on society 
because s/he depends on its parts. Respecting the rights of others means that the 
individual may have to limit his or her own, which is only possible in a “spirit of 
understanding and harmony” (Durkheim 2008[1933]:76). With this type of “thin” 
solidarity, conflict and disputes actually contribute to solidarity. Conflicts create 
relationships, increase participation in society, and highlight the need for rules to govern 
social life (Osiel 1997; Simmel 1971). This type of solidarity allows individuals or 
groups to have different values or practices, as long as everyone is committed to 
cooperation and following the same rules and procedures.   
After a society undergoes collective trauma, it is plausible to imagine either type 
(or both types) being the primary basis of solidarity. On one hand, substantive or 
mechanical solidarity seems more likely. States, communities, and other actors pursue 
actions explicitly designed to foster reconciliation and reconstruct a shared vision of the 
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future and sense of collective identity, and any cultivation of difference is often avoided 
(or forbidden, as in post-genocide Rwanda). This is often a goal of reconciliatory or 
restorative justice mechanisms. In this scenario, people are able to move beyond a painful 
past by re-affirming what holds them together at the deepest level. On the other hand, it is 
also conceivable that procedural or organic solidarity would be the primary form that 
emerges after widespread violence and abuse. Efforts to reinstate rule of law and promote 
strong institutions (legal, political, and others) to govern society peacefully are often a 
primary focus in times of transition. Perhaps in these cases, there is an even stronger 
recognition that differences do exist in society and, while it may not be possible or 
desirable to erase such divisions, it is essential to have commonly agreed upon ways to 
govern interactions and resolve disputes. Of course, it is also possible that post-conflict 
societies have both types of solidarity occurring simultaneously. To the best of my 
knowledge, there has not been this type of assessment conducted in post-conflict 
societies. 
 
Defining Boundaries 
In addition to thinking about the basis of cohesion in post-conflict societies, I also 
consider how boundaries define social groups. A primary distinction in this literature is 
between symbolic boundaries and social boundaries (Lamont and Molnar 2002; 
Pachucki, Pendergrass, and Lamont 2007). Symbolic boundaries are conceptual 
distinctions between groups, used to categorize and create a sense of “groupness.” Social 
boundaries, on the other hand, are objectified social differences which lead to 
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discrepancies in who is able to access resources and opportunities. Symbolic boundaries 
may be used to create, enforce, or legitimate social boundaries, they can also be used to 
contest social boundaries, or they may even come to replace social boundaries (Lamont 
and Molnar 2002). 
Boundaries serve to enhance collective identity, but they can create or reinforce 
inequality at the same time (Bourdieu 1984). Symbolic boundaries become very 
important as groups work to define their social identity, in relation to other groups, and 
develop a conception of who “we” are, compared to who “they” are. While some 
elements of this social identity are clearly beneficial, it can be potentially harmful to 
other groups if who “we” are is in some way superior to “them,” and this notion is 
reinforced by the groups’ respective social positions. Additionally, internal boundaries 
may exist in communities that can create symbolic or real divisions between people (for 
examples, see Anderson 1999; Becker 1999; Erikson 1966). 
In the post-conflict context, what types of boundaries are formed? How do the 
boundaries that existed prior to the conflict carry over or become modified in the post-
conflict society? Does drawing boundaries provide a critical function of helping to 
develop a mindset of community? Or does it foster animosity between groups? I found 
there are new boundaries in resettled communities, as small groups now are a location of 
unity that did not exist before the war. I also found new boundaries between generations, 
in their value systems, skill sets, and conceptions of communal life. In a setting where 
violence may be re-ignited by sparks of tension, questions of group boundaries and 
relationships hold real urgency; they played a key role in my analysis. 
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Group Interaction 
Sociologists are centrally concerned with how people interact with one another, 
contributing insights that aid in understanding the post-war context. Many of these 
interactions take place in social groups, which provide a key meso-level of analysis that 
can link individuals into broader social structures, and, reciprocally, help social structures 
influence individuals. Thus, groups are key sites for examining social interactions and 
developing a “local sociology,” in which an analysis of local interactions leads to an 
understanding of interactions and meanings throughout society more broadly (Fine 2012). 
There are several key components to social groups: collective identity, shared 
history and culture, common spaces, and ongoing social relationships (Fine 2012). The 
village fieldsites in this study constitute large social groups in that they have common 
experiences and occupy one particular physical space. As I show in the following 
chapters, their sense of collective identity, their culture, and their social interactions have 
been in a state of flux in the post-war period. Despite this, I argue that rural villages still 
represent a social group, albeit one that is in the process of redefinition and sometimes in 
crisis. Additionally, there are smaller groups in each community, such as members of 
churches, participants in farming projects, associations of business owners, members of 
savings and credit groups, and so on.  
Groups are key to the development of individuals as social beings. Through group 
membership, individuals foster an identity beyond “me,” instead incorporating “we,” the 
collective identity of the group (Burke and Stets 2009). Individuals continually engage in 
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a process of comparing themselves to the others in their social group, and as they develop 
a willingness and desire to embrace the culture and commitments of the group, they begin 
to create a social identity in reference to their group membership (Hogg et al. 2004; Riley 
and Burke 1995). Groups also are a primary source of social capital for members, as the 
community of the group provides resources to help people achieve their goals and also 
provides a sense of attachment, fulfillment, and satisfaction (Brint 2001; Chaves 2009; 
Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2009; Lim and Putnam 2010; Putnam 2001). 
Many of the processes discussed in the dissertation—creating group solidarity, 
defining social boundaries, constructing collective memory, post-conflict 
reconciliation—are based on the mobilization of culture in everyday interactions. Groups 
are a key mechanism in this process, as groups are not content-free forms (Fine 2012), 
but rather operate with a shared group culture and style (Eliasoph and Lichterman 2003; 
Ignatow 2004) that creates boundaries of who is in and who is out of the group. Groups 
operate in the context of their collective histories and develop meanings and expectations 
based on members’ shared experiences and ways of understanding the world (Fine 2010; 
Mechling 2004). The knowledge and histories shared by group members shapes their 
interactions, which in turn contribute to the continually evolving construction of group 
knowledge and history. 
Eliasoph and Lichterman (2003) provide a useful framework to think about what 
is shared by group members. First, members of a group make sense of their world using 
collective representations, which are Durkheim’s concept of symbols that are based in the 
shared history and collective experiences of the group; through collective representations, 
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the group creates meanings that are shared by members. Second, groups develop a 
particular style, or tangible patterns of interactions that are acceptable to the group; 
Eliasoph and Lichterman (2003) argue that group style filters collective representations. 
Group style does not come from individual actors, but is a property of specific social 
settings and varies according to context. Group style is comprised of boundaries that 
provide a sense of identity and set it apart from other groups, bonds that form the basis of 
cohesion and establish obligations between members, and norms for members’ speech 
and actions. The cultural symbols used to make meaning in society more broadly—the 
collective representations—are interpreted in the context of the particular group style. It 
is through the boundaries, bonds, and norms that are unique to each group that “the same 
widely shared symbols, stories, vocabularies, or codes make different meanings in 
different settings” (Eliasoph and Lichterman 2003:782). This conceptualization helped 
me to make sense of the variance in the rebuilding trajectories in three different villages. 
 
Collective Memory 
Collective memory is a shared and mutually recognized knowledge of the past that is 
reinforced by a social group, whether a micro, community level group, national, or global 
community (Savelsberg and King 2007). Collective memory is made up of the “stories a 
society tells about momentous events in its history” (Osiel 1997:18). Collective memory 
provides a conceptual link between law, culture and social solidarity, and collective 
trauma, each discussed below. 
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 First, law and collective memory are reciprocally related (Savelsberg and King 
2007). Law is able to powerfully create and transform collective memory. One way this is 
done directly is through transitional justice mechanisms discussed earlier, particularly 
through trials, as legal prosecutions act as dramatic stages for moral storytelling and 
public dialogue (Osiel 1997), or truth commissions, as the “truth” is sought in order to 
construct an official narrative of collective history (Savelsberg and King 2007). On the 
other hand, collective memories also shape the law. Savelsberg and King (2007) explain 
how this can occur through: 1) analogical narratives that interpret current social problems 
in light of past trauma, which then shapes legal institutions or action; 2) consciousness of 
historical events, using law as a tool to deal with the past; and 3) social actors—carriers 
of memory—who evoke collective memory to create discourse and legal change. 
 Second, constructing collective memory is a cultural and relational process that 
can contribute to social solidarity. Collective memory is actively produced in the present, 
for present purposes, in a way that fits together in a particular social structure or group, 
such as the family or religious system (Halbwachs 1992). Collective memories are 
dynamic in interaction with the surrounding context, changing or being reproduced 
because of their instrumental value to actors, their ability to fit into the culture, and the 
support (or lack of support) they receive from institutions (Olick 2007). The particular 
collective memory that is constructed leads then to the development of common values, 
or collective consciousness, which in turn shapes the form of social solidarity (Osiel 
1997, 2009). 
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 Third, although collective memory is a component of all social groups, it fills a 
unique role for groups that have experienced a collective trauma. Memory can fuel 
ongoing cycles of hatred when victims long for revenge, but is also essential to integrity 
and bearing witness to injustice (Rosenblum 2002). Because collective memory is created 
and fluid, post-trauma situations require a heightened awareness of its construction 
process, in order to strike a sensitive balance between too much remembering and too 
much forgetting. Longman and Rutagengwa’s (2004) analysis of how the government-
prescribed narrative of history, genocide, and reconciliation in Rwanda is repeated by 
survivors, but also is contested in the popular narrative, illustrating “the limits of a 
government’s ability to shape the collective memory of its citizenry” (168). Martha 
Minow (1998) articulates the complexities of constructing a collective memory in a way 
that makes sense of a traumatic past, integrating it into a more hopeful picture of the 
future: 
What’s needed, then is not memory but remembering, not retrieval of some intact 
picture but instead a dynamic process of both tying together and distinguishing 
fragments of past and present. What’s needed, paradoxically, is a process for 
reinterpreting what cannot be made sensible, for assembling what cannot be put 
together, and for separating what cannot be severed from both present and future. 
(Minow 1998:120) 
 
In the communities where I conducted research, residents were actively engaged 
in the construction of collective memory about the past violence. Through annual 
memorial services on anniversaries of massacre events, documentation projects through 
NGOs, and work with the national museum to develop memorial sites, community 
residents participate in projects to explicitly create particular versions of history. In their 
daily lives, they also do more indirect memory work, through the narratives they tell 
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about the past, which, as I show in Chapter Seven, differ considerably from the dominant 
global narrative of the conflict in Uganda. Finally, as analysis in Chapter Five reveals, 
there is a generational disconnect in memories of “normal” life before war and 
displacement, which has problematic implications for post-war unity and trust. 
 
This project integrates insights from sociology about the formation of unity and collective 
identity into the fields of transitional justice and post-conflict reconciliation, which are 
rarely approached from a sociological perspective. These contributions allow me to parse 
the basis of solidarity in post-war communities, analyze the construction of boundaries 
that both divide and unite, and make sense of group formation and interactions.   
 
Conceptual Model and Research Objectives 
Stages of a Transition 
Figure 2.1 presents my model of a post-war transition. I conceptualize three stages in a 
transition: violence and instability, then fragile coexistence, and finally a reconstructed 
post-war society, while recognizing that these stages are likely to blend into one another 
and are not likely to occur linearly. In this model, coexistence is a fragile or precarious 
temporary middle stage,5 initiated by a tangible marker such as a ceasefire or widespread 
resettlement, from which the society may again devolve into renewed violence or 
instability. The positive alternative is for processes of social reconstruction to facilitate 
                                                 
5 In some ways, coexistence may be seen as an end goal, in which people live together with tolerance, 
accepting differences between them. In this case, however, I am using coexistence to describe a middle 
stage, en route to a more substantive solidarity and cohesion. The key distinction here is that the middle 
stage is characterized by instability. People are living beside one another, but not with a deep tolerance and 
acceptance; instead, social relationships are fragile and precarious. 
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the transition from fragile coexistence to a stable reconstructed community. I have argued 
that much of northern Uganda is currently in the middle stage, making it particularly 
important to understand its future trajectory.  
Figure 2.1. Model of Post-War Social Reconstruction 
 
 
To operationalize social stability, I relied on measures developed by Longman, 
Pham, and Weinstein (2004:207) to analyze reconciliation6 eight years after genocide in 
Rwanda. As described in greater detail in Chapter Four, I structured my interviews with 
community residents and leaders to measure these four characteristics: 
Community Do individuals, social groups, and institutions “develop a 
shared vision and sense of collective future”? 
Interdependence  Do individuals, social groups, and institutions “establish 
mutual ties and obligations across lines of social 
demarcation”? 
Social Justice  Do individuals, social groups, and institutions “accept and 
actively promote individual rights, rule of law, tolerance of 
social diversity, and equality of opportunity”? 
Non-Violence  Do individuals, social groups, and institutions “adopt non-
violent alternatives to conflict management”?  
 
These four characteristics conceptualize the endpoint of the process; in a “reconstructed” 
stable society, I expect to find a sense of community, interdependence, social justice, and 
                                                 
6 Although I used the broader term “reconstruction,” many authors use the term “reconciliation.” 
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non-violence. Where Longman, Pham, and Weinstein used close-ended survey questions 
to assess if these characteristics were present among residents in the villages they studied, 
I developed open-ended questions that allow analysis of the process, exploring how these 
elements of reconciliation develop, if at all. (See Appendix C for the complete interview 
guide.)  
My research addressed how communities move from instability to stability. The 
process of bringing people back together after conflict begins with fragile coexistence, 
progressing through stages of rebuilding the structures or rules necessary to live together 
and then to substantive reconstruction. Such a progression may include being polite to 
neighbors, reconstructing economic relationships, working together, developing local 
democratic structures, dissolving negative stereotypes, forming friendships, building a 
conception of “we,” re-valuing cultural norms, developing trust and empathy, and, 
finally, re-constructing a coherent community narrative with a shared vision for the 
future. These are among the indicators I used to track the reconstruction process.  
The process of moving from instability and fragility to stability and solidarity can 
be facilitated—or hindered—by two unique but interrelated processes: transitional justice 
initiatives and daily social interactions. First, the process of transitional justice and 
reconciliation is facilitated by formal mechanisms explicitly designed to help societies 
transition from past abuse to future peace. Formal reconciliation mechanisms in Uganda 
include the ICC prosecutions, the amnesty extended since 2000 to members of combatant 
groups, memorialization programs, and traditional rituals or ceremonies designed to 
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address wrongs committed. The people of northern Uganda have had varied levels of 
exposure to and types of experiences with each of these mechanisms.  
Second, daily social interactions among ordinary people in local communities can 
bring a region closer to stability or can exacerbate tensions. Daily interactions involve 
complex negotiations of relationships, which ideally can lead to a sense of unity and 
collective identity. This element of the transitional process is primarily facilitated by 
informal mechanisms or strategies. Informal mechanisms include the ways that people 
navigate their everyday lives, such as the attitude they take in interacting with neighbors, 
how they reestablish homesteads and agricultural lands, to what degree they participate in 
schools or churches, what value they ascribe to social gatherings, what subjects of 
conversation are common or off-limits, and so on. These strategies may be stated or 
unstated, but are not officially prescribed or enforced. My project identified and analyzed 
these informal mechanisms. 
In addition to these formal and informal mechanisms, I also analyzed how other 
key elements of social context matter. For example, land ownership structures 
contributed to widespread negotiations and disputes, which significantly impacted unity. 
Demographic shifts were also important, particularly generational changes in leadership 
structures and socialization of youth. The structure of the local economy was another 
factor, as relationships between neighbors were affected by changes in the markets for 
agricultural products, the environment for small business development, and so on.  
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Research Objectives 
Fragile coexistence, brought about by a ceasefire or resettlement, may be a first step 
toward rebuilding, but it is a temporary stage, not an endpoint. Anger and fear from 
historic abuses may trigger new outbursts of violence, or, on the other hand, living beside 
one another may lead to processes of social reconstruction and stability. A variety of 
formal mechanisms, including trials, amnesty, and ceremonies, facilitate the 
reconciliation process. While there is a rich body of research about the strengths and 
weaknesses of formal mechanisms, what is less often studied is how these mechanisms 
actually translate into the everyday experiences of conflict survivors. Furthermore, 
alongside formal mechanisms, informal mechanisms facilitate processes of building 
social solidarity and collective identity. If formal transitional justice mechanisms are not 
combined with or followed by the more informal processes of social reconstruction, a 
community may not make the transition into the more stable stage of social 
reconstruction. Therefore, informal mechanisms, and how they interact with the formal 
mechanisms, were a primary focus of my project. 
The overarching question motivating my research was: How is peace possible 
after war? I analyzed northern Uganda as a case study to explore the lived experiences of 
individuals working to construct stable communities after violent conflict. Through 
pursuing three interrelated areas of research, described below, my objective was to 
further specify the model of post-war social reconstruction introduced in this chapter. 
First, I investigated if and how everyday strategies that community members 
develop in order to coexist also contribute to deeper reconciliation, social solidarity, and 
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collective identity. I analyzed the local-level social changes brought about by the war, 
and their impact on social interactions. I identified what informal mechanisms in resettled 
communities have the capacity to further the transitional process and contribute to social 
stability. I asked what types of solidarity are emerging in local communities, how 
boundaries are drawn between residents, and what types of interactions are present within 
and between groups. Chapter Five specifies causal mechanisms through which the 
experience of war and displacement impact unity. 
Second, I identified potential barriers to stability that can also emerge from daily 
interactions and the local social context. Additionally, I advanced a micro-level analysis 
of the development of conflict and violence, which is a needed contribution to the more 
macro-focused analyses dominating much of the literature. In the face of such barriers, I 
questioned whether and how the reconstruction process can continue, and addressed the 
possibility of deteriorating into renewed animosity or violent conflict. I discussed the 
particular legal context and the challenges to its effective utilization as a tool to help 
address barriers and resolve conflicts. Chapter Six addresses land conflict, a primary 
barrier to the reconstruction process. 
Third, I determined what role, if any, formal justice and reconciliation 
mechanisms play in survivors’ everyday lives. I also asked how informal and formal 
mechanisms interact to either further or hinder social reconstruction. In this, I advanced 
the literature on transitional justice, which is the primary arena in which scholars engage 
questions directly relevant to post-conflict societies. My focus was on the salience and 
translation of transitional justice and human rights discourses, and on the impact of 
  58 
transitional justice and human rights actors, particularly INGOs. Chapter Seven focuses 
on the role of the ICC in local communities. 
My project analyzed post-conflict reconstruction as an everyday process of 
building relationships in resettled villages. I argued that analysis must include how 
survivors of war and mass violence experience formal reconciliation mechanisms and 
must also account for the informal strategies that emerge from everyday interaction when 
displaced people return home. My research broadens understanding of how solidarity and 
collective identity is reconstructed after people experience severe and widespread trauma, 
by integrating theoretical insights from sociology with interdisciplinary and often 
practitioner-oriented scholarship on post-conflict community building. Halpern and 
Weinstein (2004) argue that researchers need to pay attention to everyday interactions in 
order to understand post-war social reconstruction:  
Most work on social reconstruction in post-war societies focuses on the rule of 
law, state-building, community development, and conflict resolution. Further, the 
study of collective memory, state myths and symbols, and conceptions of social 
identity offer important theoretical conceptions of the factors that contribute to the 
break-up of states and suggest issues that must be attended to in order to restore 
social stability in a post-war society. However, we would argue that social 
reconstruction must also attend to interactions between neighbors and friends; 
since interethnic violence is frequently intimate and relational, repair also must 
function on that level. Beyond the literature on forgiveness, psychosocial 
treatment and community development, few authors have addressed the critical 
dimension of what must happen between people to lead to genuine 
rehumanization. (Halpern and Weinstein 2004:305) 
  
Combining this focus on community-level interactions with the literature discussed in 
this review results in a promising approach that has significant traction in analyzing 
northern Uganda, as well as relevance for other post-war societies. 
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Chapter Three 
Conflict and Resettlement in Northern Uganda 
 
Alunya loyo lakwong. 
The follower is more severe than the first. 
 
In this chapter, I provide an overview of the historical context of the war and 
displacement in northern Uganda, considering the root conditions that contributed to 
conflict. Additionally, I discuss the impact of the war on individuals, utilizing population-
based surveys, and describe the current situation in the region. Finally, I introduce each 
of the three specific communities where I conducted research, offering a preliminary 
discussion of their compositions, histories, residents, and lifestyles. 
 
Historical Context: War and Displacement7  
Since 1986, the people of northern Uganda have endured war between rebel forces, now 
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony, and the government’s Uganda 
Peoples’ Defense Force (UPDF).  Much of the sustained conflict occurred in the north 
central region of the country, the land of the Acholi people. Over 1.9 million people were 
displaced as a result of the war (Human Rights Watch 2005:2). An estimated 54,000 to 
75,000 people, primarily children and youth, were abducted, forced into labor, combat, or 
sexual slavery (Pham and Vinck 2010:22). Although exact figures are not available, an 
estimated 100,000 people died in the region as a result of the violence (United Nations 
Security Council 2006). The LRA has been known for its extreme brutality in waging 
                                                 
7 I discuss a brief history of war in northern Uganda, for a more nuanced analysis, see Finnström (2008), 
Allen (2006), or Rodriguez Soto (2009). 
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war against the people of northern Uganda; despite this, the conflict received relatively 
little international attention for most of its duration. 
 Understanding the contemporary situation in northern Uganda requires knowledge 
of the historical development of violence over at least the past 50 years. The ethnic or 
regional tensions that resulted in the contemporary LRA conflict were created by colonial 
era practices and by the ensuing string of post-independence regimes and civil wars, 
resulting in present-day divisions that undergird the war in the North. Beyond this, there 
are varied motivations driving the LRA, including spiritual rationales and inspirations, 
protestation of the current government, frustration over past abuses, and the perceived 
cooperation of Acholi civilian communities with Museveni’s government. Attributing 
accountability for harms that occurred during the war is also extremely complex because 
of the nature of the abuses: many of the LRA combatants are formerly abducted children, 
resulting in a blurry line between victim and perpetrator.  
 In this section I sketch with broad strokes the history of violence in northern 
Uganda, often as recounted by local residents. Much of this material complicates the 
often simplified and de-politicized version of a conflict between an irrational and violent 
rebel group and a government trying to protect the civilian population. Rather, when I 
talked to people about history of “the war,” they had a much more complex picture of the 
violence they have experienced. The overarching point most frequently emphasized to me 
was that people have actually undergone a longer period of suffering than most historical 
accounts allow (there was not one clearly defined “war”), with many different, 
interrelated instances of violence and victimization. A leader in one community where I 
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conducted research had been working to write his own history of the community, because 
he said the elders were upset by the “shallow” accounts presented in a recent NGO 
documentation project, arguing that such historical accounts do not reflect the real 
suffering of people. Understanding these historical experiences is essential to make sense 
of how people situate their contemporary lives in a longer historical narrative of 
suffering. 
 In this section, I privilege local accounts of the violence and war. In some ways, 
this differs from other external accounts of the war, namely in the degree of blame placed 
on the Government and in seeing some root (though perhaps long-ago lost) justification 
for the LRA’s emergence and actions. I recount this local telling of history because 
residents’ view of history is what colors their present day interactions. Taking seriously 
local collective memory of violence as a series of multiple victimizations at the hands of 
multiple perpetrators helps develop an understanding of how people approach the 
transitional process and justice mechanisms like the ICC. 
 
Early Years of the War: Domestic Battles 
People described violence beginning in 1971 in the area where I conducted research. Idi 
Amin overthrew President Milton Obote and began a systematic purge of Obote’s 
supporters. This period, I was told by older community members, was when 
“disorganization” began in their communities, as disappearances and political murders 
were common. In 1979, with the help of the Tanzanian army, Amin was overthrown and 
his army fled north to Sudan, using the Gulu-Patiko Road, which is the main road that 
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goes through two of the fieldsites. At this time, the area became quite dangerous and the 
population living along the roadsides fled inland. 
 Beginning in 1980, there was a war in the central region of the country (the 
Luwero Triangle) between a rebel group led by Yoweri Museveni and the government 
forces. In 1986, Uganda’s then president Tito Okello was overthrown militarily by 
Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA).8 Okello was from the northern Acholi 
ethnic group and his military was also primarily Acholi, so the Acholi people feared 
retribution when Museveni seized power. Okello’s forces fled to Sudan, on the same 
route Amin’s army had followed, again leaving civilian deaths in their wake. The NRA 
occupied the north, punishing the Acholi people collectively for the brutality of the 
Luwero war. People recounted to me how Museveni’s forces came and demolished 
everything, burning homes, poisoning crops, and committing atrocities in the name of 
revenge.  
In Sudan, Okello’s soldiers and new recruits regrouped and formed the Uganda 
People’s Democratic Army (UPDA), known locally as Cilil, meaning “go and report our 
presence.” As they fought to overthrown Museveni’s government, they also looted 
property, killed people accused of collaborating with the government, and forcefully 
recruited youth into their ranks. While they still did benefit from popular support, they 
met limited military success, and eventually signed a peace accord in 1988. People told 
me how, during this era, there were abuses committed against civilians by both sides, and 
                                                 
8 Museveni’s own book, Sowing the Mustard Seed, presents a detailed account of the political history 
leading up to this event (Museveni 1997). 
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people actually had a hard time differentiating which group was harming them, so they 
began to fear all soldiers and adopt a mentality of running away from anyone. 
This fear fed into popular insurgencies. Alice Lakwena, claiming to have received 
spiritual power, formed the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) to unite those opposing 
Museveni’s LRA (Behrend 1999). While people still talk of the strong spiritual power of 
this movement, they struggled militarily, believing in spiritual protection during warfare. 
Alice was from the area where I conducted research, and nearly every day I traveled past 
the land where she is now buried. Joseph Kony succeeded Alice in 1987 as the leader of a 
new movement. Kony similarly claimed spiritual power, and some people told me that 
his movement was originally a group devoted to prayer and spirituality. I talked with 
people who were part of this original prayer movement. They told me that Museveni 
thought Kony’s group was a rebel movement, so they began chasing them. People joined 
Kony, but were increasingly afraid. As they struggled with starvation, they resorted to 
stealing food, which increased fear of their group. Kony arranged peace talks at the home 
of a local resident, but Museveni’s troops ambushed the gathering; this finally turned 
Kony to military action. People supported the rebel movement, now called the Lord’s 
Resistance Army, because they were so fearful of the violence committed by the 
government soldiers.  
The guerilla rebel group received at least passive support from the Acholi people 
because its primary tactic was to expose the new government’s weakness and inability (or 
unwillingness) to protect or provide for the people in the North. Unfortunately, the way 
the LRA often revealed the government’s weakness was to attack civilians and they 
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adopted increasingly violent tactics. Some people told me that the government troops 
would also commit atrocities, masquerading as rebels, to sway public opinion against the 
LRA. In 1991, there was a failed military operation in which the government armed the 
civilian population, which served to further anger and radicalize Kony. At this point, the 
general population began to distrust both the government and the LRA. In the mid-1990s, 
the government created and armed Local Defense Units (LDUs) to protect against Kony. 
Throughout the 1990s there were several peace process initiatives, some more promising 
than others, but all were ultimately undermined because of mistrust and strained 
relationships, such as ultimatums given by the government or allegations that the LRA 
was cooperating with Sudan (Rodriguez Soto 2009).  
 This longer history of the war is often over-simplified or omitted by the news 
media, NGOs, activists, or policymakers. A more complex historical narrative, however, 
provides greater context and introduces nuance in the origin story of the LRA war, which 
is often discussed without the perspective provided by these earlier events. Research 
participants, however, describe this period vividly and contribute unique insights and 
details, some of which have become deeply embedded in their collective memory of the 
war. Of course, it is important to bear in mind the constructed nature of collective 
memory and to recognize that it develops particularities that fit the time, place, and 
purposes of its creation. 
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Later Years: Transnational Conflict and International Attention 
The international dimension of the conflict continued to increase in the late 1990s. The 
LRA developed bases in Sudan, with the knowledge of—and allegedly support from—
the Sudanese government (this was perhaps in response to the supposed support from the 
Ugandan government to the Sudanese rebel group, the SPLA). As the LRA perceived the 
civilian population was cooperating with the Ugandan government, mutilations and 
abductions increased. With their ranks by then swollen with abducted children and youth, 
any government offensive against the LRA was increasingly seen as attacking victims. In 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, the Sudanese government began to back off, the 
border tensions eased somewhat, and each official government began decreasing proxy 
support to the other’s rebel force. Some resettlement began. 
 In 2002, with Ugandan soldiers returning from the Second Congolese War, 
Museveni (whose army was by then called the Ugandan People’s Defense Force [UPDF]) 
went on the offensive against the LRA with Operation Iron Fist. This again intensified 
LRA attacks in Uganda, this time spreading out past Acholi areas into other districts in 
the eastern part of the country. International attention to the conflict increased in 2003 
with the involvement of the newly created International Criminal Court (ICC), which 
may have slowed LRA activity somewhat. In 2005, the LRA headed into the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. By July 2006, peace talks commenced in Juba, mediated by 
Southern Sudan, resulting in a ceasefire declared in September. In 2007, displaced people 
began to transfer from IDP camps into “transit camps” and then to transition back to their 
villages.  
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The peace talks hit rough patches as the LRA demanded amnesty from ICC 
prosecutions, but resumed again with UN support in May 2007. In November of that 
year, the LRA even sent delegates to Kampala and expressed a commitment to 
establishing peace. LRA leaders, however, became increasingly reluctant to continue 
negotiations while facing the prospect of criminal prosecution in an international court. 
The Government of Uganda promised to pursue revocation of the ICC indictments after 
reaching a comprehensive peace agreement, but the LRA demanded stronger assurances. 
In June 2008, reports surfaced of the LRA obtaining weapons and soldiers. Uganda, 
Southern Sudan, and Congo agreed to band together and attack LRA bases in the Congo 
in December 2008, which again resulted in LRA reprisals. Not surprisingly, peace 
negotiations, at this point, were hampered. At the beginning of 2009, another military 
offensive (now U.S.-backed), Operation Lightning Thunder, against the LRA in the 
Congo again resulted in brutal reprisals against Congolese civilians.  
 
Characteristics of the Conflict 
A defining element of the war in northern Uganda was the use of the bodies of civilians 
as the battleground of the conflict. As international attention to the situation grew, news 
sources and NGOs published articles and reports with graphic pictures showing men, 
women, and children with lips, noses, arms, and legs chopped off. Mutilations were 
widespread. The LRA became infamous for its extreme brutality against residents of the 
region, as a key LRA tactic was to attack civilians to reveal the Museveni government’s 
inability or unwillingness to protect the Acholi people. 
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Another key characteristic of this conflict is that human rights abuses against 
civilians were perpetrated by both sides. The LRA has often been vilified by international 
media, policy makers, NGOs, and publics to such an extent that the war appears as a 
rebellion by a vicious and senseless rogue militia (with most of the blame placed on one 
man, Kony), with the Government of Uganda trying their best to protect people from the 
rebel group. However, while the LRA has certainly been guilty of egregious violations of 
human rights, this war was not one-sided. Government troops, the UPDF, also committed 
atrocities, including indiscriminate killings, rapes, beatings, and torture (Human Rights 
Watch 2005). Research participants were quick to point this out, in addition to their 
suffering at the hand of the LRA. 
 Massive displacement of the population began around 1996 in Gulu District; by 
2002, virtually all the rural population in Gulu, and surrounding areas of Lango and Teso, 
were displaced. Some argue that the displacement of the population was itself a violation 
of human rights perpetrated by the Government. Rather than a humanitarian necessity to 
protect the lives of residents or a voluntary movement of people seeking safety, the 
displacement was a forced, deliberate strategy of war, with some research respondents 
also perceiving it as a strategy for the government to take their land. With the rural areas 
emptied, the government would be able to more easily identify rebel combatants, and, 
thus, anyone who resisted leaving their land was labeled a collaborator and treated as 
such. The displacement was also designed to reduce the contact that abductees were able 
to maintain with their family members and to remove the livelihood support for the LRA, 
as they depended on food, water, and other supplies from rural homesteads. Residents 
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were not allowed to move outside of a carefully controlled area around the camps, under 
threat of violence from the Ugandan military (Nibbe 2012).  
Additionally, rather than being places of protection, the “protected camps” were 
generally uncoordinated and lacked many basic amenities. The situation deteriorated over 
time, eventually resulting in a severe humanitarian emergency, in which more people 
died from the poor conditions in the camps (IRINnews 2005) than did from violent 
altercations with military forces. Security was also a major problem in camps, as UPDF 
troops perpetrated violence against residents, and also did not, in many cases, actually 
fulfill the role of “protector.” Military barracks were located in the center of camps, with 
civilians’ homes surrounding them (Nibbe 2012; OCHA 2004); in one of my fieldsites, 
when the camp was under attack by the LRA, the government soldiers fled, resulting in a 
massacre of over 70 people (Justice and Reconciliation Project 2011). Respondents 
described the period from 2000 to 2006 as extremely dangerous; in the areas where I 
conducted research, it generally was not possible to travel on the roads between villages 
during this time. 
 
Resettlement in Northern Uganda  
As discussed above, in the mid-2000s, the ICC arrest warrants, peace negotiations, and 
military offensives all contributed to pushing the LRA from northern Uganda. Around 
2007, the first IDP camps began to close and some people started moving to smaller 
“transit camps” or “resettlement sites” closer to their original homelands. In the following 
years, people slowly began returning to their land. For most, this first involved staying in 
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the camps and commuting to their land to begin planting crops and rebuilding homes, 
then eventually moving back to their land. People told me that they returned home to find 
nothing, except for landmines and skeletons. In the area of Gulu District where I 
conducted research, many people finally moved back home in 2009 or 2010. As the map 
below illustrates, by 2009, about half of the displaced population in the Acholi region 
(which includes Gulu District) had returned to their home communities, while half 
remained displaced. By 2011, some people still were not back home yet, particularly 
people without the means to rebuild original homesteads, such as elderly people or 
physically disabled people. By the beginning of 2012, most of the population had 
returned and the UNHCR closed its Gulu office (UNHCR 2012). At the time of my 
research in 2011, resettlement was still a very recent (or even on-going) experience. 
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Figure 3.1. Resettlement in Northern Uganda (2009) 
 
 In the past 15 years or so, there has been a massive influx of INGOs to the region. 
In contrast to the early years of the conflict, when the situation in northern Uganda was 
not on the radar of much of the international community, later years of the conflict saw a 
rush of international organizations into the area. When people were forced into the camps 
beginning in the late 1990s, the population became dependent on humanitarian food aid 
from the World Food Programme (WFP) and other relief agencies. In the post-conflict 
period, even more organizations flooded into the region with missions to help rebuild 
communities. There were organizations focused on physical rebuilding of infrastructure 
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(schools, health centres, roads), individual psychosocial support (trauma counseling), 
reintegration of returnees, agricultural development (providing seeds and farming tools), 
and human rights programs (often, focused in gender-based violence and children’s 
rights). Many of these programs were relatively short-lived, and by the time I was 
conducting research in 2011 and 2012, a significant subset of these organizations had 
closed their programs in northern Uganda and shifted their attention elsewhere. The 
government also launched the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern 
Uganda (PRDP) in 2008 (Republic of Uganda 2007). The PRDF is a framework to 
coordinate government programs and NGO activities towards the goals of consolidating 
state authority, rebuilding communities, revitalizing the regional economy, and 
promoting reconciliation (Beyond Juba 2008). 
International and national actors have taken formal steps to facilitate justice and 
reconciliation, resulting in a unique combination of international, national, and local 
transitional justice mechanisms. As mentioned above, the International Criminal Court 
issued arrest warrants for top LRA commanders, though all the indicted remain at large. 
There have also been recent attempts to bring some other top commanders before the 
national war crimes court. The government of Uganda has extended amnesty to 
combatants, in exchange for giving up arms and returning to their homes. There have also 
been significant efforts, promoted by INGOs and local cultural and religious leaders, to 
use ceremonies and rituals based in cultural traditions of the region to facilitate 
reconciliation, cleansing, and reintegration of ex-combatants back into communities. 
NGOs have also developed memorialization initiatives, such as museums or memorial 
  72 
sites, memorial prayer days, and documentation projects. Some of these transitional 
justice mechanisms are discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters. 
 People in northern Uganda have returned to their homes and turned their attention 
to transitional justice and rebuilding, but the LRA continues to operate in neighboring 
countries. Since leaving Uganda, LRA activity has been focused along the border region 
of Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and Central African Republic, 
contributing to ongoing long-term instability in the region. Figure 3.2 shows the location 
of LRA attacks in 2011 and the first months of 2012.9 
Figure 3.2. LRA Attacks (2011-2012) 
 
                                                 
9 This is a cropped version of a map created by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, accessed 6 December 2012 at http://reliefweb.int/map/democratic-republic-congo/lra-regional-
update-central-african-republic-dr-congo-and-south-sudan.  
CENTRAL 
AFRICAN REPUBLIC 
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In 2010, President Obama signed the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda 
Recovery Act,10 which called for aggressive and strategic U.S. support to apprehend the 
LRA, though it did not result in immediate action. In early 2012, international interest in 
apprehending Kony and bringing him before the ICC was revitalized with the internet 
video sensation “Kony 2012” released by Invisible Children,11 the deployment of 100 
U.S. forces to Uganda (BBC News 2011), and the creation of an African Union force of 
5,000 troops on a mission to capture Kony (Kron 2012). As of the time of writing, these 
efforts have not resulted in locating Kony or stopping LRA activities. Because of this, 
many people in northern Uganda told me that they did not actually see the conflict as 
finished. Rather, they explained that historically there have always been cycles of 
instability and violence with periods of relative calm. Until Kony and the LRA are no 
longer fighting anywhere, many people in northern Uganda do not feel confident that the 
peace they are now experiencing will be long-lasting. 
Until one or two years before my data collection, people were still in a period of 
flux and physical transition. Only recently had the majority of residents returned to their 
homes, which meant that relationships, interactions, and community organization were 
still being renegotiated on a daily basis. Additionally, conducting research in the 
immediate post-war period meant that NGOs, government agencies, and transitional 
justice initiatives were extremely active in the region. The timing of the resettlement in 
                                                 
10 Full-text of S.1067 is available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-1067.  
11 Receiving well over a million views within a few days, the 30 minute “Kony 2012” video quickly 
sparked a heated debate about Invisible Children as an organization, the mobilization strategies they use, 
their engagement with Ugandan actors, and so on (Golden 2012). The primary strategy advocated in the 
video is the use of military force to apprehend Kony and bring him before the ICC. 
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northern Uganda provided a case in which I could explore both informal interactions and 
formal reconstruction efforts. 
 
The Impact of War and Displacement  
In 2005, 2007, and 2010, the Human Rights Center at the University of California, 
Berkeley, spearheaded population-based surveys in northern Uganda. In 2005, the survey 
explored exposure to violence and attitudes about peace and justice in four districts (two 
Acholi and two non-Acholi) while the conflict was still on-going (Pham et al. 2005). In 
2007, the study expanded to include eight districts (four Acholi and four non-Acholi), 
and surveyed residents in villages, towns, camps, and resettlement sites during the 
transition to peace (Pham et al. 2007). Finally, in 2010, the study focused on attitudes 
about justice and reconstruction in four Acholi districts (Pham and Vinck 2010). Each 
survey was representative of the adult population in the selected districts, and included 
2,585, 2,875, and 2,498 respondents, respectively. Results from these surveys, 
highlighted below, illustrate the impact of the war and displacement. 
 The surveys found extraordinarily high levels of exposure to violence. According 
to the 2007 survey, in Acholi districts, 85 percent of respondents had a family member 
killed in the conflict. In 2005, in Gulu District specifically, over half (53 percent) of 
respondents reported being abducted by the LRA and 47 percent reported witnessing a 
family member being killed. Respondents also reported abuses specifically by the UPDF: 
in Acholi districts, 8 percent reported being beaten and 4 percent reported a family 
member killed by the UPDF. In 2010, 68 percent of respondents said that they had been 
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threatened with death during the conflict. In Gulu District in 2005, 10 percent of 
respondents reported being sexually violated. These rates are among the highest levels of 
exposure to violence ever formally reported in a population (Pham et al. 2005). Overall, 
95 percent of respondents in 2007 self-identified as victims.  
 In the Acholi sub-region, 94 percent of respondents were displaced during the 
conflict (Pham et al. 2007). Of those living in an IDP camp at the time of the 2007 
survey, only 38 percent said their quality of life in the camp was good. The war and 
displacement also resulted in destruction of the physical environment and residents’ loss 
of their livelihoods. Respondents in Acholi districts in 2007 overwhelmingly reported 
that they had lost income (87 percent), their homes (93 percent), and productive assets 
(91 percent) because of the war. By the time of the 2010 survey, most respondents were 
in their home communities, and about 90 percent of respondents felt safe sleeping at 
night, going to work, and collecting water and firewood. Their biggest priorities in 2010 
revolved around provision of basic needs, including food, agriculture, land, education, 
and healthcare. In 2010, just 44 percent of respondents thought that the peace they were 
experiencing was permanent. 
 This exposure to violence and physical destruction is important context for my 
research, which explores the less tangible effects of the war on social life and 
relationships among survivors. Understanding the history and local collective memory of 
the conflict also helps to contextualize respondents’ present-day narratives about their 
communities. An overview of the last several decades reveals a long history of trauma 
and suffering, with many instances of violence and multiple layers of guilt, distrust, and 
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blame. These experiences are not, for most, distant memories, but a very real part of their 
lives and their interactions with people in their communities and beyond; as one man 
explained to me, this history reveals that the “trauma is still active” in people’s daily 
lives. For most, this has developed into a narrative of both individual and collective 
victimization, as people see suffering inflicted in their lives from many fronts. 
Additionally, Acholi people generally and people in the particular area where I conducted 
research, specifically, do face collective blame and stigma for being perceived as the 
origin of much suffering for others in Uganda and neighboring countries. People were 
active participants in this history: they lost family members to violent deaths, they took 
up arms to join various resistance movements, they actively worked for peace 
negotiations, they joined the spiritual movements, and were involved in every other 
possible way. This history helps us make sense of the tensions and struggles of post-war 
social life. 
 
Daily Life in the Villages 
In this section, I introduce key elements of life at the present moment for people in rural 
Gulu District in Uganda, a topic that will be developed in greater detail in later chapters. 
As I discuss later, some of these elements of social life differ from how respondents 
describe life before the war; some of these cultural practices and elements of social 
organization are in a current state of change and redefinition.  
For most people, daily life in the village revolves around working their farmland, 
or “digging the gardens.” They wake early in the morning and go to the gardens before 
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the sun gets too hot. In the late morning, they come home for some tea or a small meal. 
Depending on the season, they may go back to the garden for a few hours. Some people 
dig collectively with their neighbors, others with their immediate family, and others dig 
alone. Other daily tasks include fetching water and transporting it back to the compound, 
cleaning the compound, gathering firewood, doing laundry, caring for animals, and 
cooking. Women do all the cooking, which is a labor-intensive process, often starting 
with grinding the raw food, such as millet, into flour to cook. In the afternoons, people 
often gather in the village trading centre, for the daily market, socializing, or drinking. 
The rhythms of life shift with the seasons, as the rainy season brings planting and more 
concerted work in the gardens. Children go to school during three terms, and stay home 
for month-long holidays in between each, helping their families in the gardens.  
 Most people earn their living by farming land and growing food to feed their 
family. Some grow enough to sell a small surplus locally in the village market. A few sell 
larger amounts outside of the village. Livestock also provides a valuable source of 
wealth, income, and food. Most families have chickens, some have goats, and a few have 
cows. As the animals reproduce, families are able to sell the offspring to cover expenses 
like school fees or clothing. Many families are also supported to some degree by family 
members who are in Gulu town or the capital city of Kampala and are able to send back 
small amounts of money from their work. In each village, there are also a few business 
people in the trading centres who run convenience shops, restaurants, mechanics shops, 
or drinking joints. 
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 There are multiple layers of leadership at the village level, and two of the most 
central are the rodi and the local council (LC) system. Rodi (singular is rwot), meaning 
chiefs, lead various aspects of village life. At the most basic level are the rodi kweri, or 
chiefs of farming, who oversee all aspects of farming in a particular residential zone of a 
village. Since farming is the primary activity of life in the village, rodi kweri play a very 
influential role in everyday life. For each zone, there is also a woman designated as rwot 
okoro who assists the rwot kweri and is concerned especially with women’s issues in 
farming. Governance throughout Uganda is arranged according to the LC system. The 
village is the lowest administrative unit, governed by a local council I (LCI). The LCI has 
a committee of members, but the most prominent is the LCI chairman. The LCI chairman 
(often just referred to as the “LC-one”) is elected to five year terms, but many serve for 
long periods of time, recognized as important leaders in the village. 
 In the region where I conducted fieldwork, village residents are nearly all from 
the Luo ethnic group, which stretches across northern Uganda and in surrounding 
countries. People consider Acholi to be their tribe, and within that there are several sub-
tribes in the region. At the village level, however, the greatest diversity comes from clan 
membership. Clan membership is determined by patrilineal descent. When a couple 
marries or decides to live together, the woman leaves her clan and goes to live with her 
husband’s clan. Within a clan, all older male relatives are referred to as “father”; 
according to people I spoke to, this system brings relationships very close, making it 
impossible to ignore the issues of any family members. 
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 Family members live together on a compound, which is a grouping of huts and 
gardens, set apart from neighboring compounds. The composition of a compound can 
vary, with some including just a husband, wife, and children, while others are much 
larger, including a grandfather, grandmother, their sons (with their wives), and 
grandchildren. A compound functions as a household unit, with family members working 
together to raise their children. Many families practice polygyny, with men typically 
having between two and five wives.  
 
Two women sitting in a cluster of grass-thatched huts in a family compound, 
with a small food storage hut in the foreground. 
 
 There are clearly defined gender roles in villages, particularly in terms of daily 
household responsibilities. There are physical manifestations of gender differences, with 
women wearing only dresses or skirts, sitting on the ground while men sit on chairs, and 
kneeling down to greet men or serve food. There are also gender disparities in 
educational levels, with women disproportionately having not attended school, not being 
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able to read or write, and not speaking English. These gendered expectations in the 
village are somewhat easily transcended, however, by women who come as visitors, who 
have higher levels of education, or women who have leadership roles. There are 
increasing pushes by NGOs and the government for women’s rights and girls’ education, 
so gender roles are in a period of active flux in this region. 
 The features of daily life introduced here are discussed in greater depth in the 
following chapters. Particularly important is that daily life is oriented around agricultural 
activities, and thus these can be a source of unity and interdependence. On the other hand, 
inequality in terms of livestock, land, or other wealth has become a point of contention.  
 
Three Communities  
In this section, I discuss my selection of three communities as primary field sites for the 
research and introduce key distinguishing characteristics of each of the three 
communities.  
 
Case Selection 
After conducting informal interviews (described in Chapter Four) and consulting with 
research assistants and community leaders, I selected three primary field sites in which to 
carry out research: the villages of Lukodi, Awach, and Anyadwe (also called Ajulu or 
Patiko).12 I selected Lukodi because it was the site of a well-known massacre and has 
                                                 
12 I use the real names of these communities. At community gatherings where I discussed my research, I 
asked residents and leaders if they would like me to use the name of their village. Not only did they say, 
yes, I could use the name, but they felt strongly they wanted the name used so that people would know the 
stories of their specific community. Some ethnographers argue that using real names of people and places 
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attracted significant transitional justice attention; I selected Awach because it was 
particularly isolated during the conflict and has been said to have had a rocky return 
process; and I selected Anyadwe as what seemed to be the most “typical” experience of 
the war, displacement, and return. 
The fieldsites are all modestly sized rural communities of a few thousand 
residents, located in Gulu District, within approximately 10 miles from one another (see 
Figure 3.3). Residents of this particular area experienced some of the most frequent and 
most severe violence during the conflict. All three communities were sites of IDP camps, 
in which displaced people congregated around the village trading centres. In each, the 
return process began around 2009 or 2010, and by the time of the research most people 
had returned to their original homesteads. 
Lukodi was the site of a well-known massacre in 2004. Because of this and its 
proximity to Gulu, it has attracted significant attention from outside organizations and 
volunteers, with people in Lukodi now actively working on reconciliation and 
memorialization initiatives. Lukodi also has had an unusually high level of exposure to 
the ICC. I compared this relatively distinct case to communities with more typical 
experiences of the war, meaning that they experienced deaths, abductions, looting and 
destruction, and forced displacement, but not a single well-known event like a massacre. 
Anyadwe and Awach fit this description, and thus had not received the attention from 
transitional justice-oriented initiatives that communities such as Lukodi had received. 
From my conversations with research assistants and informal interviews, it seemed that 
                                                                                                                                                 
hold the researcher to higher standards of evidence and ethics (for example, Duneier 1999; Scheper-Hughes 
2000) 
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Awach and Anyadwe represented two different types of experiences, however. During 
the war, Awach was effectively cut off from Gulu town and surrounding areas, and was 
known to be quite dangerous. That reputation continued throughout the return process, as 
several informants told me that people in Awach have had serious challenges and 
conflicts during resettlement. Anyadwe, on the other hand, was described as having had a 
more typical resettlement process, with fewer serious conflicts or challenges. For these 
reasons, I anticipated these three villages would be strong cases for comparison. 13   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 I did consider several other field sites. I planned to include a community called Atiak. Like Lukodi, Atiak 
experienced a well-known massacre in 1995, and there have been significant transitional justice initiatives 
(particularly memorialization efforts), but they were originally spearheaded from within the community. I 
attended some events in Atiak, but decided not to conduct interviews there because of logistical challenges. 
Atiak is located near the border of Sudan, requiring difficult and lengthy public transportation. I also 
considered Pabbo (a community located on the road to Sudan, south of Atiak), as an alternative to Awach, 
as both areas have had challenging or complicated return processes, often with conflict in the communities. 
Pabbo was the largest IDP camp and is still a large populated area, so narrowing down a “village” area 
would have been difficult. Ultimately, I decided to not include Pabbo because it is in a different district 
(Amuru District) from the other fieldsites, and I wanted consistency in terms of local government 
administration. 
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Figure 3.3. Location of Fieldsites, Gulu District 
 
The three field sites, thus somewhat represent the range of experiences in the 
region. In subsequent chapters I develop the unique characteristics of each of these three 
transitional communities. The following section provides an introduction to basic 
distinguishing elements of Lukodi, Anyadwe, and Awach.  
 
Lukodi 
Lukodi is divided into five tek kweri (zones or sub-villages), each with between 19 to 39 
compounds, for a total of 142 compounds in the village, all depicted on the map below.14 
                                                 
14 I worked with community leaders to construct the village maps, as described in detail in the methodology 
discussion in Chapter Four. 
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During the war, Lukodi was a non-gazetted (or unrecognized) camp, which means the 
population received lesser protection and humanitarian aid than gazetted IDP camps 
(OCHA 2004). Today, Lukodi is the smallest of the three fieldsites, both in terms of the 
population and the size of the trading centre. The trading centre has just a few buildings 
hosting a handful of businesses, including two convenience stores, a drug shop, a bicycle 
repair shop, and a grinding mill. The daily market is held in an open area under the shade 
of a canopy of mango trees, with women spreading out their products on fabrics on the 
ground. 
Figure 3.4. Community Map of Lukodi 
 
There is one primary school in Lukodi’s trading centre and a secondary school 
farther away on the road towards Gulu. A portion of the school grounds, separated from 
the community with a tall wire fence, is rented out to a Christian INGO, ChildVoice 
International (CVI). CVI works with “child mothers,” and dozens of teenage girls live at 
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CVI in Lukodi, receiving education, counseling, and vocational training. In an open field 
near the trading centre, there is a memorial monument to the over 70 victims of the 2004 
massacre. The field is usually overgrown with tall grasses, though some residents are 
actively trying to involve the community in its upkeep. Another INGO, Justice and 
Reconciliation Project (JRP), has been instrumental in promoting this type of community 
organizing in Lukodi. JRP has guided the development of a “Core Team,” made up of 
community members who work for post-war reconciliation in Lukodi. Currently, they 
organize an annual memorial prayer day on the anniversary of the massacre and they are 
working with the national Uganda Museum to develop a memorial site in Lukodi. In 
addition to these reconciliation and memorialization initiatives, people in Lukodi have 
had a high level of exposure to the ICC, with an investigation into the massacre, visits 
from high-level ICC delegations, and community outreach efforts. 
 
Lukodi Primary School, with a mural by World Vision, 
warning children not to touch explosives. 
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Anyadwe 
Further north from Lukodi, about 35 kilometers from Gulu, the next major settlement is 
the village of Anyadwe, also known as Ajulu-Patiko. Anyadwe is divided into three tek 
kweri, with 164 total compounds. Anyadwe’s trading centre is bigger than Lukodi, with 
about ten buildings containing various small businesses, including drug shops, a 
restaurant, a bar, and convenience stores. There are bicycle repairers and mechanics, a 
stand selling roasted pork, and a veterinarian. There are also a few offices for various 
government officials. The administrative headquarters for the sub-county are located in 
Anyadwe, temporarily housed in a building left vacant by World Vision. There is also a 
building left by the American Refugee Committee. There are two primary schools in 
Anyadwe, a market area with rows set for the sellers, and nearby police barracks. 
Additionally, there is a health centre in Anyadwe, with active outpatient treatments, a 
maternity ward, and community health outreach programs. 
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Figure 3.5. Community Map of Anyadwe 
 
 Anyadwe is known, historically, as an area rich in cattle and livestock, which 
indicates a relatively higher level of status and respect. All the clans in the surrounding 
area, including areas of Lukodi and Awach, are united into a tribe called Patiko. The 
chief of Patiko (the rwot me Patiko) is a highly revered and important leader in the 
region, and he is based in Anyadwe. In 2011, a new rwot me Patiko was anointed.  
Anyadwe also is unique because of the presence of “Baker’s Fort,” which is a site 
with ruins of stone walls and buildings. The fort was built by Arab slave traders in the 
1800s, who enslaved local residents. The British explorer Samuel Baker provided guns 
and assistance to the Acholi people against the Arabs, making him now the namesake for 
the fort. When local people gave me tours of the ruins, they described how the fort was 
the site of many Arab atrocities against the people of Patiko. The name “Anyadwe” 
means “daughter of the moon,” and was the local name given to Samuel Baker’s wife, 
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who frequently spent time at the Fort and was admired by the local community. People in 
Anyadwe are now very protective and proud of the Baker’s Fort, which they are working 
to develop as a historical tourist site with the Uganda Museum. 
 
The “palace” of the Rwot me Patiko in Anyadwe. 
 
  
Awach 
The Awach area is larger than the first two communities. There is a trading centre, 
surrounded by three dispersed villages, Payuta, Paromo, and Latwong. In order to select 
an area comparable to the area we included in Lukodi and Anyadwe, I included tek kweri 
from both Payuta and Paromo, which surround the Awach trading centre. In consultation 
with local leaders, I selected five tek kweri for the interview area, with a total of 153 
compounds. With a large trading centre, Awach may transition from a village to a “town 
board” in the next few years. 
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Figure 3.6. Community Map of Awach 
 
 Like in the other two communities, there are a variety of shops in the trading 
centre. In Awach, however, there are also several restaurants, multiple bars, and a video 
hall. Even in the mornings, there are always men drinking and hanging around the trading 
centre; Awach is known for a high level of alcoholism and the accompanying fights or 
disputes that arise when people are drinking. There are more events organized around 
youth interests, such as video showings, dances, musicians, and football. Awach has a 
primary school and a secondary school. Like Anyadwe, the headquarters for the sub-
county (a different sub-county) are in Awach. There is also a health centre, larger than 
the health centre in Anyadwe, which has a large gated compound near the trading centre. 
The market in Awach is housed in a permanent covered structure, not with people 
informally setting up their products on the ground. There is more diversity in Awach than 
the other two sites. There is a highly visible population of mentally ill individuals who 
often hang around the trading centre. There is also more variety of clans than in Anyadwe 
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or Lukodi. Finally, there is significant religious diversity; there is a prominent Catholic 
Mission in Awach, established in the 1970s, as well as a Protestant church and a mosque. 
 
Part of the Awach trading centre, with men talking and drinking under a mango tree. 
 
 Awach was the site of the second largest IDP camp during the war. It was known 
as a particularly dangerous place, and for much of the conflict it was very isolated from 
Gulu town because the road to Awach was frequently used by the rebels. In the 1980s 
and early 1990s, Kony actually began his movement in Awach; I talked to older people 
who had attended his spiritual gatherings and were part of the early movement. Chiefs 
from the area around Awach were also involved in negotiating with Kony during the war 
and had frequent contact with the rebels. Additionally, Human Rights Watch (2005) 
documented particularly high levels of human rights abuses by the UPDF in Awach, 
including extrajudicial killings and regular practices of beatings and torture. 
 
In this chapter, I provided historical and contextual background information specific to 
northern Uganda and the research fieldsites. To begin, I provided a history of the war and 
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displacement in the region, describing a long-term local narrative characterized by 
multiple victimizations and suffering, resulting in widespread exposure to violence, 
mistrust because of crimes perpetrated by multiple parties, and complete and prolonged 
forced displacement into IDP camps. Massive waves of resettlement occurred just a few 
years before data collection for this project. The post-war period has seen massive growth 
in INGOs and government rebuilding programs, in addition to a diverse array of formal 
transitional justice mechanisms. With this context in mind, I sketched the broad contours 
of contemporary daily life in rural northern Uganda. Life is governed by a multi-layered 
system of local leadership, with daily life centered around extended family residential 
compounds in a patrilocal and patrilineal system, focused on subsistence agricultural 
activities. Village communities are small and relatively self-contained, with closely 
intertwined histories and relationships among residents. My research analyzed the 
resettlement and reconstructive trajectories of three neighboring villages. These 
communities are similar in many respects, but differ in their exposure to transitional 
justice mechanisms, the depth of their involvement with INGO and government 
programs, and the relative smoothness of their post-war transitions. 
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Chapter Four 
Data and Methodology 
 
Ojuk kwe cero ki cet iot pa marone. 
If you step in dung and go into your mother-in-law’s house, 
she may not let her daughter go with you. 
 
In this chapter, I reflect on my position as a white, western, educated woman, as an 
“outsider” conducting research in rural Uganda. Next, I detail my methods, including 
gaining entrée, working with research assistants, translating interviews, recording 
observations, conducting informal interviews, sampling, and managing the formal 
interview process. I also describe the socio-demographic characteristics of the interview 
respondents.  
 This entire research process was fundamentally a group effort. I am deeply 
indebted to many individuals—research assistants, translators, community guides, 
residents, and leaders—who tirelessly helped me with this project. They patiently helped 
me understand the nuances of doing research (and living as a human being) in northern 
Uganda. I truly could not have completed this research without them. 
 
Positionality in Fieldwork 
In this section, I discuss how my intersectional identity as a white, western, educated 
woman affected my place in northern Uganda generally and in the research context 
specifically. 
 
  93 
Outsider & “Adopted” Outsider 
A classic sociological understanding of the different types of knowledge of “insiders” and 
“outsiders” (Merton 1972) has colored methodological debates about the relative merits 
of insider or outsider status of the researcher in doing fieldwork. In general, defining who 
is an insider and who is not falls to whether or not there are shared characteristics in 
terms of race, class, and gender. At times, this has become a heated conversation: Can an 
outsider ever really know? Can an insider ever be detached enough? In the postcolonial 
context, the debate becomes more politically and morally charged, with claims that 
outsiders studying communities in Africa (particularly) are necessarily neocolonial. 
 While in most ways I was definitely an outsider in rural Uganda, I also want to 
complicate the dichotomy a bit. Jennifer Pierce (1995) argues that there are not “true” 
insiders or outsiders, because sharing characteristics like race, class, or gender does not 
necessarily make someone an insider, and also someone who appears to be an outsider 
may actually be “adopted” in some ways. Similarly, after doing research among West 
Indian immigrant youth, Mary Waters (1999) concludes that people are about more than 
their race, class, or gender, and there are more diverse ways to form connections. 
Anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod (1991) argues that the boundary between the self and 
the other really is less clear than it often seems, as our identities are, of course, social 
constructions and there are diverse forms of difference among people, frequently 
resulting in “split selves,” or people who are insiders in some ways but not in others. 
Pierce goes on to discuss how researchers are often able to move back and forth between 
statuses, claiming that being an insider or outsider is not static, but there is interpretation, 
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negotiation, and shifting. Additionally, she argues that these are not dichotomous 
statuses, a claim that is salient to other conceptions of hybrid insider-outsider statuses, 
such as Hill Collins’(1986) outsider-within, Simmel’s (1971) classic conception of the 
stranger, or Abu-Lughod’s (1991) description of feminists and “halfies.” 
 In interactions with people in rural villages, I was an outsider most notably in 
terms of race and nationality and in my socio-economic class and education. However, in 
many other interactions, such as with INGO workers in the region, these same 
characteristics marked me as very much an insider. As a woman, I was positioned to be 
able to talk and interact easily with women, but less so with men. However, the 
intersectionality of my identity affected both of these interactions. Women in the villages 
were a bit more distant from me because of my level of education, but also because of my 
nationality, or more specifically, my language, as rural women were substantially less 
likely to speak English confidently. On the other hand, my nationality and level of 
education and the distance that this afforded made me able to more easily transcend 
gender boundaries and speak more freely with men than a Ugandan woman may have 
been able to do.  
Generally, my most obvious social characteristics marked me as an outsider. I did 
find, however, that as people learned more about me and as I spent more time in the 
villages, I did come to be “adopted” by some people. In time, I was treated as someone 
who belonged and whose presence was almost expected at community events. One 
potential reason for this was because I had had a longer engagement with Uganda than 
they expected of other outsiders, and people generally seemed to highly value the fact 
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that I had come back time and again and focused on building relationships in the country, 
even if I had not been to their specific communities before. The dominant religion in the 
region is Christian, and, having come from a Christian background myself, I was able to 
relate to their religious commitments.15 Additionally, I think that my gender performance 
helped me to be “adopted.” I always dressed in long skirts, like rural Ugandan women do, 
was comfortable sitting on mats on the ground with women, and was an enthusiastic 
helper in many kitchens. Time and again people would comment on this, telling me that I 
was not like other white women who would come to visit them, and that this showed I 
understood and respected their culture and values. I also think they began to perceive me 
as their ally and a potential long-term advocate, something I discuss below.  
There are definitely challenges to conducting research as an outsider, even in the 
shifting and variable context I describe above. I constantly found myself questioning 
whether or not I was really getting close enough to people and their daily lives. I found 
myself engaged in an ongoing process of negotiating my presence, something that would 
not have been necessary as an insider. Being a racial outsider was probably the most 
difficult part during participant observation with people who did not already know me, 
such as attending events, schools or churches, or walking down a street. As a white 
person, there was no way to not stand out and attract immediate attention. As I came to 
know people, though, my race became less of a novelty. I also am sure that, as an 
outsider, people were more measured and careful in what they would tell me or show me. 
I was very often treated with high levels of respect as a guest, given preferential treatment 
                                                 
15 Although I do think this shared religious background had some impact, it was definitely less central in 
northern Uganda than it had been during my previous stays in other regions of the country. In the post-war 
period, there seem to be fewer formal churches and less of a prominent social role of organized religion. 
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and hidden from the realities of how people lived when I was not there. I worked every 
day to try to minimize these limitations, but I have no doubt they are real. 
At the same time, being an outsider comes with unique advantages as well. 
Namely, people may confide in an outsider more readily, as research subjects do not 
perceive the researcher to be embroiled in local tensions, have strong perspectives on 
contentious issues, or be strongly connected to other community members (Waters 1999). 
In the position of an outsider, the researcher may be more interesting and less threatening 
to respondents. I do think this was the case in my fieldwork, as people would share their 
opinions of particular local conflicts that I am not sure they would have shared so readily 
if I was from their community. This was also important in selecting local research 
assistants to do the village interviews. I had originally planned to hire individuals from 
within each village, but was advised early in the process that it would be best to hire 
interviewers who did not have connections in the villages, so that respondents would be 
able to speak more freely. Of course, the interviewers shared race and nationality with 
interview respondents, but the interviewers’ outsider status was essential during the 
interview process.  
Another advantage of being an outsider is that patterns may be more readily 
observable and unique perspectives can come from those marginalized from the inside 
group (Hill Collins 1986; Abu-Lughod 1991). I did find this to be beneficial, as I was 
able to question practices that research subjects took for granted as part of their daily 
lives, such as family structures, traditions, or styles of interpersonal interactions. While 
my outsider status helped me to observe patterns they may not have noticed, my status 
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was also beneficial in the opposite direction, as people assumed that I did not know 
anything about their lives. They took the time to explain things that they likely would not 
have discussed with somebody who grew up in the area, such what specific kinship 
obligations mean, why they value certain traditions, or how dispute resolution systems 
operate. People generally seemed to derive a great deal of satisfaction from explaining 
these things to me, and many elements of daily life were explained to me over and over, 
from multiple people on multiple occasions, which helped me to notice consistencies and 
variations in their explanations. 
While I cannot realistically change certain elements of my status, I have tried to 
incorporate into my analysis the unique challenges and advantages afforded by my 
various outsider or “adopted” outsider statuses. Furthermore, I have tried to be cognizant 
of how my race, gender, class, nationality, and education contribute to what I saw and 
how I interpreted my findings. I recognize that there is necessarily some element of 
tension in my status as an outsider, but I have tried to highlight the unique ways of seeing 
that emerged from my particular position. 
 
Building Rapport 
Establishing rapport was a primary concern throughout my fieldwork and I used two 
main strategies. First, I adopted a persona of “positive naïveness” (Madison 2005). I 
consistently took on the role of one who does not know, and thus needed to humbly rely 
on those who do know in order to learn. In this, being a student was helpful, because that 
was a role that people easily understood. This made the people I was interacting with the 
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experts and my teachers, and I found people generally responded well to being in this 
position. Particularly in the beginning (or in meeting new people throughout the 
fieldwork), I would ask people to teach me Acholi vocabulary, how to cook, what crops 
they were farming, or about other very factual topics about their daily lives. These sorts 
of conversations and the activities that came from them (such as cooking or farming) 
were excellent ways to establish initial comfort with my presence and place people in a 
position of teaching me about their lives. I often received comments that they were not 
used to seeing white people trying to learn about such things, and people seemed 
genuinely pleased with the novelty of seeing me struggle to learn these practices. This 
attitude of a learner continued as relationships progressed to greater depth, and I could 
ask people to teach me about their families, their values, their spiritual beliefs, their plans 
for the future, or other deeper issues in their lives. I developed rapport by treating 
fieldwork as an ongoing process of conversational exchange, in which people in Uganda 
were my guides and I actively engaged by listening receptively. It was less about me 
gathering information for my own purposes, and more about me being open to learning 
what people in the villages wanted to teach me. I do think this went a long way in helping 
me develop rapport. 
Second, I relied heavily on key contacts and cultural brokers. These individuals 
acted as a bridge, mediating between me and people I wanted to get to know. Key 
contacts played an essential role in initial networking and gaining entrée. For example, 
early in the fieldwork process, I asked contacts from previous visits to Uganda and 
connections from academic networks to put me in touch with people working on 
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resettlement issues in Gulu District. In most cases, it was these connections that linked 
me to research assistants, translators, key individuals in each community, and others who 
would eventually become close friends and valuable research informants. These people 
helped to “translate” much more than language. They helped me think carefully about 
practical issues like what gifts to bring when I visited homes or how to explain my 
research to people. They patiently helped me understand complex elements of social life 
that I struggled to grasp, such as kinship structures, land ownership systems, or Acholi 
proverbs. Perhaps most importantly, though, they facilitated countless opportunities for 
me to visit homes, attend events, and talk with a wide range of people. This was not 
merely a logistical contribution; in introducing me to their family and friends, these key 
contacts personally vouched for my presence, the integrity of my intentions, and the 
value of my project. This was absolutely fundamental to my acceptance in the 
communities and the eventual success of the project.  
 Even though I think these strategies allowed me to develop some degree of 
rapport in the communities where I conducted research, I would be remiss to make claims 
to have been fully accepted into peoples’ lives and confidences in a period of a few 
months. In conducting research among street vendors in New York, Mitchell Duneier 
argued that “participant observers need not be fully trusted in order to have their presence 
at least accepted” (1999:338). He found that even if people did not fully trust him, they 
still had to continue going about their lives, and so by virtue of the fact that he was there, 
he was able to make observations and understand something about their lives. I think my 
case is similar. People allowed me to be present in their communities, and though they 
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perhaps were hesitant to intimately trust me, spending time consistently in the villages 
did allow me to be accepted to the degree necessary to complete this research. 
 
Subjectivity 
My goal has been to articulate my “self” in the research process, rather than making 
myself invisible in the following chapters (Pierce 1995). I recognize that objectivity is not 
necessarily possible, nor is it my goal, but rather I recognize that I have produced a 
“truth” that was filtered through my subjective experience (Scheper-Hughes 2000). My 
goal was to produce “a highly disciplined subjectivity” (Scheper-Hughes 2000:132). This 
admission of subjectivity does not mean, of course, that the claims I make are beyond 
critique and are instead personal opinion; actually, it is an invitation to the reader to be 
even more critical. I sought to be transparent about my subjectivity and recognize how 
my specific subjectivity reflects particular positions, choices, and effects (Madison 2005). 
 As Abu-Lughod says of positionality: “every view is a view from somewhere and 
every act of speaking a speaking from somewhere” (1991:468). This calls us, as 
researchers, to recognize the situated nature of our knowledge, to be forthcoming about 
our own biases or partialities, and be sensitive to the idea that our own picture is 
incomplete. The best we can do is to be aware of how our subjectivity functions in our 
research and be clear about its effects (Duneier 1999). Nancy Scheper-Hughes (2000) 
claims that because everything we know is filtered through our subjective experiences, 
there will be a clash between researchers and subjects, something she experienced 
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firsthand as the people she wrote about were deeply critical of the direction of her final 
analysis. 
 Because of my particular subjectivity, I was more likely to notice some elements 
of life in Uganda and less likely to notice (or be interested in) others. For example, as a 
critical scholar, I was particularly cognizant of issues of power, inequality, and exclusion. 
As a person from the global North, I was sensitive to the involvement of INGOs and 
attuned to potential negative implications of their work. As a sociologist, I was perhaps 
less aware of or less interested in the nuances of agricultural production, despite the 
centrality of this agriculture in the lives of many in northern Uganda. These examples 
illustrate how what I observed was necessarily shaped by my unique point of view. 
 
Relationship to Others 
Recognizing my own subjectivity is one element of positionality in fieldwork, but 
articulating my own position also requires being conscious of how my particular position 
places me in relationships others. As an outsider, I was not merely “outside,” but I was 
standing in some definite relation to the other who is studied (Abu-Lughod 1991). I 
thought about this in two ways: first, the relationships between myself and research 
subjects because of historical and contemporary social context and, second, the 
relationship between us that emerged by virtue of the researcher and research subject 
dynamic. Both of these elements were infused with important dimensions of power. 
 My positionality forced me to acknowledge my own location in the power 
structures that affect the lives of research subjects (Davies 2008; Madison 2005). As a 
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U.S. citizen of European ancestry, I needed to be sensitive to my own historical and 
contemporary implication in forces of economic, political, and social exploitation in 
colonial and post-colonial Africa. More immediately in the lives of research participants, 
I was cognizant of my association with the post-war flood of international aid workers 
and researchers, many of whom have developed perhaps admirable programs, but have 
also been criticized for having a short-term mentality, being insensitive to local cultures 
and values, or introducing programs with unintended negative consequences.  
I am sure that this had a significant impact on how many people perceived me and 
interacted with me. Before being fieldwork in the villages, I was warned by several 
academics and NGO workers that people in rural communities were tired of outsiders 
coming to take from them and then not seeing tangible improvements in their lives from 
the interaction. Indeed, I was met with wariness at times, or even hostility in a few cases, 
as people were not sure about my motives. On the other hand, many people were 
extremely pleased to welcome me, but often with the mistaken expectation that I was 
there to bring some type of development project to them or their community. This 
required me to carefully and immediately explain who I was and to try to set myself apart 
in some way from those who came before me; I emphasized that I was a student and that 
I was not bringing a development project, but that I would write a book about their 
communities and tell their stories. At the same time, I recognized that I was in many 
ways similar to those folks: I went to Uganda in order to help myself and other academics 
understand more about their lives; I went hoping that this interaction might also help 
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them improve their lives after war; and I was only there for a relatively short period of 
time. 
 The second type of relationship was between me as a researcher and the people in 
Uganda as research subjects. Unfortunately, this relationship is necessarily infused with 
power, despite the best efforts of cultural anthropologists or feminist ethnographers to 
give voice to research subjects and make them equal participants in the research process. 
Drawing from these traditions, throughout fieldwork I tried to see the research process as 
an ongoing dialogue between myself as the researcher and the people in the communities. 
Seeing it as a constantly changing reciprocal encounter, rather than a more bounded 
unidirectional exchange in which I asked for information and they gave it to me, allowed 
more freedom in our relationship, as I sought to become an “ethnographic presence” in 
their lives (Madison 2005). Even with research that takes this participatory approach, 
however, there is still inherent inequality between the researcher and research subjects 
(Duneier 1999; Abu-Lughod 1991; Pierce 1995).  
These two elements of positionality have important implications for my research, 
namely in terms of pursuing critical ethnography and thinking seriously about 
representations, discussed below. 
 
Critical Ethnography and Questions of Intervention 
As a public sociologist, I have a sense of responsibility to address injustice and suffering 
in a particular lived domain, and to make at least some small contribution to changing 
unjust social conditions. On a daily basis during fieldwork, this led to practical questions 
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of how involved I ought to be in research participants’ lives. When I am aware of—and 
committed to working against—structures of inequality and injustice, and then come into 
close personal contact with people living in poverty because of the inequality of this 
global system, it presents an ethical dilemma. Does the fight against structures of 
oppression require me to personally help the individuals harmed by the same system that 
afforded me such privilege? This is a dilemma ethnographers commonly wrestle to 
reconcile, especially when the research involves people who are particularly 
disadvantaged. Mary Waters (1999) calls this the “thorniest” question for researchers, 
one that often is only resolved through making “snap decisions” in the moment. In his 
fieldwork with unhoused poor urban black men who sold books and magazines on a New 
York City sidewalk, Mitchell Duneier (1999) was regularly presented with this dilemma 
directly, as people would ask him for money and other forms of assistance. 
Pragmatically, he realized he could not help everyone every day, so he eventually learned 
how to say no, but to at the same time express his anguish at having to do so. He decided 
that he would help people to the extent that others on the sidewalk would be willing to 
help. He also ultimately concluded that his real contribution was through conducting his 
research with integrity and respect for the research participants. 
 In many ways, I sought to mirror Duneier’s approach. This dilemma was not one 
that was confined to my own internal moral struggle. On a regular basis people asked me 
for money, to help pay their children’s school fees, to start a project for them, to buy 
them farming tools, to pay for their medical expenses, and nearly every other request 
imaginable. Some were quite easy to refuse (Buy me alcohol? Find me a wife from 
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America?), but most were very difficult. On the one hand, I did want to help people who 
were struggling or suffering. On the other, I knew that I could not single-handedly help 
everyone in northern Uganda, and I knew that if I helped one woman with her medical 
bill today, the home I visited tomorrow would have heard of it and would have their 
request ready for me. I knew that not only were was my pockets not deep enough to 
support these requests, but that it would ultimately be harmful to the longer term 
objectives of the research project. Furthermore, cognizant of my positionality in the era 
of white people coming with INGOs, I knew that fulfilling these requests would actually 
contribute to a problem in the area, of foreign money and well-meaningness coming in 
with short-term solutions. My research assistants and community guides were very much 
aware of this tension, and we discussed it frequently. They often served as “cultural 
brokers” to help me carefully respond to such requests, explaining that I was a student, so 
I was not able to help everyone, but I was trying to help through telling their stories. To 
the vast majority of requests for material support, I said no.  
 On the other hand, there were also cases where I did decide to offer help. In 
keeping with Duneier’s guidelines, I restrained myself to offering help in line with what 
other community members would do, if they were able to help. These were also always 
situations where I had a relationship with the person, not people who asked me for help at 
our first meeting. Most often, this help came in the form of small loans, which were 
always paid back. I tried to help as a community member would do, such as picking up 
some ibuprofen for an elderly woman too weak to travel, typing and printing notes for 
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community meetings, contributing funds to help with funeral expenses, or providing food 
and drink for those who were helping me.  
Near the end of fieldwork, when all the interviews were finished, I talked with the 
village guides and leaders about beginning community projects in each place. I explained 
that I wanted to try to give something back, as a way to thank them for all they had given 
me. Together, community leaders discussed needs in their villages and debated various 
projects they would like to implement. The agreement was that if they developed 
carefully conceived project proposals, I would return to the United States and try to raise 
funds to implement all three projects. Ultimately, together we were able to realize these 
projects. I returned about eight months later, bringing the modest funds to start a goat 
project in Lukodi, a grinding mill in Anyadwe, and a community bank in Awach. These 
projects were initiated and are operated by community members, who developed models 
of self-sustaining projects, with the understanding that the support would be a one-time 
donation. 
While some in the more classic anthropological or ethnographic tradition may shy 
away from this level of intervention, I felt compelled to take an active role. From my first 
day in each community, I knew that my presence would affect people’s lives in some 
way. I came to terms with this and adopted the mindset that I ought to be mindful and 
intentional about my unavoidable impact. 
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Representation 
My role as a researcher, with its accompanying power over research participants, pushed 
me to think carefully about how I would represent them in my writing. As I have already 
discussed, my subjectivity led me to have one particular perspective or interpretation of 
life in northern Uganda. This was particularly important because my version of reality 
was not just an alternative version, but it would actually have some degree of authority. 
This is a fundamentally uncomfortable position for me, as I come to be regarded as an 
“expert,” but the people I am writing about do not. There is always a risk that research 
participants will disagree with or be upset by my representation of them and their 
communities. Researchers approach this in various ways: seeing the risk of upsetting 
some people as justified because the research is working for positive social change 
(Pierce 1995); carefully reading each participant every passage of the final text that is 
about them and incorporating their feedback (Duneier 1999); or claiming that the 
standard should be to show people the same respect and empathy in writing as you would 
talking to them directly (Scheper-Hughes 2000). Even with these best laid plans, there are 
still troubling tales of how the communities we write about may feel deeply betrayed by 
the outcome of the research, such as communities in northern Ireland perceiving Scheper-
Hughes (2000) as betraying their privacy and trust. 
What is at stake here, though, goes deeper than hurt feelings or betrayed trust. 
Representing others always raises ethical questions, as representations have consequences 
and we, as researchers, should be accountable for these implications (Madison 2005). 
Michelle Fine (1994) argues that representing the voices of research participants is not 
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enough. Some researchers strive to let the voices of others speak for themselves, even 
taking particular care to represent counter-hegemonic voices. Still, she says, this 
minimizes the role of the researcher and our interpretation. Rather, we ought to be more 
explicitly participatory, intentionally positioning ourselves with a particular position 
(Fine 1994). This has come to be known as reflexive (or postcritical) ethnography. 
Reflexive ethnography is focused not only on the social change of critical ethnography, 
but also on positionality and how the researcher’s representations themselves can be acts 
of domination (Davies 2008; Madison 2005; Noblit, Flores, and Murillo 2004).  
Part of this is to recognize multiple layers of accountabilities to multiple 
audiences (Davies 2008; Abu-Lughod 1991). Not only am I accountable to academic 
colleagues, advisors, and the broader scientific community, but I also hold myself 
accountable to the people in northern Uganda whose lives I am writing about. My 
representations seek to do justice to the trust they placed in me to tell their stories, from 
my perspective. When I was back for the second, shorter period of fieldwork in 2012, I 
discussed my developing analysis with research assistants, community guides, and 
colleagues at Gulu University. During the process of revising the dissertation into a book 
manuscript, I plan to seek more specific and detailed feedback on the text. I admit that 
opening myself up to critiques from people in Uganda is intimidating. What if they 
fundamentally think I do not understand their lives? What if I made mistakes in 
representing their history or contemporary relationships? What if they are upset by my 
interpretations? However, I think making myself vulnerable in this way is essential 
because it flips the power dynamic. By committing to receiving feedback and actually 
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responding to the feedback by making changes to my analysis, I am giving them real 
power over me and the research. The very act of doing research made people in Uganda 
vulnerable to exploitation or misrepresentation by an outside researcher. Seeking real 
feedback on the product of the research makes me, the researcher, vulnerable to their 
perspectives as well. 
 
Methodology  
I spent a total of 11 months (January to September 2011 and April and May 2012) 
conducting fieldwork based in Gulu. The fieldwork involved a combination of informal 
interviews, participant observation, and formal in-depth interviews.  
 
Gaining Entrée, Informal Interviews, & Participant Observation 
I acquired several in-country affiliations and approvals. The project was approved by the 
Uganda National Council on Science and Technology (UNCST), the government agency 
responsible for overseeing research conducted in the country. I also obtained a letter of 
clearance from the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) of Gulu District, the local 
government executive. I officially affiliated with the Faculty of Social Sciences at 
Makerere University and with the Institute of Peace and Strategic Studies (IPSS) at Gulu 
University. The affiliation with Gulu University was particularly useful in helping me 
develop networks with professionals and other researchers working in the area.  
I conducted about twenty interviews with a variety of professionals who are 
experts on various issues facing resettled communities in the region. I interviewed NGO 
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workers, human rights advocates, government officials, service providers, religious 
leaders, and academic researchers. I conducted many of these interviews in the first few 
months of fieldwork, specifically to learn about potential communities to serve as field 
sites for data collection. I continued to conduct informal interviews sporadically 
throughout the fieldwork, in order to increase my understanding of the current situation in 
the region and to learn more about the role of NGOs in reconstruction processes. I took 
detailed notes throughout the interviews, but did not audio record these conversations. 
(See Appendix A for a list of organizations interviewed.) 
 After identifying potential fieldsites from these key informant interviews, I 
traveled to each site, introduced myself to community leaders, and asked for their 
permission to conduct my research. Next, I spent some time making informal visits to 
residents, either individually in their homes or in larger community gatherings. In 
Lukodi, this initial legwork lasted longer, because it was the first place I was visiting. 
Here I had a large community forum-type gathering where people told me about the 
issues they felt their community was facing. I also hosted a smaller meeting with key 
representatives to discuss and revise my interview questions. In each village, we had a 
community mapping meeting to start the official interview process (discussed below). 
During these meetings, I shared background information about myself and the study with 
community leaders. I addressed any questions that they had. At the end of the discussion, 
I asked their permission to participate in their community and conduct interviews. 
Throughout my time in Uganda, I spent time as a participant observer in the three 
primary field sites, but also in other surrounding communities and in Gulu town. Most 
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often, I visited residents’ homes, sharing meals and conversations. I also frequently 
attended events like markets, churches, community meetings, political events, and 
various other gatherings. During the 2011 and 2012 data collection, I produced 
approximately 425 pages of fieldnotes of my experiences and observations.  
 
Research Assistants, Translators, & Community Guides 
In preparation for beginning the formal, in-depth interviews, I hired four research 
assistants who had been recommended highly by colleagues at Gulu University: Susan 
Ajok, Nancy Lamunu, Kenneth Oyet, and Alfred Olegmungu. The research assistants all 
had bachelor’s degrees and experience conducting a wide range of research projects. I 
spent about one week training them in the background of my study, goals and details of 
interview methods, and doing practice interviews with the actual interview questions. 
They are all in their late 20s to early 30s and represent a certain segment of the 
population in post-war Gulu—young professionals employed by post-war NGO, 
government, and research programs. These talented individuals served as valuable 
colleagues and an effective working group to advise me throughout fieldwork. They 
consistently offered valuable insight and advice on how to combine the objectives of 
research with the real life conditions or culture in the villages. (See Appendix B for 
further descriptions of research assistants.) 
 While English is the official language in Uganda and is the language of 
instruction in schools, there are also over 50 local languages. In Gulu District, Acholi is 
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the first language for most of the population.16 In Gulu town, most of the population also 
can speak English. In the villages, anyone who has had at least some schooling knows 
basic English. There was definitely a segment of the population that did not know 
English, mostly women and older people, but there was usually someone around who 
could help translate. As soon as I arrived in Gulu, I began taking intensive private Acholi 
lessons and practicing Acholi on a daily basis. John Bosco Komakech worked as my 
Acholi language teacher and the translator for the project, translating nearly all of the 
interview recordings. In addition to his excellent work providing countless hours of 
translation, Bosco came to be a trusted advisor on the project, providing valuable 
insights, helping me puzzle through challenges, and answering my questions about 
Acholi culture, history, and tradition. I consistently worked to practice and improve my 
Acholi ability, which definitely helped establish rapport in the communities, as people 
enthusiastically appreciated my efforts and seemed to enjoy being my teachers.  
In addition to working with the research assistants to conduct and translate the 
interviews, I worked with local guides, or residents from each village, who helped 
mobilize the community members, physically led me to each homestead, introduced me 
to residents, and served as community-specific informants. The guides were selected 
because of their thorough knowledge of the communities, their reputations as people of 
good character (thus making them well-respected throughout the village), and their 
English competency (thus allowing them to serve as translators during visits and events). 
All three were young men, in their 20s or 30s: Vincent Oyet in Lukodi, Alfred Kaloso in 
                                                 
16 A segment of the population also speaks Swahili or Luganda (the local language of central Uganda) as a 
third language. I have a basic knowledge of Swahili and some background in Luganda. 
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Anyadwe, and Otto George in Awach. (See Appendix B for further descriptions of 
community guides.) 
Although, for consistency and readability, I typically refer to myself in discussing 
activities of the project, in many ways this research was a group effort. I am indebted to 
this talented team of individuals who worked with me to complete this project, 
particularly throughout the interview process. 
  
Interview Sampling & Recruiting 
I followed the same sampling strategy in all three communities to construct systematic, 
geographically-based, gender-balanced samples of 20 residents in each village. I also 
selected purposive samples of about 10 leaders17 in each village. In total, the interview 
sample includes 91 individual in-depth interviews in the three primary fieldsites. 
 Working with the community guides and LC1s in each community, I first 
organized a meeting of community leaders to draw a community map. The mapping 
group consisted of people18 who were knowledgeable about the village, intentionally 
selected to have several representatives from each zone or tek kweri. I also participated in 
the meetings, as well as at least one project research assistant and the community guide 
for the fieldsite. The mapping was extremely participatory, with people organizing into 
groups by tek kweri and working together to sketch out all the compounds in their area, as 
                                                 
17 In Anyadwe, we actually interviewed two women’s leaders, making a total of 11 leader interviews. The 
first was to be a practice interview for a new interviewer, but he did a good job with it, so I did not exclude 
it from the sample for analysis. 
18 The community leaders included in the mapping process were typically the rodi kweri, rodi okoro, and 
LCIs. There were 16 people in Lukodi and 19 in both Anyadwe and Awach. The groups consisted of 
mostly men, but each did include a handful of women. 
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well as any landmarks they chose to include. Some groups were able to do the exercise 
easily, while a few struggled to put the layout of their community on paper. I left the 
directions open-ended, so they could include what they felt was important, simply 
emphasizing that they should not exclude any compounds.  
The whole group then worked together to draw a large map that combined all of 
their smaller sketches.19 There was a significant amount of on-going dialogue, debate, 
and discussion as the final maps were drafted. Group members discussed specific cases, 
determining where distinguishing lines ought to be drawn to determine separate 
compounds, rather than just indicating an entire clan on the map. In some cases, there 
was discussion because of compounds that were, in actuality, headed by women, but 
some group members felt that women could not be listed as head of household, so they 
would put a male’s name or considered leaving off the female-headed compounds 
altogether.20 We clarified this, however, and all such households were included on the 
maps. After several revisions and checks for accuracy,21 the final maps included every 
compound in each village, the name of the head of the household, and landmarks such as 
paths, roads, streams, trading centres, schools, bridges, major hills, and drinking water 
sources. (See Figures 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6, in the previous chapter, for the final maps with 
names of residents removed.) Community leaders felt confident that all households in the 
community were accurately represented on the final maps. 
                                                 
19 In Lukodi, however, they ran out of time to complete this step, so Vincent Oyet compiled all the 
drawings onto one map. 
20 This came up briefly in Lukodi, where Vincent immediately told them to include these households; in 
Anyadwe, there was more discussion about it, but the RA and I instructed them to include female-headed 
compounds. 
21 After the group meetings, I had smaller meetings with the RAs and local guides to review and revise the 
maps as needed. After I constructed the digital copies of the maps, I brought copies to various community 
events and asked for any final revisions. 
  115 
The maps were used to select the samples for resident interviews.22 After 
selecting the compounds, I alternated man/woman designation to result in equal gender 
distribution.23 In total, the sample includes about 14 percent of the population of 
compounds in Lukodi, about 12 percent in Anyadwe, and about 13 percent in Awach. 
I selected the purposive sample of leaders in consultation with key informants and 
the guide in each community. I indicated that I would like to talk to people who provided 
leadership in a variety of capacities, and the guides in each community (independently 
from one another) generated a list of the areas of leadership that should be represented. 
We then discussed potential interviewees for each category. In all three communities, 
leader interviews include: 
- A chief in charge of farming (rwot kweri) 
- A women’s chief in charge of farming (rwot okoro) 
- A youth leader 
- A school headmaster 
- An elected local government leader 
- A protestant religious leader 
- One or two traditional elders (atekere or rwot moo) 
 
In each community, there were a few leader selections that demonstrated unique 
characteristics of each village. In Lukodi, we interviewed the leader of the massacre 
survivors’ group; in Anyadwe, we interviewed a leader from the health centre; in Awach, 
we interviewed a leader of disabled persons and a leader of peace and security. In both 
Anyadwe and Awach, with larger trading centres, we interviewed a business leader. 
Finally, in both Lukodi and Anyadwe, we interviewed women’s leaders.  
                                                 
22 For Lukodi, I used the map to sample every 7th compound, working through each zone clockwise; in 
Anyadwe and Awach, I systematically selected every 8th compound. 
23 In a few cases, a compound did not have an adult of the selected gender, so we switched the man/woman 
designation with the next compound on the list. 
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The general recruiting process was to go to a compound with the local guide and 
at least one interviewer. In some cases, particularly if we were coming in the morning 
when people were typically in their gardens digging, the guide arranged our visit in 
advance or we would set up the next day’s visits before leaving the field at the end of the 
day. We would enter a compound, greeting whomever was around, and somebody would 
immediately bring chairs or mats to sit in the shade of a tree. The community guide 
introduced us and the study, setting a relaxed mood, helping the potential respondents to 
trust us. Then the interviewer and I both talked, introducing ourselves, explaining the 
research, the selection process, and the interview. We asked if they had any questions and 
responded if they did. In compounds with more than one adult member of the selected 
gender, each man or woman picked a number to determine who would be invited to be 
interviewed. After identifying the potential respondent, we again asked if they had any 
questions and if they were interested in doing the interview. If and when they said yes, 
we arranged a day and time to do the interview. At the time of the interview, the potential 
respondent and the interviewer went through the formal consent process before beginning 
the interview. 
Each respondent was given a “thank you” gift of a kilo of sugar, a bar of soap, 
and a bag of salt (around a $2-4 value). During the initial explanation of the interview 
process, respondents were not told about this gift, to prevent it from influencing their 
decision about whether or not to participate. During the formal consent process, the 
interviewer told the respondent about the gift. We achieved a 100 percent response rate, 
with every individual selected for an interview agreeing to participate. Physically, the 
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data collection was quite demanding. We travelled along footpaths, deep into the village, 
often returning several times in order to find the selected potential respondent at home 
and able to be interviewed. (See Appendix B for examples of challenges in locating some 
respondents.) 
 
Conducting Interviews 
The interview questions were based on the measures of social reconstruction developed 
by Longman, Phuong, and Weinstein (2004), as discussed in Chapter Two. Interview 
topic areas were: the sense of community between residents; how community members 
rely on one another; issues of social justice in the village; and conflict and its resolution 
in the community. Additionally, I developed a section to discuss the respondent’s 
personal narrative of displacement and return and a section addressing the formal post-
conflict reconciliation and rebuilding initiatives in the community. For the interviews 
with community leaders, interview topics were similar to those for the residents, but the 
leaders were asked to comment on the community’s experience as a whole, in addition to 
their own personal experience or perspective. The final interview guide is included in 
Appendix C, and reflects several rounds of revisions following pilot interviews and 
feedback from community leaders in Lukodi, research assistants, and colleagues at the 
University of Minnesota and IPSS at Gulu University. The project research assistants 
translated the consent form and contact script, then the translator back-translated and 
made revisions. The project translator translated the interview guide, and the research 
assistants provided feedback for revision. 
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Respondents selected the interview locations, which generally were in their 
homes.24 The interviews were from 45 minutes to three hours long, with most around two 
hours long. The interviews were generally conducted in Acholi, by the research 
assistants. (See Appendix B for a discussion of gender of interviewers and respondents.) I 
personally conducted four interviews with community leaders who preferred to 
communicate in English.25 The interviews were audio recorded after receiving verbal 
consent from each respondent.26 The interviewers also took sparse notes, as possible, 
during the interview. Following the interview, they recorded fieldnotes about the context 
of the interview. 
 
Respondent Characteristics  
Table 4.1 below depicts demographic characteristics of the 91 respondents, broken down 
by community and leaders. Among residents, about four-fifths reported farming as their 
only occupation or economic activity, which is typical in northern Uganda, where the 
population depends predominantly on subsistence agriculture for their livelihood. 
Respondents range in age from 20 to 79 years old, and resident respondents in Awach 
                                                 
24 Interviews were most often at the respondent’s compound, either inside a house or seated outside in the 
shade of a tree. A smaller number of interviews, particularly with community leaders, were conducted 
around the trading centres. We did the interviews in as quiet an area as possible, making sure they were 
private so the respondent was free to express themselves. Sometimes the interviewer and respondent sat on 
wooden chairs or stools, or sometimes, with the women, they sat on a mat on the ground. I instructed the 
interviewers, even the men, to sit at the same level (on a chair or on the floor) as the respondent, to 
communicate equality of status and respect. 
25 There were about eight community leaders who seemed very comfortable communicating in English, so 
we gave them the option of interviewing in either language. Four of them said they would like to do the 
interview in English. There were also a handful of respondents fairly comfortable with English who 
conducted their interviews with the RAs in a mixture of English and Acholi. 
26 The interviewers were careful to explain the reasons for audio recordings because I had been told that 
some people might be hesitant about the recorders. The interviewers asked for the respondents’ permission 
to record and everyone agreed.   
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were generally older than in the other two communities. Nineteen respondents had no 
formal education or very low levels (Primary 1 to Primary 327); all but two of those with 
very low education were women, while men were disproportionately represented among 
those with higher education levels. A majority of residents reported they were Catholic; 
noticeably more resident respondents in Awach were Catholic, reflecting the presence of 
the well-established Catholic mission in the community. The purposive sample of leaders 
differed from residents in some significant ways. The leaders were more likely to be 
male, older, and Protestant. They were more likely to have an occupation other than, or in 
addition to, farming. 
Table 4.1. Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Interview Respondents 
 
Lukodi 
Residents 
n=20 
Anyadwe 
Residents 
n=20 
Awach 
Residents 
n=20 
Leaders 
n=31 
Male 50% 50% 50% 71% 
Farming only 80% 84% 80% 45% 
Age     
     Mean  36 years 34 years 45 years 50 years 
     Elder (55+ years) 5% 10% 25% 32% 
Education     
     High (some secondary or higher) 32% 20% 35% 35% 
     Primary (completed P4 to P7) 42% 65% 30% 52% 
     Low/None (completed P3 or below) 26% 15% 35% 13% 
Religion     
     Catholic 65% 63% 80% 48% 
     Protestant/Anglican 20% 26% 15% 48% 
     Other28 15% 11% 5% 3% 
 
Although not depicted in Table 4.1, most respondents had large households and 
were co-habitating with partners. Although it was difficult to measure consistently across 
                                                 
27 In Uganda, there are seven years of primary school (P1-P7), four years of lower secondary (S1-S4), and 
two years of upper secondary (S5-S6). 
28 The most common other religious affiliation was “born again,” which is also called “Savedee” in 
northern Uganda. Five respondents said they were born again, one respondent was Baha’i, one respondent 
claimed no religion, and there was one missing value for a resident of Anyadwe. 
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respondents,29 the average number of children was about six and the average size of a 
respondent’s compound was close to 12 people (with a range from 2 to 36 people). Most 
respondents claimed their current community to be their ancestral home or home by 
marriage, though a few of the leaders, such as in health care or education, were from 
elsewhere in the region. All respondents had been displaced by the conflict, fleeing either 
to displaced persons’ camps or to the main town of Gulu. They began gradually returning 
home in 2009 and 2010. Appendix D includes a complete list of all interview 
respondents, their genders, ages, and levels of education, which can be used as a 
reference throughout the remaining chapters. 
These figures are consistent with the socio-demographic characteristics in Gulu 
District as a whole. The 2010 survey conducted by UC-Berkeley’s Human Rights Center 
(Pham and Vinck 2010; discussed above) was representative of the adult (over 18 years) 
population in Gulu District. The average age of their sample was 39 years old, which is 
consistent with what I found. About 68 percent had no education or incomplete primary, 
while about 12 percent finished primary school, 3 percent had vocational training, and 
about 17 percent had at least some secondary school. They found approximately 59 
percent of respondents could read and write. They found about 69 percent were married, 
11 percent were never married, 6 percent divorced, and 14 percent widowed. In 2010, the 
average weekly income in Gulu District was 23,157 shillings, or about $11.50. The 
                                                 
29 This is difficult to compare between respondents. Most people were caring for a mixture of their 
biological children and children that they were responsible for because of the family structure in their clans. 
Additionally, while many respondents lived with a partner, their responses to whether or not they were 
married varied due to practices of cultural marriages and marriages in churches. Polygyny was also 
common, with many men having two to four wives. 
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income in most village areas is likely lower, particularly as most people have no means of 
income beyond their farming activities. 
 
In this chapter, I discussed my positionality and its associated implications for fieldwork. 
My socio-demographic characteristics placed me most obviously as an outsider in rural 
Uganda, yet in some ways I was an “adopted outsider,” and in some specific settings 
(such as with INGO workers) I was certainly an “insider.” I developed rapport through 
adopting an attitude of “positive naïveness” and relying heavily on cultural brokers and 
key contacts. The chapter continued with a discussion of how my data collection and 
analysis were colored by my subjective experience. I discussed my relationships to 
research subjects, both in terms of our respective places in historical and contemporary 
global power systems and in terms of the power inequalities inherent in the researcher-
subject relationship. Finally, I discussed questions of intervention and involvement, 
including how I represented myself and my objectives. 
 In the second half, I outlined my methods of data collection. During eleven 
months of fieldwork, I conducted expert interviews with a purposive sample, participant 
observation in three fieldsites, and 91 systematically selected in-depth interviews with 
village residents and leaders. To do so, I worked with a team of research assistants, 
translators, and community guides. I concluded with an overview of the socio-
demographic characteristics of interview respondents. 
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Chapter Five 
Social Unity: A Casualty of War? 
 
Dako nywal kila wore. 
A wife gives birth with a co-wife. 
 
Lagada yilo ki luwotgi. 
The elephant grass is more itchy with others. 
 
 
This chapter examines how the war, displacement, and resettlement impacted unity and 
interdependence in Lukodi, Anyadwe, and Awach. I consider how people, relative to 
before the war, feel connected to one another and to what extent they feel they are a 
cohesive unit, with a collective vision of their past and future. First, I discuss trust among 
community members, or to what extent they have confidence that their neighbor will be 
there when they need them. Second, I present responses to questions asking whether or 
not they see their village as a united community. Next, I discuss the role of traditions in 
holding the community together. Next, I analyze interdependence and reliance, 
considering how residents actually practice their need for one another in daily life, 
particularly through the practice of communal farming activities. Finally, I turn to the 
emergence and proliferation of small groups, a new post-war phenomenon that has 
shifted the organization of village life.  
Importantly, there is a minority of respondents who feel that the experience of war 
and displacement has actually improved trust and unity, who see communal work as 
actively occurring, and who appreciate the new form of unity that has come from the 
emergence of small groups. The majority of respondents, however, feel that the war 
deeply damaged the foundation of their social life; explaining how this happened is the 
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central task of this chapter. I argue that there has been a fundamental reorganization of 
social life in post-war communities, which may have problematic implications for their 
collective futures. In the following analysis, I develop how the war negatively affected 
unity through contributing to broad shifts or social change, which in turn created new 
patterns of daily social interactions, as depicted in Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.1. War Negatively Affected Unity, Causal Mechanisms 
 
 
 
Unity 
 
 Weakened trust & unity 
 In pockets or small groups 
 Instrumental or artificial 
 
Shifts in Daily Interactions 
 
 Decline of traditional cultural practices 
 Decline of communal work 
 Rise of small groups 
 
Broad Social Change 
 
 Crisis of leadership 
 Gap in socialization 
 Increasing poverty, inequality, & monetization 
 NGO interventions 
War & Displacement 
 
 “Survival of the fittest” 
 Enmity over war-time wrongs 
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I discuss perceptions of trust and unity, then the observable shifts in daily 
interactions, and interspersed throughout these discussions the four key social changes 
emerge as contributing to the decline in unity. First, a barrier to unity is the loss of 
leaders during the war. Without these leaders, there is no longer the attention to tradition, 
and community work also suffers. Second, the war created a gap in socialization so that 
young people are unable to carry on traditions. They often do not share older values and 
are not used to agricultural work. Third, poverty and inequality deepened during the war 
and this acts as another barrier to unity. And, finally, NGOs foster a particular type of 
unity but it is not all-encompassing and some see it as inauthentic.  
 
Trust after War 
In this section, I discuss respondents’ perceptions of trust in their villages.30 Before 
asking respondents to evaluate trust and how it may have changed, we first need to 
understand how they define trust. Most often, respondents describe trust as helping others 
in times of trouble or need. When a family loses a loved one, or in cases of accidents or 
sicknesses, respondents say they know they can trust their neighbors if they come to 
support the family with food, money, physical labor, or expressions of solidarity. Sarah 
Lamunu, in Lukodi, explained: 
 
                                                 
30 Respondents often brought up trust and community cohesiveness when they were asked at the very 
beginning of the interview to generally compare the quality of life now to life before the war, indicating 
that this is an essential element in their experiences of life in their village. Later in the interview, they were 
also asked directly if they feel close to their neighbors, what makes a good neighbor, and if they trust their 
neighbors. 
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I: Can you give me an example of trust that you experience in this village?   
R: Yes, an example of trust is that although we have minor frictions among us, if 
there is something serious that takes place, like for example I lost a dear child or 
someone in the family, all those people around in the community they will 
converge together to sympathize with me. So, that is it. They will also raise 
money, and they will do some collections…[and] present it to whoever is in 
need…and say, this is our contribution in order to support you in this difficult 
time. So, this is trust in practice. It was very good in the past, it was better than 
now, but it is still there, it is not completely faded…A person who is trusted, even 
if you have a problem will not shy away, will always come and say, I do not have 
anything to present but here I’ve come to express solidarity. (Interview #17) 
 
Trusted neighbors should be willing to offer loans for school fees, advice in cases of land 
disputes, transportation for a woman in labor, or other similar support in difficult 
situations. The second most common expression of trust to respondents is when people 
work together, such as digging together, participating in groups, and doing community 
service work. This type of communal work is discussed in a later section.  
 
Varied Perceptions of Trust 
Although they described their ideal picture of trust, not all respondents could describe 
specific examples of trust in action. Rather, respondents had a divergent range of views 
about whether or not people in their communities actually trust one another. As Figure 
5.2 illustrates, perceived levels of trust vary significantly between the three villages. 
When asked, “Do you think most people in your community can be trusted?” respondents 
in Lukodi had the most favorable view of local trust. This can perhaps be attributed to the 
smaller, more homogeneous population in Lukodi or to the community building efforts 
launched by NGOs in the wake of the 2004 massacre. Additionally, just two people in 
Lukodi said they thought trust was very low in their community, compared to a much 
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higher proportion (45 percent) in Anyadwe. At the time of the interviews, Anyadwe had 
recently experienced divisive antagonisms over land conflict, which perhaps decreased 
perceptions of trust. I discuss land conflict in depth in the next chapter. 
Figure 5.2. Levels of Trust Vary by Community 
 
According to many, even those who thought trust is high, the level of trust has fallen 
since before the war. Wilson, a 42-year-old man in Awach, expressed a typical sentiment: 
I: According to your observation do you think the people of this village are 
trusted? 
R: The level of trust has fallen down…Only a few are trusted at the moment. As I 
said before, before the war broke out, people were living a sincere life, trust was 
there, the actual trust was there. When people returned from the camp they 
returned with a different attitude, the trust in them seriously deteriorated. It is now 
coming down lower and lower. People no longer trust one another.  
I: So only a few are trusted? 
R: Exactly that, only a few people are trusted at the moment…One can tell you 
something sincerely, but his innermost thought he will never disclose it to you. If 
he happens to know of something he will not tell you the exact version of what he 
heard. Trust has fallen deeply. (Interview #86) 
 
Respondents described several types of people as untrustworthy or not trusted in 
their community. First, and perhaps most expectedly, many respondents do not trust 
people who drank, used drugs, stole, or were “evil” and practicing witchcraft. 
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Respondents also do not trust people who do not relate well to others, such as those who 
do not keep their promises, or who are dishonest, bitter, jealous, or greed. Finally, many 
respondents specify that they do not trust youth, meaning young people in their teens, 
twenties, and sometimes even thirties. Often, the negative behaviors described above are 
attributed to young people, particularly drinking, fighting, theft, greed, and laziness. 
 
War, Poverty, & Weakening Trust 
Some respondents made a direct, explicit connection between the lack of trust and the 
war and displacement. For example, they explained that the main problem with the youth 
is that they grew up in the camp, never knowing anything but war, so they are 
unaccustomed to living peacefully with neighbors, engaging in agricultural work, 
providing for themselves without handouts, and solving problems without violence. Otto 
James articulated this perspective: 
[The youth] are not trustworthy. If you recall, these are the bunch of children that 
were born in the camp, so it is that generation that grew within the war time. In 
the camp there was no order, there was only confusion and they grew in that 
environment of dishonesty and corruption and everything. They would see when 
food relief was brought, people would fight for food and the strongest would take 
a bigger portion while others would miss out. The children were seeing all that. 
So that gives them the impression that for survival you have to do anything—fight 
if it needs to fight, steal if you can steal it. And they have a new expression, they 
don’t say “stealing” but they say “removing.” “Removing” means to take it from 
one hand to another hand. Imagine—something evil is now painted with soft 
words: “Remove the article.” It means steal it. As I said before, from the age of 13 
to 18, these are a lost generation. At the back of their minds they just say, survival 
for the fittest. If you cannot use force [to get what you want], you use big cunning 
and remove it quietly. (Interview #60) 
 
In addition to attributing the “lost generation” to the war, respondents also made other 
connections between the war and growing distrust. For example, a head teacher in Lukodi 
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explained that people cannot trust one another now because of the history of wrongs 
between them during the war. Another respondent, in Anyadwe, said that living in the 
camp made the community “complex,” and there are now many types of people living 
together, so it is unrealistic to expect them all to trust one another.  
 From my observations, I learned that the war also indirectly contributed to the 
lack of trust in two ways: first, by igniting quarrels over land; and second, by increasing 
poverty and creating greater discrepancies between “rich” and poor. In responding to the 
trust interview question, nine respondents in Anyadwe, three in Awach, and one in 
Lukodi mentioned that land disputes lead to distrust in the community. Some explained 
that those involved in land disputes cannot trust one another, while others said more 
generally that they cannot trust people who are fighting over land or “grabbing” land. 
This is a major issue detracting from trust and unity in all three communities, one that is 
discussed in much greater detail in the next chapter. 
 Many respondents also explained that economic issues are at the center of 
distrust. Several respondents mentioned that trust is a unique challenge for people living 
in poverty. When you are poor, they explained, you do not have the luxury of trusting 
others to pay you when promised, you are struggling too much yourself to be able to help 
neighbors with their needs, and you may resort to less than admirable measures to make 
ends meet. Walter Ocira said, “When people are poor, they tend to do anything. Take for 
example a person who is starving. In order to get something, he can do anything or say 
anything” (Interview #30). 
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Several people also mentioned that they can only trust people who are at their 
same level of wealth, saying that the poor only trust the poor and the rich only trust the 
rich.31 For example, Betty Labong, from Anyadwe, said:  
I: Are the people within the community full of trust for one another? 
R: Yes, there are some people who are really trusted, and people also trust them, 
but not everybody. The majority are not trusted. 
I: Why is that so? 
R: The problem is those who are already living an easy life, who seem to have 
most of the things they need, they feel that in bringing nearer to them the poor 
people, they will deplete their resources. So in order to keep them at bay, they are 
not to associate, not to give the impression that you love him or her, so that they 
are discouraged and they stay away from you. That is the mentality of most 
people here. If they are to socialize, they will do it at their level, with fellow rich 
fellows, but they cannot mix with less privileged people like us here. (Interview 
#44) 
 
Ultimately, distrust between socio-economic groups means the rich and poor both see one 
another as fundamentally interested in the other’s misfortune and unable to engage in 
social exchange without a question of exploitation and money. Frances, in Lukodi, 
explained how the rising importance of money is related to a concurrent decline in trust: 
R: People are money-minded. So when people can only exchange things it means 
trust is fading away. People should be able to help each other, even for free. It is 
now difficult to find people who can take something and give it off without 
requesting anything in return.   
I: So it means a person who is not trusted cannot give things freely? 
R: Yes, that person will not give anything to you freely. These days when you 
request something, the question will come back, “For how much?” So that 
question…means nothing is given freely. (Interview #19) 
 
As Figure 5.2 indicated, there was a substantial minority of respondents, 
particularly in Lukodi, who did think that most people in their communities are trusted. 
                                                 
31 The term “rich” needs to be understood in context, as very few (likely, none) members of these 
communities would be considered “rich” by external standards, but the better-off community members may 
have more permanent housing structures, livestock (particularly cattle), money for school fees, and access 
to larger-scale farming techniques, like ox-plows. 
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Unfortunately, however, there were many respondents who reported that most people 
cannot be trusted and they feel unsure about whether or not people in their community 
would really help them in times of need. As David, a religious leader in Anyadwe, 
explained, people who do not trust each other will not look out for their neighbor and 
their distrust can lead to fear, sabotage, and rejoicing in neighbors’ misfortunes: 
I: Are [people who cannot trust each other] in this community? 
R: Yes, the moment a person comes to suspect even slightly that you can harm 
him, he will always live in doubt. He will always keep you in question mark. 
When I have any slight suspicion that you are against me, I will also fear 
you…when I know that you are against me, I will not trust you anymore, and that 
means I don’t love you anymore. And if I hear anything that will harm you, I will 
just simply keep quiet, I will not alert you. Because to me, your downfall is even 
better; I will rejoice over your downfall. Sometimes such a person may even be 
the one now drawing some schemes to destroy you. Either he will keep you 
uninformed, or he may even actively take part in trapping you. (Interview #40) 
 
 Ultimately, this environment of distrust seems to spring from the displacement 
period, in which people were pitted against one another in a struggle to survive and make 
ends meet. With the decline of agricultural activity in the camp, the influx of outside 
resources, and the rise of wage labor and small businesses, interactions now seem to be 
heavily focused around money, which people fault as giving rise to greed and jealousy. 
As many now live in situations of dire poverty, struggling to restart their productive 
agricultural activities after having lost essentially all their assets during the war, people 
seem reluctant to help their neighbors in need, even if some technically have the means to 
do so.  
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How War Can Help & Hurt Unity 
Exploring trust and distrust is one way to understand social cohesion, but the interviews 
also asked respondents to comment more directly on unity. When asked “Do you think 
the people of your village are united?” and “If you compare it to the time before the war, 
are people more or less united now?” most respondents described a mixed picture of 
unity in their villages. Respondents were asked first to define a “united community,” and 
they typically described positive characteristics, such as people working collectively in 
farm work, coming together to solve problems, celebrating together, helping out in times 
of troubles, and visiting one another regularly. They also described an absence of some 
behaviors, such as people not “backbiting” one another (talking behind someone’s back), 
not quarreling, and not lying to one another. Some also described more intangible 
characteristics, such as people feeling close to one another and having “one mind” with 
their neighbors. 
Three unique perspectives emerged, as Figure 5.3 shows. First, there are some 
respondents who viewed unity quite positively, and discussed how unity has improved 
since (or because of) the war. Second, there were a minority of respondents who spoke 
unequivocally about the lack of unity since the war. Most respondents, however, 
described a mixed picture of unity, praising some positive developments in post-war 
unity, but at the same time leveling serious critiques. 
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Figure 5.3. Respondents See Mixed Picture of Unity 
 
Similarly to their positive views on trust, respondents in Lukodi were more likely 
than those in Anyadwe or Awach to see post-war unity as strong. As depicted in Figure 
5.3, nearly a third of respondents in Lukodi said that their community was united or that 
their unity was stronger than it was before the war. Overwhelmingly, however, most 
respondents in all three communities described a mixed picture of unity, discussing some 
ways that unity is weak and some elements of strong unity. Unlike trust, views on unity 
were relatively consistent across communities. This perhaps suggests that asking about 
unity is a broader question, less affected by particularities of social relationships in 
specific villages. The trust question, however, is more specific and tangible, asking if 
respondents actually trust their neighbors. Together, these two measures provide a more 
nuanced picture of social relationships than either could separately. 
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“Unity That Came with the War” 
Respondents who felt unity had actually improved since or because of the war cite 
several reasons. One explanation is that being displaced to the camps forced people into 
greater physical proximity to one another. Bosco, a business leader in Anyadwe, talked of 
how he now tries to maintain the relationships he formed while in the camp: 
I do not deny there was unity among people before the war, but I feel that the 
unity has grown…this unity involves people of the bigger community, and 
wherever you move you find—even in the remotest corner of the community—
people know each other, and they are even interested in one another. So I think 
this unity is better. In a way, when we were pushed together to the camp, we 
started becoming acquainted with one another. We became close friends in the 
camp, and when the camp was dismantled and we were to leave and go to 
different directions, our link still remains. Even up to now when we are living 
kilometers apart, I will still take time and ride to my friend who is on the other 
end of the sub-county, and we feel still as close as before, despite the distance that 
has been created. So to me, that is a sign of unity that came with the war. 
(Interview #37) 
 
Not only were people pushed together, but they found they needed to rely on one another 
to a greater extent than before the war. Juliano explained how people needed one another 
to survive: 
Before the war, people were carefree. In fact, they had everything so there was 
little need to unite, because you had almost everything you needed, all you 
wanted for your family. So before the war, people lived their own lives 
individually, not caring so much for their neighbors, because they actually did not 
need the help of their neighbors. But when the war broke out, people felt they 
needed one another. If you get a piece of news, you will run to share with you 
neighbor: “Remember this thing is happening like this, there.” So people became 
united as a result of suffering. So I would say that the war somehow forced people 
to unite and the level of unity now is higher than that before the war. Yes, the 
level of unity has developed. (Interview #28) 
 
Some emphasized the spread of poverty during the war, saying this actually 
improved unity by bringing people together and forcing them to rely on one another. 
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Additionally, some respondents see less inequality in the post-war period, which also 
strengthens unity, as everyone is now “at the same level.” When Thomas, a middle-aged 
man in Awach, was asked to compare unity now to before the war, he talked about how 
poverty forces unity: 
When I look at it carefully, at that time there was peace, fine. But the unity that 
was there was not as clearly seen and felt as now. People had almost everything 
they wanted, therefore there was not much need to come together. People could 
afford anything without coming to a neighbor. Now when I see, after the war, I 
think it is poverty that is now pushing people to unite. So, there is higher level of 
unity today after the war than it was before the war. (Interview #84)   
 
Thomas went on to say that NGOs and government programs played a role in 
teaching people how to come together to help support one another, saying “All this came 
about because the NGOs and the government organs I think trained the people to come 
closer to one another.” This was an explanation offered by several respondents for 
improved unity. For example, a woman in Awach explained that unity is strong, and she 
attributes this to NGOs combating ignorance:  
R: Yes, [now] people just help you. When they understand your problem, they 
help you…when they understand the kind of help you need, they offer to help…   
I: So I’ve gathered from you now that there is at least unity in this 
community…Am I right? What about in the past? 
R: Maybe in the past it was ignorance. Although there was peace, the people were 
not so much united because of ignorance. But today people are all kinds of 
sensitized. These days we have so many people who are literate and informed. 
Now, these days we have a lot of NGOs. These NGOs, when they see where life 
is low and can be uplifted, they come in straight away. (Interview #74)   
 
Similar responses emphasized the rise of education and information, saying that people 
are better informed about the benefits of working together, giving them a “deeper 
awareness” of unity. Felix Ojok, an elected leader in Lukodi, framed it explicitly in terms 
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of people knowing their rights because of NGO “sensitization.” He said this is a positive 
result of the war: 
…if I compare the level of unity and the quality of unity I would say this unity 
will eventually be superior to the unity that I knew before the war. Because there 
have been more sensitization programs, people are very united. People know their 
rights and they know the rights of their neighbors, so this unity is an informed 
unity. Although war is generally very bad and we don’t like it, but after having 
suffered this war, people have learned something new. They’ve learned to unite, 
they’ve learned to do things collectively. So this is something that might have not 
been learned quickly if there were no war. So I’m not encouraging war but I’m 
saying out of this war, something positive also came up. (Interview #9) 
 
Relatedly, a few respondents emphasized that NGO and government programs helped to 
create small groups in the community, which increase unity among people. This is a 
phenomenon that will be addressed in greater detail later in the chapter. 
It is important to emphasize that some survivors of war see the war and living in 
the camps as actually having improved unity. It is tempting to tell a monolithic, bleak 
narrative of how war destroys everything good in peoples’ lives. In this case, however, 
some respondents not only see that unity survived the war, but also recognize some ways 
that the war may have unexpectedly helped. 
 
“A Form of Unity Which is not Real”  
However, as Figure 5.3 revealed, most respondents had a mixed perception of unity, 
describing both positive and negative aspects of post-war unity, seeing people as united 
in some ways, but also expressing concern that unity is in some ways inauthentic or 
incomplete. For example, when asked if they think their community is united, many 
respondents said it was, but when asked follow up questions (particularly asking them to 
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compare unity now to that of the past), they went on to reveal conflicted perceptions of 
unity. In this vein, Frank Acellam, a leader of a school in Anyadwe, said that people are 
united, but not to the level of before the war:  
…currently, people are united. Only that for us, who at least have knowledge 
about the past, we see that there is a difference. But if somebody never knew what 
was there, they see that people are united. And they are united. If you don’t want 
to compare [to before the war]. That’s it. (Interview #39) 
 
Auma Christine explained that before the war, they did not use the term jirani, which 
means “neighbor.” Rather, before the war, people saw one another as family, without the 
one step removal that seeing someone as a neighbor implies. She explained the rise of the 
concept of jirani: 
The unity of those days was good because of these reasons: those days we used 
not to have the issues of neighbors. You would term them as children in the 
homestead. But the word jirani just came because of the camp. [Before the war] 
there was unity within the homestead, and whenever you were not there, you 
would find that your home has been taken care of very well. That was the kind of 
unity that used to exist. But now days the unity is in halves—only with the 
neighbors that you cooperate with. (Interview #77) 
 
Others similarly said that there is unity, but that it is lacking some way, such as: 
there are only “pockets” of unity; there is not “sincerity” in today’s unity; people come 
together when they have to but not “spontaneously”; people only unite with those who 
are “cooperative”; and people unite only if there are serious problems, not in everyday 
situations. A man in Anyadwe said, “People are still living just their individual lives. If 
we meet, we meet just to sell and buy, like in the market, or to drink, but we don’t call 
that one communal is stricter sense” (Interview #60). Some respondents said that unity 
now is fundamentally of a different type than the unity in the past, whereas others said 
that recreating unity is a process and they just are not yet to the “same level” or as “full-
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fledged” as unity in the past. Respondents also explained that some people choose not to 
participate in unity, instead preferring to be isolated, or that people may appear united, 
but that may not really be their true feelings: 
There is unity in all these homes, but all are different. In Acholi, they say that a 
calabash is clean from outside, but dirty from inside, meaning that someone might 
welcome you outwardly, but you might not know what he or she has at heart. He 
might just say something with the mouth, but from the heart he will be saying, “I 
just talk to this person because I have to, but I don’t like him totally and 
completely.” He would be saying that, “I wish this person would just go to my 
hut; he wouldn’t come out alive.” (Interview #71) 
 
Rather than joining together because of a desire to be with one another, several 
respondents said that people only “unite” in order to benefit in some way, creating an 
instrumental type of unity. Steven Okumu, a cultural leader in Lukodi, described this as 
an “artificial” unity: 
I: If you compare the level of unity now and the level of unity before the war, are 
they the same? 
R: Yes, there is a big difference; that unity was superb, it was a clear and sincere 
unity.  This unity that people are trying now is conditional, you come together if 
you want to get something. It’s not so much love and affection that binds you, but 
it is if you want to get something you have to come together. So, to me, this unity 
is not real, but it is a form of unity anyway…Today we are trying, but honestly it 
is not the level of unity that was experienced before the war…the kind of unity we 
have is a form of unity which is not real…the heart is externally showing unity, 
but secretly and deep down is full of a lot of questions. And that is the kind of 
unity we are living with. It is like, I would say, an artificial unity. (Interview #5) 
 
Respondents described how people will come together when they think they are going to 
benefit, attend community meetings when they think they will be paid, and work together 
on projects that will directly help themselves. Their expectations are colored by their 
interactions with NGO and government programs during the war and resettlement, which 
would not only bring development projects to the villages, but would pay “sitting 
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allowances” to people who would come to meetings, participate in workshops, or receive 
training. A reverend in Lukodi, Evelyn Auma, explained how people begin attending 
church again when they hear rumors that a project may be starting: 
I: In this village do you think people are united?   
R: Well, it is difficult to measure the level of unity here. But one thing I can say 
with certainty is that when there is something interesting, something people know 
is good, then you can see the way people can come up fast. For example, if people 
come to know that there is help—like it happened here in Lukodi that the Church 
of Uganda came up with a project to support a certain category of people. On 
announcing that in the church, you can see the turn up, it means people turn up 
very fast when they know they’re going to benefit. Even those who did not used 
to come for prayer, you will see the level how they pray now more regularly. 
(Interview #1) 
 
In contrast to the respondents in the previous section who said that poverty since 
the war has improved unity, many others linked post-war economic shifts to decreased 
unity. These respondents said that because people are so poor, it makes unity impossible. 
People are focusing on their own lives and their own families’ survival, so they are not 
left with the will, energy, or even the resources needed to cooperate with one another. 
Further, some said that in the post-war period, the rich and the poor are less united, as the 
rich scorn the poor and those who are particularly vulnerable are left to fend for 
themselves. As a village health leader explained:  
I: …do you think this community is united? 
R: They are not. 
I: Okay. Can you tell me more? 
R: Because in this community, the rich…don’t mind about people. The poor, they 
are just left, they are suffering there. The handicapped, who cannot do anything, 
they are just left, they are suffering. Some of them are still in the camp. They have 
nowhere to go. I say they are not united at all. They don’t care about people. They 
don’t care about the old, they don’t care about the people with AIDS. So they are 
not united really. (Interview #35)  
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Extending upon this, some said that the rise of money has led to jealousy and 
greed, which is incompatible with unity. People try to monopolize program resources for 
only their families, are jealous of others’ successes, and think that money is the only way 
to solve their problems. George, a religious leader, said, “Nowadays, people unite 
because they want to benefit; it’s full of greed…Nowadays you unite only for a short 
time and then people get divided. The love for money has grown” (Interview #68). Betty, 
a young woman in Awach, said that people unite to benefit personally, but they also 
actively try to keep their neighbors from benefiting, so they join groups with people not 
in their immediate areas:  
It is difficult to understand completely the mind of an individual what he or she 
thinks in his heart. Maybe there are some elements in the community that they are 
opposed to and they think that if they bring development here, their so-called 
enemy will become beneficiaries. It could be some selfish thought of this kind or 
that maybe the person is too hard-working that he will excel and become even 
better than me. When there is an opportunity for anything, instead of letting the 
people of his or her community understand it first, he will go and alert people in 
another community to take the chance to make use of such opportunity. 
(Interview #73) 
 
Some respondents directly connected this rise of greed and selfishness to the war, such as 
Wilson in Awach: 
When the war came and now the war is gone, all of the unity among people has 
fallen miserably…These days people are money-minded, too much money 
minded. All because while in the camp the people suffered too much and they’ve 
come to believe more and more in the use of money. They think that it’s only 
money that can get them out of problems. It has gone down in the belief of the 
people, people have got that conviction. People have left the camp and returned to 
their home, but their mentality has not changed. (Interview #86)  
 
Additionally, as with trust, disputes over land use and ownership is directly connected to 
unity. Respondents talked both about how the emergence of land conflict is indicative of 
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fallen unity and, on the flip side, how land conflict divides people and destroys unity. 
This is a topic which is addressed in much greater detail in the next chapter. 
While respondents discussed above noted key benefits to unity that may have 
come from the war, many other respondents linked the disintegration of unity to wartime 
experiences and life in the camps. First of all, the camps brought economic and lifestyle 
changes that exacerbated tensions and decreased unity. For example, one respondent 
spoke of how rich and poor had to live beside one another in the camps, and this brought 
tensions between them. Another told of how people from many areas were gathered 
together, all with distinct behaviors and practices, which caused strain in the community. 
Others talked of increasing laziness as people were not farming. Richard Oyat, the 
headmaster of a school, described how the camp cultivated a survival of the fittest 
mentality, which is still causing division because post-war program resources are not split 
equally among all residents: 
I: Why do you think there is no unity now days? 
R: The lifestyle. That is how I look at it. When people were in the camp it was a 
matter of being the strongest and who is fast, and that is what people think of. 
And if possible everything should be for free, according to them. This is the 
attitude in the community…They always want free things, and if it’s there he 
should get more than the others. And that is what is causing division among 
people. There is no equal distribution…[Y]ou find that one will just pick the 
auntie’s son [to receive benefits], and this is causing division to the society. And 
others just end up saying, no, this is for so and so’s family…And yet there are 
others who are struggling on their own. Others are benefitting. (Interview #67) 
 
 In addition to these changes that occurred in the camps, according to respondents, 
unity has also been weakened because people have grievances over war-time abuses and 
accusations, resulting in continuing enmity. For example, some members of the 
community who were abducted in the course of the war committed abuses or killed others 
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in the community. Or, as Moro, a young man in Lukodi, described, there are cases where 
an individual abducted another person from the community, and then they eventually 
return, yet the one they abducted never came back: 
I: Do you see any difference between this life and the life you lived here before the 
war, regarding unity? 
R: Yes, there is a problem here. During the war some LRA, who happened to 
come from this village, came back and abducted yet other youth, and took those 
youth into the bush. Sometimes these youth they have taken did not come back, 
but they, instead, managed to come back. So people have got that grievance, that 
so-and-so abducted my son or my daughter, took him or her to the bush, and we 
don't know what has become of our children, but they somehow returned and they 
are so healthy. So that kind of pointing and accusing fingers, stigmatizing those 
people, is still there. People really look at them in silence, that, my daughter or 
my son did not return, but he came back, and yet he took them. But before the 
war, there were no grievances of that kind because nothing had happened among 
people, so there was no cause of enmity; but today is a different story. 
I: So it means people are not united? 
R: Yes, they are not so much united because, naturally, if people know that you 
took the son or the daughter of so-and-so…if you come back alive the way they 
will look at you is that deep down in their hearts they have maybe not forgiven 
you. (Interview #22) 
 
In addition to such deep harbored feelings, according to Acholi culture, when there is 
such a conflict or wrong between two parties, their families are not to interact with one 
another until it is officially resolved. One respondent talked of how war breeds division, 
particularly along clan or family lines, as people are unable or unwilling to let go of what 
happened in the past: 
…For me, another cause of being a divided community is recalling things that 
might have happened in the past. You know our past contains both the good and 
the bad, but sometimes people are not willing to let the bad things of the past go. 
They are somehow still clinging to that and they continue telling the generations 
to come that, remember in the past so and so did us like this…When people have 
[this] already deep down in their heart, at the surface they may try to coat it with 
sweet words and smile, but the smiles are not even sincere, and deep down in 
their heart they are hating each other and that one is serious…I’ve already noticed 
that many times when people fight at the beer party, sometimes serious fights, it’s 
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not because they have picked a fight but it means they have kind of reopened the 
old wounds. The wounds are already there but it’s a matter of just opening the 
cover and then the whole thing will explode. (Interview #49) 
 
A few other respondents similarly talked of how people were traumatized during the war 
and in the camps, and this, understandably, made them less able to trust and feel less 
united with their neighbors. Although not all, or not even the majority, of respondents 
brought up such issues in discussing trust and unity, it is likely that this unspoken context 
of deep and recent trauma colors their perceptions of post-war social life. 
This section has shown a complex picture of post-war unity. Some told the 
unexpected story of how the war helped strengthen unity, essentially forcing unity 
through camp proximity, poverty, and the struggle to survive—all facilitated by NGOs’ 
“sensitization” about unity. Yet, most saw problems and challenges to post-war unity, 
speaking of the emergence of jirani, isolated pockets of unity, and insincere or 
instrumental unity. These challenges to unity emerge directly from the experience of war 
and displacement, particularly through the prevalence of a “survival of the fittest” 
mentality and lasting enmity over war-time wrongs. In the following sections, I turn to 
three additional causal mechanisms that help explain how the war affected unity: the loss 
of culture and traditions, the decline in communal work, and the emergence of small 
groups as the dominant form of social organization. 
 
Destruction & Loss of Culture  
Many interview respondents and other people in the course of fieldwork talked about 
culture as something that they used to have, but during the war it was destroyed or lost. 
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Some said that Acholi communities do not have culture anymore, while others talked 
about a process of rebuilding the culture that was damaged. Of course, it is not unusual to 
romanticize the past, even in the absence of a war, but people in northern Uganda 
expressed deep concern over how this affects their current lives and may affect their 
future; for this reason, I explore the source of their concern.  
In post-war villages, many residents are distraught by the lack of solidarity. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, there are various types of unity or solidarity that can hold 
people together. In the course of my fieldwork, residents of northern Uganda expressed a 
longing for the substantive or mechanical solidarity of their past, when people felt united 
by shared values and understandings that they now lack. At the same time, there is not 
strong procedural or organic solidarity, either, because their social organization is not 
based upon difference or specialization. Most respondents, it seems, are left wondering 
what holds their communities together at all. For many, culture and tradition are the 
essential, substantive glue that are necessary to solidify bonds between people in their 
communities; without culture, they are not certain what can hold people together.  
When talking about the “loss of culture,” people typically spoke of culture as a 
fixed “thing,” a conception that does not fit well with social scientists’ perceptions of 
culture as ever-changing ways that people think and interact with others and the material 
world. Although people in Uganda use the word “culture” in this particular context, I 
suggest that they are referring to a set of phenomenon quite distinct from sociologists’ 
perceptions and perhaps better akin to the concept of “traditions.” Specifically, when 
people talked about the loss of culture, they most often referred to: 1) long-standing 
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communal practices; 2) leadership structures of elders and chiefs; and 3) rituals 
connecting the spiritual and physical worlds.  
Many people in northern Uganda lament the decrease or disappearance of specific 
communal traditions. Particularly, many respondents talked about the lack of customary 
dances. In the past, people would come together to dance for a wide range of occasions, 
such as celebrations, events honoring leaders, and funeral dances. Particular dances were 
practiced by certain segments of the population, such as dances intended specifically for 
young people or women. Although there are some dance troupes still functioning, they 
tend to be relatively specialized, rather than involving large segments of the population in 
the ritual. Another practice that as often cited as disappeared is that of wang oo, which is 
when members of a household sit around a courtyard fire at night for the elders to tell 
stories to the children. Lapolo Gloria, a woman in Anyadwe, explained the practice: 
In the past, there was what we call wang oo, and in the evening children, women, 
men, youth, all gathered around the wang oo. They would sit there and narrate 
many things. Somebody can tell his story of the day, what happened, his plan for 
tomorrow. Others will also tell tales or stories with some meaning. Also that is the 
time to teach the children moral values, of how to live respectably in the 
community. So it was a meaningful time, but wang oo is gone with the war. Now 
we are trying to see if it can be revived. (Interview #45) 
 
As this quote alludes, many respondents highly value leadership from elders, and 
thus see declines in traditional leadership structures as extremely problematic. Many of 
these leaders passed away while people were in the camps, and a new generation of 
leaders did not emerge during that chaotic time period. Additionally, several respondents 
described the elders and leaders now as weak, corrupt, or otherwise unable to perform the 
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tasks of leadership. Betty, a young woman in Awach quoted earlier, said that elders now 
are lost themselves, which makes them unable to lead the younger generations: 
I: What caused people in the past to be more united and not so much now? 
R: I think our culture was valued and it was cherished and it was taught by the 
elders to the younger generations. So, the elders were taking time to instruct the 
younger generation, a thing I don’t see any more these days. Though I was still 
young, I am able to remember [before war] to compare with this life. And I 
confirmed from my parents. They say that life was very good. Even my parents, 
they say that this life now is a kind of degenerated life. The elders [have] lost 
direction themselves. I could even say that the brilliant elders that used to cherish 
the [younger] generation by instructing them are all gone. The elders we have 
today are indifferent elders…they themselves are already a lost case…so they are 
lost and the children [now] do whatever they like, without guidance. There is 
peace, but minus this good culture, our life is ruined. (Interview #73) 
 
Adong Evelyn explained that elders were the “conscience of the community,” and said 
there are no longer such elders around to safeguard unity: 
I: Why do you say [before the war] was the best kind of unity? 
R: Because people used to actually value unity very much, and they were 
speaking the truth, and that was it. Elders were there, and the elders were very 
concerned with the unity of the community members. They were like the 
conscience of the community. They would tell you, do this and don’t do that. This 
one is bad. And people were very obedient to the elders. That forced unity very 
much before the war. Now, there are no elders; all those wonderful elders are 
gone now. What we have now are just an indifferent confused lot of elders. These 
present elders, they don’t stand up as those elders used to do and speak with 
boldness, maybe discouraging some things or promoting something good. 
(Interview #78) 
 
According to respondents, respect for elders and traditional leaders has declined 
because of this lack of leadership but also because the generation that grew up in the 
camps did not learn respect for leaders to the same extent that past generations had. As 
such, elders, clan leaders, and chiefs have seen a decline in their influence and respect in 
the community. The most important local level traditional leaders, the rodi kweri, have 
declined in importance; their role is to oversee communal life as it involves farming, but 
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there are increasing numbers of people not participating in communal work (as I address 
in the next section) or even farming at all. 
Finally, people see a deep connection of the spirit world and the physical world, 
and traditional rituals are used to maintain positive relationships between the two. When 
there are bad spirits or unresolved spiritual issues, there are repercussions not only for 
physical health or well-being, but also on relationships between people in the community. 
There are bad spirits (cen) from things that happened in the war, but also between people 
in the resettlement period. Because people, particularly the young generation, are less 
aware or mindful of these issues (and what practices are needed to cleanse cen), many see 
the relationships between people as contaminated.  
Lapolo Gloria, the young woman quoted above talking about wang oo, talked 
about how people are trying to reclaim these elements of their culture or traditions that 
bring people together: 
I: If you compare the quality and the level of unity now to that level of unity that 
existed before the war, what comparison can you make? 
R: I can say that people are just learning to live again as a community, because 
during the camp life, that was not a community life. People were like they were in 
prison. You don't call prisoners community, they are just forced to live together. 
But now people have come out of the prison—called camp—and they are now 
learning how to recapture the value of cultural heritage. It is still a process, and it 
is not perfect either. (Interview #45) 
 
Some previous scholarship on post-conflict rebuilding suggests that communities must 
form a “new normal,” rather than focusing too much energy on trying to recreate their 
previous life (Corkalo et al. 2004). In northern Uganda, however, I found a distinct desire 
to preserve or rebuild key elements from communal life before the war. The next section 
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turns to communal work in the villages, which is a highly valued element of culture that 
respondents nearly unanimously cited as essential to trust, unity, and cohesiveness. 
 
Shifting Interdependence and Reliance  
In order to transfer the “peace,” decided by elites, from fragile coexistence to a deeper 
sense of community, daily social contact is essential, as it promotes “indirect” 
reconciliation (Biro et al. 2004; Daly and Sarkin-Hughes 2007). 
 
Communal Work as an Expression of Unity 
Respondents said that the practice of communal work is the primary way in which 
residents practice interdependence and reliance.32 “Digging in the garden” is residents’ 
predominant daily activity, with survival depending upon agricultural productivity. While 
this work is often done individually, there are also important systems of communal work. 
This section discusses communal work practices in the post-war period, arguing that 
there have been significant changes to such practices as a result of the war and 
displacement. 
Although important, respondents were not only interested in communal work as a 
way to increase agricultural productivity; rather, they described communal digging as 
essential to community life, so they were very concerned about declines or changes in 
                                                 
32 Respondents talked about communal work, interdependence, and reliance in response to several 
interview questions. When asked what makes a community united and if their village is united, many 
people talked about collective work. Respondents also talked about interdependence and reliance when 
they were asked to describe a recent project where people worked together for the good of the community, 
when they were asked to describe their daily activities and recent interactions, and when they were asked 
about the last time they needed to ask for help from someone. 
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these practices. In defining unity, many respondents said that they know a community is 
united if people are working collectively; therefore, respondents often idealized group 
digging because they saw it as intimately connected to unity. There are many positive 
social benefits to collective work, such as functioning as a time to share information and 
knowledge, teach young people, support vulnerable community members who need help, 
get to know each other, and socialize with neighbors. A woman in Anyadwe explained 
that working in groups shows that people are united: 
I: When we say the people of Ajulu are united, what does it mean? 
R: That is when you don’t practice jealousy and enmity, when you live like 
children of one family and yet you are a big community. When we live in a group. 
Everything we do together, we maybe celebrate together, we have meetings 
together. In garden work, ranging from digging, going to weeding, going to 
harvest, going to thrashing and harvesting, we do it always in a group. Then you 
can say the community is united. People who come to visit will go back knowing 
that the people of this village are truly united. (Interview #50) 
 
Nearly every respondent explained that digging collectively was a defining 
feature of lives in their villages before the war. Because of this, they usually explained, 
the unity of the past was stronger than it is now. Since returning home, however, 
communal work is less common and the type of group work has changed. Betty, a 
resident of Awach, talked of the value of communal work, and explained that it is no 
longer happening as it did in the past: 
I: What is the difference, do you think people were more united in the past than 
now? 
R: Yes, in the past people were practicing unity single-heartedly. 
I: Can you give an example to show that people were more united in the past than 
now? 
R: Even digging, people used to dig together. In this area here, everybody would 
just flock together. They say that today, we are going to dig the garden of so and 
so everybody will turn up there. You dig together and have social time together, 
social moments together. If somebody has encountered some hardship or has lost 
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a dear one people will come to such a person. But these days things are different.  
Although people are enjoying peace, the unity is lacking. So, people in the past 
before the war were more united and now people after the war are severely 
divided. (Interview #73)   
 
 
Communal Farming Practices 
There are different systems of communal work, with varying expectations for rotation 
and for compensation. Aleya is the most common type of collective work now, and most 
respondents claimed that it is the only type of communal work that is still practiced. 
Aleya is a rotating system of collective digging, in which the group of usually not more 
than ten people digs in the field of one group member each day. Typically, they decide by 
lottery the order of the fields they will dig. There is no expectation for payment at all, and 
at the end of the day, the group members go to their respective homes, joining together 
again the next day to dig the next member’s field. These rotating digging groups are often 
nearby neighbors and extended family members, and while some groups have both 
women and men, several respondents said that women are more likely to work 
collectively.  
While aleya was happening in all three communities, it was most common in 
Lukodi; in contrast, several respondents in Anyadwe and Awach said that even aleya was 
not happening at all, clearly indicating that, at a minimum, some people are left out of 
communal work activities. Part of the explanation for this difference may lay in how 
much people trust their neighbors. To devote time and energy to working in neighbors’ 
fields, it is necessary to trust that neighbors will also show up to help when it is time to 
dig your field. As noted previously, in Lukodi, 56 percent of respondents felt that they 
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could trust all (or almost everyone) in their community, and this trust likely influences 
the prevalence of rotating group work. 
Although many respondents did say they dig in aleya groups, it is not practiced 
uniformly within communities. In Anyadwe, particularly, quite a few respondents say 
that no form of communal work, including aleya, is happening in their area at all, with a 
few saying that there had been efforts to start such work, but that it always seemed to fail. 
Similarly in Awach, several respondents said there was no collective work, as Adong 
Evelyn insisted, even after repeated questioning from the interviewer: 
I: Can you recall a time when the people of Paduny here came together to work 
for the common good of the people?  
R: No, nothing. 
I: You mean the whole of Paduny Paromo here has never come up to do 
something in common, in a group? 
R: Nothing. Under this rwot kweri, we have never come up to do something as a 
group. 
I: How about in the whole of Paduny? Here in Paduny Paromo, when people 
came to do some communal work…? 
R: Nothing, nothing, I have not seen anything. I haven’t seen anything good that 
they have done. 
I: Do you mean that you don’t cooperate, you don’t collaborate to do communal 
work? 
R: No, we don’t unite…as far as sharing work, a communal work, is concerned I 
have never seen any. That one I have never seen any. 
I: It means you…don’t collaborate to do any work for the good of the community? 
R: No, nothing, nothing. 
I: …Maybe on some days the leaders will say, “You people we want you to come 
together on such a day to do this kind of work”? 
R: Well, I can say that before the war, the village chief would mobilize people to 
come and maybe take turns in digging the field of every community 
member…But that was before we went to the camp. Now that we have returned 
from the camp, nothing like that has happened, not even the rwot okoro or the 
rwot kweri has come up to mobilize people. Such things are not there anymore, so 
people are doing their individual work. 
I: What about the leaders who sometimes mobilize people to come and do such 
work? …Is there anything besides digging that people come to do together? 
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R: Nothing. Nothing, up to now as I am speaking, there is nothing like that. 
Nothing is happening here. In other communities or other villages it may be a 
different story. Here, nothing completely. (Interview #78) 
 
A few said that people would occasionally join together temporarily for a task, but 
disband after they accomplished it. Many respondents in these two communities agreed 
that while some people may participate in aleya, there are many others who do not, 
instead only working individually.   
Even in Lukodi, where aleya was reported more commonly than in the other two 
communities, many respondents explained that the practice is not being done “to the 
same level” as it was in the past. For example, there may be internal dissention, conflict, 
and gossip in the group, as a woman in Lukodi explained: 
I: Are [people in the village] united? 
R: Yes, they are united although there is also some degree of weakness in that 
unity. For instance, they would start up a group for digging together called aleya. 
But after some time, there is a split again in that group and people pair in twos or 
sometimes a small band, so this kind of weakness. So, unity is there but unity with 
some deformity also… 
I: …Can you explain a little more?   
R: Yes, it’s kind of weakness within the unity—I give an example that we accept 
to go and dig a field together of one of our neighbors and we all converge there 
and maybe I’m first in finishing my portion of digging very fast and leave others 
behind and I come home.  But some people who may feel ill of me will begin to 
speak all kinds of things when I’ve gone home. So, this is the kind of weakness I 
see. It is weakness within the unity…   
I: So after that now you will begin to live in tension and doubting one another.    
R: Yeah, it sometimes deteriorates so badly that a member or some members will 
decide to leave the group because of things happening like that. (Interview #17) 
 
Even where aleya is happening, respondents described the practice as more “selective,” 
not “whole-hearted,” or on a “smaller scale” than it was before the war. 
While aleya is still happening, at least to some extent, other forms of collective 
work are not. Most commonly, respondents lamented the loss of a practice called awak. 
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For awak, people dig in a large group, usually mobilized by local leaders, and they are 
typically “compensated” at the end of the day in food and beer. A few people said that 
community members in the past would come for awak even if they were not going to 
receive food and drink, because they were responding to a need of someone in the 
village. Respondents described awak as a “special kind of unity” and as an important 
social event. A 58-year-old woman in Awach said:  
I: If you are to compare on how people rely on each other now and how people 
relied on each other before the war, how is it? 
R: There is a lot of difference, because those days there was a lot of reliance, but 
now days there is only little reliance…In those days there was a type of digging 
called awak, whereby people would come and dig—maybe the whole village 
would come together and dig. And then they would dig and drink alcohol and 
then eat food. They would sing and dance, and then there would be a competition 
among women that she should also host an awak. But now days it’s no more… 
I: What is the difference between awak and aleya? 
R: Awak involves a lot of cooking…They only dig in aleya and people disperse, 
but in awak people come and sit together. They eat, they tell stories, they drink, 
and they dance. Other people get so drunk they dance and sing, and people are 
very happy. (Interview #80) 
 
Awak was so important because it was a representation of large-scale unity of the whole 
village and was a time for the community to celebrate and enjoy being together. While a 
few respondents in Awach (not the other villages) said that this had happened since the 
war, most people said that awak was not happening at all.  
 
Causes of the Decline in Communal Farming 
The loss of awak is important to respondents not only as a representation of the loss of 
unity among neighbors, but also because it highlights two problematic elements of post-
war life: 1) a decline in respect for previously important leadership structures; and 2) an 
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increase in inequality between the rich and the poor. Mobilizing the community for awak 
falls under the purview of the chiefs of farming, the rodi kweri and rodi okoro. Some 
leaders confided in the interview about how difficult they find it now to unite people, as a 
religious leader in Awach explained: 
But now days…if you say that people should go and do the work at once, the 
youth always divert. The older ones will always be complaining that they are 
unable…[People] always say that they have no reason to do the work because 
there is no money to do the work. This is causing a lot of pain to the leaders. It’s 
getting so hard for the leaders to unite people, because people have so much greed 
for money. If you bring any good project for people to work on at once, people 
will always have differences and another will prefer maybe to do the work 
another time. Others will maybe also come up with a different way of wanting to 
do the thing, causing a lot of disagreement within people. There is also very little 
respect between the people. There is very little respect among the people. 
(Interview #68) 
 
Residents were similarly disillusioned by the inability of these leaders—who played such 
a significant role in pre-war life—to bring people together. A few even said that there had 
been attempts to mobilize people for awak, but then nobody showed up for the work, 
resulting in wasted food that had been prepared: 
There was an attempt that the people were mobilized…The intention was to have 
a group for digging, but it never worked out; nobody turned up. So it remained 
just a wish. Imagine if you call people like that, they all promise they will come, 
and you prepare a big quantity of food, expecting them to come and eat it after 
duty, only to realize that no one turns up. That cooking is a waste; you have 
wasted a lot of food that could have lasted some days. (Interview #45) 
 
Secondly, according to respondents, post-war collective work practices highlight 
inequality between those with some money and those who have none. Many said that 
people now will not help in someone else’s field without expecting payment. What this 
means is that people with money (or “strength”) can still mobilize large groups of people 
for communal work, for payment. A security and peace officer in Awach, Michael, 
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explained the value of money in communal work; in the quote below, he used the Acholi 
word kero, which literally means “strength,” to refer to money: 
I: If you are to compare the way people rely on each other now days and those 
days when there was no war, what is the difference? 
R: In the past people used to stay with each other a lot, but now days I see people 
would prefer to do their things individually. In the past people used to mostly dig 
in groups, people used to mobilize and dig in groups, but now days it’s very 
different because if someone has money [kero] he would just go ahead and call 
people to do his work…Now days people don’t like relying on each other. If they 
have money [kero] to do something, they just go ahead and they do it without 
calling anyone to come and help [without pay]. (Interview #69) 
 
Thus, those who do not have the means to provide food, drink, or payment are unable to 
mobilize the community members for collective work.  
On the other hand, some saw a positive side to increasing income inequality. A 
few people talked about how now the poor are actually more united because in order to 
survive they must work together in a group. An elderly woman in Lukodi, where aleya is 
practiced most commonly, explained that while awak is problematic for people who are 
poor, aleya works well: 
R: Awak is not so much practiced but aleya [is]…some people…can mobilize 
people because they can prepare food and drink for people. When those who 
[have] less…invite them, they don’t respond. So, it is like a competition between 
the well to do and those who are poor. So now, the practice that is now common 
and it can be done by any category of people is aleya…  
I: If you compare the level of unity now and that which was practiced before the 
war, is there any difference? 
R: Yes, there is a difference. The difference is that, this way of life concerning 
community work has made people more united than in the past. In the past some 
people were so well off that they didn’t mind the rest. Even if nobody came to 
their home or to help them, they had everything. But today, in order to get the 
help of your neighbors, you have to join the group. So, I think this one is better 
because whether you like it or not, if you want to live together, you have to come 
to the group. So, if those who keep out there, they don’t want to join the group, 
they consider themselves wealthy, eventually they will find themselves not even 
going well with the community. Those who consider themselves the poor, they 
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say, ok, let the poor now gang together and form our community. But eventually 
they also move away from poverty, because as I said, unity is strength. (Interview 
#4)  
 
Awak is not practiced because of the decline in traditional leadership structures 
and the increasing salience of money in the village, according to respondents. There are 
also several other reasons that communal work has declined more generally in the post-
war period. First, they talked about how the war caused poverty, which forced people to 
focus on only their own lives, their own survival, their own work. People now expect 
payment for any work (as stated above) and they expect it immediately, because they are 
too poor and too regularly facing desperate situations to be able to trust that their 
neighbor will pay them later and they fear being neighbors taking advantage of them.  
Second, relatedly, respondents talked about how disunity destroys collective 
work. Respondents discussed how difficult it is to get people to unite since the war, as 
mentioned earlier in the chapter, and they linked this directly to communal work. When 
there are disputes, lack of respect, lack of trust, jealousy, and division, people do not feel 
that they want to help their neighbors by working together. Okello, a rwot kweri in 
Awach, said: 
I: But what is the difference in the level of reliance? 
R: Those days people used to unite a lot more than these days. Now days, issues 
like land conflict and many other problems have poisoned peoples’ minds. There 
is also jealousy. You might think, for example, that if I go to work in Lamunu’s 
home, I’ll make Lamunu rich, and if I go to work in Obur’s home I will make him 
rich…and this is the bad part of unity now days. But those days people used to 
work together without minding anything. (Interview #70) 
 
In the past there was unity and solidarity, but a few respondents additionally described 
how there was force behind collective work, with stronger community sanctions, such as 
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confiscating valuables if you did not show up, and stronger power of the elders to 
mobilize people.  
Finally, there have been changes that present demographic or logistical challenges 
to collective work. Many young people since the war have been moving to town, instead 
of staying the village and farming. Perhaps the major contributing factor of this type, 
though, has been a lifestyle change that came about because of camp life. In the camp, 
very few people were able to farm. Instead, many sat idly with not much to occupy their 
time, often leading to drinking. Respondents said that this increase in alcoholism and lack 
of engagement in productive work for so many years led to the destruction of communal 
work in the post-war era. Otto James, a 45-year-old man in Anyadwe, said: 
I: When did you last remember having come together to collaborate or to fulfill a 
task? 
R: If you talk about the joint communal work the last time it was carried out, I 
don’t recall…as far as I can remember, since the time that we were in the camp, 
that was already the end of the communal work. People were not doing communal 
work as such. And the worst came when people were already in the camp, around 
1997 there when people were living in the camp, actually people were sitting from 
morning to sunset doing nothing. And that is how some people resorted to 
drinking. So since that time, people stayed in the camp doing no work, then 
having returned home people are doing their own individual work, so joint 
venture is something I’ve not heard for a long time. (Interview #60) 
 
Particularly, respondents explained how men used to provide leadership in communal 
work practices, but now do not take a leadership role, and instead many men drink too 
much, are in prison, or spend their days sitting idly in the trading centres. All of these are 
factors that respondents described as contributing to the decline in communal work 
practices; taken together, they present a complex picture of how changes during the 
period of war and displacement led to the destruction of communal work. 
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Non-Farming Community Work Projects 
There is also non-farming communal work in the villages, which is often initiated (or 
required) by NGOs or the government. This type of community work is categorically 
distinct from the communal farming described above. When asked to describe a time that 
people in the community had come together to work on a project that benefited others in 
the community or the village in general, people often struggled to think of an example. 
Many respondents described projects initiated by an NGO or the government, in which 
residents provided some labor or maintenance. For example, when programs provide 
wells or boreholes, residents are usually tasked with keeping the area around the water 
source clean. Similarly, when programs are constructing roads, they often enlist residents 
to help dig the road and pay them for their labor. There are also building projects, for 
example when NGOs finance the construction of school buildings (which respondents 
describe in both Lukodi and Anyadwe), and involve the community members in making 
bricks for the project. Residents are often paid for their involvement in such projects. 
When redirected away from these types of projects by the interviewer and asked 
to think of a locally-initiated group effort, respondents generally had a hard time thinking 
of an example, with some saying that such work has not happened in their village. Most 
often, they described community maintenance work, such as slashing the weeds around 
paths or keeping areas around the market clean. Particularly in Anyadwe and Awach, 
residents emphasized that it is a rule that you must show up for such community work 
projects, or you will face a fine or have your property confiscated. However, some 
residents talked about how some people still refuse to participate in this work or show up 
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but do not actually work hard, both of which can bring disputes in the community. There 
was one particularly proactive example in Lukodi of the community gathering and 
deciding to “fight poverty” in their village by working together to build a house for a 
resident in need. There were a few respondents in Awach who talked about helping dig 
fields for disabled, vulnerable, or residents facing hardships. In general, however, these 
examples were the exceptions, not the rule. More commonly people did not mobilize to 
work on collective projects unless they were initiated and paid for by NGOs or the 
government or unless the threat of fines was strictly enforced by local leaders. 
 As we have seen, communal work practices have changed and, particularly in 
Anyadwe and Awach, declined, presenting a problem for the development of post-war 
unity and interdependence. Sarah Lamunu, a resident of Lukodi, summarized this 
perception, saying that in the past residents would mobilize to work in groups to help 
community members, particularly those in need: 
Before the war, people were more united. And there was sincerity among people. 
And the kind of unity was a perfect one, unlike this one. Now, today when we talk 
of unity, you find only a handful of people…ganging together to form a kind of 
group, but in the past, the whole village was united. And, they were living with 
one heart…Before the war, you would just announce that you have something you 
need and neighbors to come and help you. They would all come without 
hesitation. But today, if you say you need your neighbors to come, they would ask 
a lot of questions: why are you calling them, what are you going to give them, and 
so forth…But if you find a person who is without anything, like me here…they 
consider me my own problem. That is my fate, I have to shoulder it while they 
fare on…Before the war, you’d find that I may just make an announcement and 
more than twenty people converge in my field and work that same day and 
complete everything. But these days that cannot happen. (Interview #17) 
 
In this quote, Sarah mentioned the existence of groups in her village, although she 
explained that she is left out of the groups. Despite the negative picture of communal 
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work in post-war villages that was presented in this section, there in fact are thriving 
groups where people are working together in farming and other projects. As I show in the 
next section, this type group formation is intimately linked to NGO and government 
policies during the displacement and post-war periods, and is contributing to growing 
isolation and inequality. 
 
Emergence of Social Groups  
Types and Characteristics of Groups 
In these post-war communities, small groups have emerged as a powerful form of 
organizing social life.33 People explained that this proliferation of small groups was not 
the way the community was organized before the war; it is a new feature of the post-war 
era. An Anyadwe resident who is active in multiple groups said: 
These groups were not there in the past. These are something new. If there were 
any groups then they were the groups without proper rules and guidelines to be 
followed. These days we have well-established groups with rules to be followed. 
So you know people have learned one thing—alone by yourself you can never 
achieve much, but with the rest you can achieve more than you expect. As the 
song says, united we stand and divided we fall. (Interview #57) 
 
There were a range of groups described by the residents, with the most common 
being savings and credit groups called bolicup, which means “dropping the coin.” 
Bolicup was a model introduced by NGOs during the war, though it was loosely based on 
an existing practice called kalulu, meaning “picking the chances.” Kalulu groups are 
                                                 
33 Interviews included a direct question in which the respondent described any groups he or she belongs to. 
Respondents sometimes mentioned groups in questions about unity, interdependence, rules in the 
community, or their typical social interactions. I also learned about groups from the interviews with 
leaders, particularly leaders of youth groups, women’s groups, a survivors’ group, business groups, and a 
disabled persons’ group.   
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revolving savings groups, in which members bring small amounts of money to save, and 
each month one member gets a pay-out of their savings. Bolicup also has the element of 
savings, but adds loans (to be paid back with interest) and “welfare” (paid back without 
interest), meaning members can access funds as needed and in emergencies. Bolicup 
groups tend to be quite formalized, with closed membership of 20 to 30 people, usually 
more women than men. Some bolicup groups also engage in agricultural activities, such 
as rotating digging or managing communal fields or other projects. From both interviews 
and my observations, bolicup groups are extremely important to the daily lives of many 
residents and are becoming an increasingly significant social safety net for members.  
In addition to the ubiquitous bolicup and digging groups, many respondents 
belonged to more specific types of groups. There are youth groups, groups that perform 
drama and cultural dances, agricultural groups (such as those raising poultry, pigs, or 
farming cash crops, like rice or cotton), and church groups. In Lukodi, there is a massacre 
survivors’ group and a group to oversee the development of the memorial site. In 
Anyadwe and Awach, respondents described a few groups of vulnerable residents, such 
as a group to help the mentally ill and groups of “child mothers,” disabled people, people 
living with HIV/AIDS, and former abductees. There are also groups of business owners, 
such as shop owners or motorcycle operators. 
 Groups are almost always headed by elected or appointed leaders, including a 
chairman, secretary, treasurer, and mobilizer (in charge of informing members about 
meetings and other news). They usually operate according to bylaws or other rules, 
written or spoken, such as requiring that members should not come to meetings late, 
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should not speak out of turn, should always show up for group work, and should always 
pay back loans in a timely manner. Such group rules are usually enforced by monetary 
fines or confiscation of belongings. Group members also described more general rules, 
such as that group members should not gossip about each other, should not lie, or should 
not start quarrels within the group. To belong to a group, a new member often pays a 
small membership fee and the group must approve their membership. Respondents 
described desirable characteristics of potential new members as someone of “good 
character,” who works hard, who promotes unity, and does not drink.  
Group members usually select a group name, almost always of a proverbial nature 
and illustrating something of the shared worldview of group members. In Lukodi, 
Anyadwe, and Awach, group names teach positive character traits (such as “Truthfulness 
is good” [Ada ber], “Knowledge doesn’t come from talking” [Tek dog aye pe ngec]), and 
“Work for it with your hands” [Tim ki cingi]), offer sources of encouragement (such as 
“God is the one that provides” [Rubanga ma miyo] and “In a group I draw strength” [Atek 
ki lwak]), and often illustrate frustration with poverty (such as “A poor person must 
struggle” [Lacan kwitte], “Poverty is not a disease” [Can pe two], and “Poverty will make 
you wise” [Can miyo ryeko]). 
 
A Shift Caused by NGO and Government Programs 
Both NGO and government programs directly led to the formation of most of these small 
groups at the village level. People explained how, in order to access benefits offered by 
such programs, they were required to form groups. Resettlement programs generally did 
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not give assistance to individuals, instead offering material support—like money, seeds, a 
grinding mill, or animals—only to small groups. As a result, many are instrumentally-
formed groups, gathering members with the explicit hope of attracting outside support. A 
traditional leader in Lukodi, who is part of forming a digging group, explained: 
I: What was the purpose of forming such a group? 
R:  The whole idea was initiated by some NGOs because their policy was to help 
people in a group. So if you are by yourself they will say they will not help you. If 
you want help from them, you have to form a group, so that is how people I think 
borrowed the practice of always doing things in a group. Our people have been 
watching that these NGOs would take seriously a group that has been formed in a 
village. The NGOs would check on villages a number of times to ensure that that 
group does exist. So after they confirmed that the group really existed, they would 
then give the help. And people have been seeing that these people are serious. 
That’s why we here also in our community of Lukodi we have decided to form a 
group so that we are also recognized. (Interview #5)   
 
Many programs actively promoted and still promote group formation. In all three 
communities, people talk specifically about the National Agricultural Advisory 
Development Services (NAADS), which is a Government of Uganda program to promote 
agricultural development, and the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF and 
NUSAFII), a regional development program funded by the World Bank. Residents also 
describe forming groups for support from INGOs, including Save the Children, CARE 
International, Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED), American 
Refugee Committee (ARC), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), and Association of 
Volunteers in International Service (AVSI); local NGOs promote groups, as well, like the 
War Affected Children’s Association (WACA), Grassroots Women Association for 
Development (GWAD), and Concerned Parents’ Association (CPA). Particularly in 
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Lukodi, residents described support from such groups and discussed forming groups in 
hopes of attracting more support. 
Betty, a young woman in Awach, has been part of a newly forming bolicup group, 
because people in her area were seeing other groups getting benefits from NGOs and 
government programs. She said they decided to gather together in order to also attract 
development support: 
So we thought that it will be good for us to form a group so that through our 
group we may also, you know, present ourselves out there to other organizations 
so that we are also known, because if we hide ourselves too long, no development 
would come our way. This village would be a forgotten village. If you go to the 
rest of the parts of Awach, people are benefitting in many ways…Most of those 
groups that are being helped started the way we have started here, through the 
simple village savings and credit schemes. That’s why we have decided to form 
this group so that at least we do like others, because if development comes 
through unity, we also want our village to be developed. (Interview #73) 
 
In contrast, a woman in a bolicup group in Anyadwe insisted that the first objective of 
such group is to promote unity. She goes on to say, however, that groups like hers form in 
order to be ready to attract donations from NGOs: 
I: How did you come to form that group? 
R: So it was a big meeting that all the people of Ajulu were mobilized in the 
center, and they said that it is time that everybody should belong to a group. And 
the first purpose was not saving, it was not money, so that the first purpose was 
building unity so that people at least learn to depend on each other and to love one 
another. That was the first purpose and that is why all these other smaller savings 
and credit schemes were founded around Anyadwe village here. So the second 
purpose was for the saving and credit to take place so that you as individual 
members may benefit through borrowing small loans and also at the end of it you 
will have accumulated some meaningful amount of money that can help you. 
Then thirdly, that if some NGOs will come by they will find that we are in groups 
so they would not just ask us again to form groups, we should now use the 
existing groups for any other help that may come from out there.  (Interview #49) 
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Again and again, respondents talked of their hope that the group membership will 
yield tangible benefits that will support their agricultural work, pay their children’s 
school fees, or create possibilities for generating income. Sarah in Lukodi told about a 
poultry project formed with support from an NGO (whose name she cannot even recall): 
I: Do you think such program will change the life of the people here? 
R: I think it will. It’s beneficial to those who are in the group but for people who 
are outside like me, it may not be—I may not benefit directly. That is the 
advantage of being in a group. Because, once you have formed a group that is 
known, not only one NGO will come and help you; maybe after ACTED there 
will be another NGO coming. As long as that group is maintained, they will help 
the group. So it has become a policy now that in order to receive help and benefit 
you must belong to a group. (Interview #17) 
 
A young woman in Awach expressed a similar point, but highlighted her frustration that 
her group has not received support, while other groups in the community have benefitted:  
R: People who form a group are easily recognized and they are supported. Those 
organizations that are helping people, they insist on helping people who have 
already formed groups, like those who have formed bolicup groups… But those 
individuals who are not willing to join a group are not considered. Just like last 
week, they brought some goats to one of the groups…and then this coming 
Thursday, I learned they are going to receive seeds…For us, we have been 
sending our requests, but they are always turned down…  
I: What is your view about people that have formed groups receiving special help, 
more than those individuals? 
R: My hope and view is that also in our small new group we should also be 
recognized and also helped like they are helping other groups. Why is it that other 
groups are being supported and our group is not, and yet we are within the same 
neighborhood? …in this place of Awach there are 20 different groups, but they 
are helping the same groups over and over. And that puzzles us. (Interview #72) 
 
 
 
Community Groups and Unity in the Villages 
As hinted in the quotes above, the emergence of small groups impacts unity in the 
villages, particularly as some residents are excluded from the groups and their associated 
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benefits. As discussed in a previous section, some respondents described unity before war 
as an overall unity, one that encompassed all members of the village, essentially in one 
big group; now, unity is on a smaller-scale or more isolated. Understanding the 
emergence of small groups helps to explain this new form of unity, which is based in 
group membership. As a religious leader in Anyadwe explained: 
I: Can you compare and contrast the level of unity between people now and the 
level of unity that existed among people before the war? 
R: Yes, there was unity [then], and there is unity now, but they are different types 
of unity. Before the war, people used to unite in large scale. That means the 
people within a given place, a community like Anyadwe, the whole of them will 
come together. That was the kind of unity that existed before the war. These days, 
people also practice unity, but in smaller units, in smaller groups. (Interview #40) 
 
 Many respondents talked very positively about how small groups promote unity, 
with some using the presence of small groups as a proxy indicator of the existence of 
unity. For example, a youth group leader explained, “When you see people in a particular 
village forming groups, that is one indication [of unity]. So the more groups you find in a 
village, the more signs of unity that it exhibits” (Interview #34). A rwot okoro in Lukodi 
talked at length about how groups are able to unite people from various areas of the 
community, bringing them together to work and make decisions collectively. She spoke 
of how the group helps to meet the needs of its members: 
I see that his unity that we are practicing now is involving a wider area including 
people that are far away. In the past, only a small part of the village would come 
together to do their own work. But these days, with all this savings and credit, 
people have been moved from far away corners to come together. So I see that 
this one involves more people than the kind of unity that was experienced in the 
past. These days we have to come together to open the ground, to plant the seeds, 
to weed, and also to harvest. So we do it as a group. Then later on when we sell, 
then we sit down to decide what to do with the money…some money can be 
given to the members to borrow and return to the treasury, some money can be 
put to generate further profit, and some money can also help to send children to 
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school. In our community we have a majority of widows and also orphans.  So, 
this project will cover them; they will not feel that they have been isolated. They 
will feel they are one in the community and the community will immediately 
respond upon realizing a need of such a member. In the past, such things were not 
there. Each homestead was managing its affairs. So when you were stuck, there 
was nowhere to go.  But these days, when a family is stuck, there is the reference 
points is the group. So the group will sit and see what to do. (Interview #2) 
 
While groups undoubtedly have positive effects for their members, I argue that, 
problematically, groups may increase inequality and exclusion in communal life. First, 
those who are not a part of groups may be excluded from the social support described in 
the above quote. Second, competition, jealousy, and rivalries can emerge between groups 
that are competing for resources. 
Overall, about a third of the respondents did not belong to groups at the time of 
the interview: 41 percent in Lukodi, 29 percent in Anyadwe, and 43 percent in Awach.34 
There is not a strong pattern in terms of who belongs to groups and who does not, 
although it seems that men and those with higher education may be slightly less likely to 
be in groups. While those who are members of active groups often see unity and trust as 
strong in the village, those who are not involved in groups are often more isolated and do 
not perceive that the village is as united. As respondents described it, this type of 
isolation was much less prevalent before war, before the growth of small groups. Several 
respondents, such as Otto James, 45-year-old man who does not belong to any groups, 
talked about how the emergence of groups has weakened unity because people rely only 
on groups and cannot rely more broadly on their neighbors: 
                                                 
34 These figures do not account for residents in digging groups, because of difficulty in determining 
whether digging groups are really more informal groups organized for communal work or if they are more 
formalized and interested in expanding their activities or attracting outside support. 
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These days people do not rely on one another to the level that used to be before 
the war. They only rely on a few selected people, their circle of trust, and in that 
circle of helping one another. Instead in the past, the area for trust or reliance was 
wider so almost everybody was a possible person to rely on, but it’s a different 
story today. In the past even the scope for coming together was bigger, coming 
together to dig was bigger, and there was also the belief that every child was my 
child…People valued human beings more than today. These days people do not 
value the gift of one another so much. So this trust is moving away from trusting 
the person to trusting a group, so this kind of thing is not what it used to be. And 
in that group, that is already the unit; you cannot trust any other group now, you 
have to belong to your group only, so in a way you are cut off already. (Interview 
#60) 
 
Even those who generally support the idea of small groups recognized this problem: 
I: Do you think those [NGO and government] programs are helpful to the 
community members? 
R: Well, the weak point is that they do not sensitize people enough, and they 
insist that you should be in a group. That means there are certain people, for one 
reason of the other, cannot join that group. Such people are left out, and therefore 
we feel that those are loopholes, people that are now automatically neglected. 
They are left out, so they don’t benefit. (Interview #41) 
 
Several respondents problematized the explicit connection of group formation 
with seeking government and NGO resources. At the heart of their critique is the idea that 
groups are not really based on unity, but are based on material gain, resources, and 
money. A Protestant reverend, himself very active in promoting groups within the 
community, commented: 
The unity of those days [before war] was stronger compared to the unity of 
nowadays. Those days…everyone would unite and would really care about the 
other. But nowadays, people unite because they want to benefit; it’s full of greed. 
They want to unite because they want to benefit. The unity of nowadays always 
lasts for a short time, but in those days it was stronger. Nowadays you unite only 
for a short time and then people get divided. The love for money has grown. 
(Interview #68) 
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The same man, Otto James, quoted above explained how this orientation leads to rivalries 
and power struggles within groups, so that trust and unity become impossible, even in the 
group: 
[Since the war,] you may see a few [groups] here and there, but this will not be a 
symbol of unity, it will be like an association maybe looking for some ways of 
raising funds…And even after that, those who participated together will again 
begin to rival over what was given. So when there is any kind of such group, 
many people will struggle to be the leader of such a group so that they can take 
the upper hand and they take the lion’s share of whatever proceeds may be 
realized. So usually such groups also end up in chaos because where there is no 
trust there is no true unity. (Interview #60) 
 
Oyet Richard, a 30-year-old man in Anyadwe, who belongs to a group of 
motorcycle drivers but no other community groups, similarly explained how groups 
destroy unity by cultivating jealousy. Groups do not receive equal resources from NGOs 
or government programs, but he does not fault the NGOs for this. Instead, he said that the 
problem is the selfishness in the community. Compounding the problem, he explained, is 
that many groups are based on family ties. Several respondents explained how many 
groups operate according to “WOL,” which is a locally-used acronym referring to 
relatives (wadi), in-laws (or), and friends (larem). Some interview respondents described 
this as an “evil.” As local leaders or groups access support provided by NGO or 
government programs, they distribute benefits according to WOL, leaving out other 
community members. Oyet Richard warned that the bad feelings that come from this are 
a very serious matter dividing people: 
R: What I don’t appreciate very much is those distributions of certain items that 
they give only to some selected people, and the rest who are under the same 
problem miss out altogether. This, I think, is not good. It brings the spirit of 
sectarianism…In general, NGOs are…trying what they can, although it is 
overwhelming. The need is so great, the help is major. The problem is not with 
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those who offer help like the NGOs; the problem is with us the community here, 
that some people are so greedy and selfish, hoarding all these things for their 
family…ignoring other people completely. This is the unfairness that I am talking 
about…The spirit of selfishness can be seen that they take everything—his wife is 
part of it, his child and everybody, but the rest of the neighbors go without. Only 
five of them will form a group, a group of people from the same family, and 
benefit from it. 
I: So do you think that the projects are not worth it? 
R: The project is worth it, except that he’s celebrating, he has everything, and 
people like us have nothing completely. It’s a saying that the puppy that has taken 
porridge is joyful, but the puppy that is starving is aggressive. So if the puppy that 
is satisfied tried to play with the starving one, definitely that one would become 
very rough because it is hungry. Similarly, those NGOs that have come and 
showered gifts or presents on one family at the expense of leaving out others 
completely, they are spreading nothing but jealousy. When my friend there 
[laughs], I will not join him in the laughter, I will just frown. In one party, some 
are frowning, some are laughing. You can imagine that there is something wrong. 
And people should not pretend that they are not aware of these grievances that are 
being felt in the community.  (Interview #52) 
 
The boundaries between groups are not symbolic, but they have actually emerged 
as social boundaries (Lamont and Molnar 2002; Pachucki et al. 2007); groups have 
variable access to resources, and thus group boundaries can create and reinforce 
inequality. Most respondents are cognizant of the problems that can come from small 
groups, particularly as some individuals are excluded and jealousy can develop between 
groups. Some critiqued this new form of unity, lamenting the loss of a broader unity in 
which neighbors were connected to one another by virtue of belonging to the same 
village, rather than the same small group. Despite these critiques, however, many 
respondents are still ultimately supportive of the new group-based system, hoping that 
they too will realize some tangible benefits from group membership.  
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Discussion  
As shown in this chapter, most people saw the war and displacement as harmful to social 
life, but there were also some who reported positive effects, essentially seeing the war as 
having forced unity by bringing people into close proximity, causing residents to depend 
on one another for survival, and increasing NGO “sensitization” programs. Most 
respondents, however, perceived that trust had fallen among their neighbors since the 
war, and said that now only a few people are trusted. Particularly, many did not trust 
young people, and saw them as ill-prepared for communal life in resettled villages. Trust 
was also weakened by wrongs committed during the war, land conflicts emerging during 
resettlement, and the increasing prevalence of monetary exchanges in rural villages. The 
majority of people also saw significant problems or complexities with post-war unity, 
saying it is weaker than it had been before war, that people now see one another only as 
neighbors (rather than family), that unity is only in pockets, that unity is now artificial or 
insincere, or that it is a substantively different type of unity now. Where some saw the 
war as helping people band together, many others saw it as contributing to greed and 
jealousy, an “eat or be eaten” mindset, struggles over limited resources, and conflicts that 
arise from close proximity. War and displacement significantly altered unity in post-war 
communities, and Figure 5.1 (at the beginning of the chapter) articulated this relationship 
by depicting a chain of causation. 
There are three key interrelated changes in daily social interactions that directly 
influenced these shifts in unity. First, residents perceived a “loss of culture,” seen in 
decreasing communal traditional practices, eroding leadership structures of chiefs and 
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other local leaders, and less attention given to previously highly regarded rituals 
connecting the spiritual and social worlds. These cultural practices are the lost 
substantive “glue,” or the shared values and norms, which many residents yearn for in 
their post-war lives. Second, communal work practices, which are described as essential 
to village unity, have been in a state of flux and decline. Large scale communal work is 
not happening post-war, and even the smaller forms of group work are suffering because 
of declining respect for local leaders, poverty and inequality, jealousy, and lifestyles 
learned in the camps. This lack of daily social contact and interdependence is problematic 
for post-war reconstruction (Biro et al. 2004; Daly and Sarkin-Hughes 2007). Finally, the 
rise of small, formalized social groups is a new feature of post-war villages. Nearly 
always formed instrumentally to access resources of NGO and government programs, 
these groups are now the primary location of village unity. For members, groups can 
provide an important safety net, social capital, and sense of inclusion (Brint 2001; Lawler 
et al. 2009; Lim and Putnam 2010). For those not in groups, however, this presents a new 
element of exclusion. With the advent of groups, residents lament the loss of broader 
village unity in which people could rely on any of their neighbors for support. 
The war directly led to four broad currents of social change, which contributed to 
the specific shifts in social interaction described above. First, there is a crisis of 
leadership. Strong local leaders are key figures in cultivating social solidarity, but during 
the war, the older generation of elders and chiefs passed away, and the post-war leaders 
do not seem to have the same level of authority, organization, and insight. Of course, 
there are still strong leaders, but their numbers are fewer, they have more narrow ranges 
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of authority, and respect for leaders among the population has dwindled. Without a strong 
local leadership system (not just a few isolated leaders), there is no longer the attention to 
tradition and cultural practices. Leaders play a key role in the organization of communal 
work, and this loss—as we have seen—is extremely detrimental to unity. 
Secondly, the war and displacement was a period where young people were 
socialized quite differently than those who grew up in times of peace. For well over a 
decade, many young people did not learn agricultural skills, attend school, or have 
“normal” social interactions in their communities. Rather, their formative years were 
characterized by chaos, uncertainty, and instability, with many experiencing the loss of 
parents or other family members and a significant minority experiencing abduction and 
direct participation in hostilities. This gap in socialization means the current generation of 
young adults is less interested and less equipped to carry on traditions and participate in 
communal work. They often do not share older values, and generations raised before the 
war often view them as lazy, immoral, and troubled. Many young people do not see 
themselves as deeply connected to their neighbors via an intricate village social support 
network, and have instead adopted a more individualistic attitude with less investment in 
village life. 
Third, the war resulted in deepening poverty and inequality and the creation of 
new economic arrangements, which present additional barriers to unity. During the 
camps, as agricultural activity drastically slowed or was halted completely, people relied 
on a variety of other methods to support their families, including wage labor, opening 
small businesses, informal vending, and, of course, reliance on resources and support 
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from aid programs. War also decreased wealth and increased poverty for most, as they 
lost livestock, belongings, and homestead buildings. Some, however, were better able to 
capitalize on the new economic arrangements, perhaps being particularly able to attract 
program resources, move their families to larger towns (or out of the region altogether), 
or form successful businesses. As many respondents discussed, poverty makes it difficult 
for people to trust one another, the rise of the monetary economic system fosters jealousy, 
and inequality seriously strains social relationships. 
 Finally, during the war and especially in the post-war period, NGOs and 
government agencies instituted programs designed to foster unity and social stability, and 
in the process directly contributed to the rise of small groups in the villages. The 
involvement of NGOs brought a particular type of unity—and some respondents indeed 
discuss how this has been a positive development, creating stronger unity post-war. 
However, this new unity is more localized, creating strong bonds within smaller groups, 
at the expense of greater exclusion of some residents and the rise of competition between 
groups. Additionally, some see it as instrumental or inauthentic, as people join together to 
access resources, rather than from a deeper commitment to helping one another. To create 
a collective social identity, there needs to be some conception of “we” (Burke and Stets 
2009); in the post-war period, the “we” is no longer the entirety of the village, but that 
identity is found in the small group. 
 Some similarities and differences have emerged across communities, as shown in 
Table 5.1. In general, Lukodi respondents were more likely to have positive assessments 
of post-war social life. Respondents in Lukodi most often reported trusting all or most 
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people in the community and the aleya practice of communal digging is alive and well in 
Lukodi. While there were more similarities between communities in how they perceived 
village unity, Lukodi respondents still did stand out with the most positive views. 
Formalized small groups were widespread in all communities, though Anyadwe had the 
highest number of active participants and Lukodi showed greater evidence of direct and 
active NGO and government program involvement in groups.  
Table 5.1. Key Differences in Unity between Fieldsites 
 Lukodi Anyadwe Awach 
Perceptions of trust Highest level of trust Lowest level of trust 
Some people are trusted, 
some are not 
Perceptions of unity 
See unity as mixed; 
strongest perceptions of 
unity 
See unity as mixed See unity as mixed 
Communal work Aleya very common 
Not practiced uniformly, 
or at all 
Not practiced uniformly, 
or at all; some mentioned 
awak and helping 
vulnerable residents 
Small groups 
Widespread; most 
diversity in types of active 
groups; most direct 
connections with 
NGO/government 
programs 
Widespread; highest 
proportion of respondents 
active in groups 
Widespread 
 
 This variance suggests complexity in how the characteristics of communities may 
lead to unique post-war trajectories, even among neighboring villages where people 
largely experienced similar histories of war and displacement. Most notably, unity in 
Lukodi may be facilitated by the village’s smaller size and its accompanying lower level 
of clan diversity, compared to Anyadwe and Awach. Lukodi also has a smaller trading 
centre, providing fewer opportunities for drinking, leisure activities (like pool halls, bars, 
or video halls), and less of an appealing gathering place for those uninterested in daily 
productive work in their homes. Additionally, the people of Lukodi experienced the 
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tragedy of the 2004 LRA massacre, which drew significant external attention and 
prompted a unique form of organizing. In Lukodi, there are active committees devoted to 
promoting reconciliation, supporting victims and survivors, establishing memorialization 
initiatives, and advocating for compensation or restitution. These committees center 
around a core group of individuals, many of whom have direct ties to supportive NGOs, 
but also extend to a broader base of community members who are regularly mobilized for 
a range of meetings, work on the memorial site, organizing the annual memorial prayer, 
and other tasks. This form of organizing is unique to Lukodi and is certainly not 
inconsequential in influencing residents’ perceptions of village unity and cohesion. 
 In general, trauma from the past was not commonly discussed or explicitly a part 
of daily interactions. Perhaps because the violence occurred in the extremely recent past, 
there is not yet a readiness to determine how to incorporate it into present life, so people 
are left with individual memories, and not yet a strong sense of collective memory. 
Noticeably, however, Lukodi does have active memorialization, documentation, and 
reconciliation initiatives, which have involved a large group of community members. 
Previous scholarship demonstrates that constructing collective memory can promote 
solidarity (Osiel 1997, 2009), which is perhaps one way to explain the higher levels of 
trust and perceptions of unity in Lukodi. 
 Through these insights about what contributes to unity and also what barriers to 
unity have emerged in Lukodi, Anyadwe, and Awach, I further specify the model 
introduced in Chapter Two. In daily social interactions in resettled villages, informal 
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mechanisms both facilitate and hinder the post-war transitional process, as seen in Figure 
5.4.  
Figure 5.4. Informal Mechanisms Aid and Inhibit the Transition 
 
 
Specifically, traditional practices (such as wang oo and customary dances), communal 
work arrangements, organized small groups, socialization of the war-time generation, 
local leadership structures, interactions with NGOs and other outside programs, local 
economic arrangements, and dispute resolution systems all are key influences in the 
transition to post-war stability. Many of these key informal, interactional mechanisms are 
likely to be salient in other post-war contexts, as well, but there are likely to be other 
mechanisms that would emerge as key to the transition in other specific times and places. 
Careful analysis of each post-war society is essential to understanding the key social 
resources or pressure points that can be utilized most effectively in the transitional period. 
  177 
 
Chapter Six 
Communities in Conflict: The Wars Within 
 
Yito pe duny nono. 
There is no smoke without fire. 
 
The previous chapter discussed both facilitators of and barriers to unity and provided an 
analysis of the ways social ties have shifted in the post-war period. In this context, 
Chapter Six provides an in-depth case study of one particularly potent barrier to unity, 
focusing on a new form of conflict emerging in post-war villages. I argue that land 
conflict is a catalyst with the potential to spark deep divisions, animosity, and violence. 
The chapter also discusses dispute resolution mechanisms used to address land conflicts. 
In analyzing dispute resolution, I consider a plural legal system that allows for cases to be 
resolved in the local community or through the state-based court system. I argue that the 
dispute resolution systems are often not able to handle land conflicts successfully. 
Contentious interactions between resettled residents are problematic because the entire 
region is arguably in a period of strained and fragile coexistence, and negative 
interactions could easily devolve into renewed cycles of violence and instability. I found 
that land conflict is a strong divisive force that threatens unity and stability, yet is not an 
issue that has been adequately addressed by national or international actors involved in 
rebuilding efforts. I argue that concerted focus on land conflict is imperative to the 
peaceful future of the region. 
 Disputes over land are certainly not the only type of conflict troubling community 
residents. They also frequently deal with other types of disputes, such as domestic 
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violence, theft, animals destroying crops, corruption, fighting, political conflicts, and 
reintegration of former combatants. Much transitional justice literature would suggest 
that the most contentious of these would be reintegration of former soldiers under the 
Amnesty Act, but I found that people emphatically did not see reintegration as the major 
issue facing their communities.35 Rather, I focus on land conflict because it was what 
respondents most often cited as the most common and the most serious type of 
disagreement in their villages. Additionally, land conflict reveals important elements of 
power and strained social relationships, so unpacking this issue helps to further an 
understanding of social reconstruction after war. Finally, I focused on land conflict 
because in many ways it is a social problem that has emerged because of the war and 
displacement, so it follows that rebuilding and reconstruction programs should address 
land issues. 
 
Previous Scholarship 
Transitional Justice 
In the aftermath of violent conflict, national authorities, inter-governmental actors, 
NGOs, and local leaders all promote various mechanisms that are designed to help 
communities deal with the past and move on to a peaceful future. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, most research about rebuilding after violent conflict falls into the socio-legal field 
                                                 
35 Although an in-depth analysis of perceptions of amnesty and reintegration is not developed in this 
dissertation, I did collect data on these subjects. I found respondents to be overwhelmingly supportive of 
amnesty. While they certainly did see challenges to the reintegration of people who return home with 
amnesty, they expressed a willingness and confidence in their ability to overcome such challenges, working 
to be supportive of returnees. A preliminary analysis of perceptions of amnesty is available, and I plan to 
expand an analysis of this topic in my future research. 
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of transitional justice. For example, many transitional societies authorize truth 
commissions to uncover details about what happened, criminal trials to hold individuals 
accountable, reparations to attempt “repair” damage, amnesties to pardon some of those 
responsible, or ceremonies and rituals based in the culture of survivors designed to bring 
reconciliation within communities. Transitional justice scholarship examines if and how 
these mechanisms contribute to a sense of justice, truth, accountability, reconciliation, 
and so on. A strong literature has developed to identify the strengths and weaknesses of 
each of these approaches (for examples, see Borer 2006; Hayner 2001; Kritz 1995; 
Mallinder 2007; Roht-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena 2006; Teitel 2000). 
In the case of transitional northern Uganda, there are several transitional justice 
initiatives designed to guide the region from war to peace. The ICC has issued arrest 
warrants for the top LRA commanders and there have been attempts to hold national war 
crimes trials of other leaders. National amnesty legislation has allowed the pardon and 
return of tens of thousands of ex-combatants. Culturally-based rituals have been used to 
reintegrate ex-combatants and try to bring reconciliation between community members. 
NGOs and other institutions, like museums, facilitate memorialization initiatives. Each of 
these mechanisms is oriented towards the past, wrestling with how to make sense of a 
history full of atrocities and violence. While these efforts are necessary, of course, this 
chapter contributes a context-sensitive analysis, considering what conflicts may actually 
be emerging during the “post-conflict” transitional period. I argue that land conflict—an 
emergent conflict in the region—is important to understand in its own right, but also 
because of its potential to undermine the effectiveness of transitional justice efforts. 
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Emergent Conflict 
A theory of emergent conflict, advanced by political scientist Hugh Miall (2007), 
provides a useful framework for understanding post-war communities in Uganda. In this 
model, a society experiencing some type of social change will give rise to emergent 
conflicts, as people struggle to cope with the results of the change. These emergent 
conflicts are not necessarily problematic, and disputes can actually provide a space for 
necessary solidification of social norms, rules, and relationships (Osiel 1997; Simmel 
1971). Rather, depending on the context and the strategies people use to deal with the 
emergent conflict, the situation will develop either into a peaceful accommodation of the 
social change or into an intensification of the conflict, leading to violence and potentially 
war. Thus, it is important to understand a society’s capacity to deal with emergent 
conflict successfully.  
In this analysis, I conceptualize the transition from a long period of war into a 
time of relative peace as a social change, one that requires communities and individuals 
to cope with the shifting nature of social relationships and redefine interactions among 
themselves. As established in the previous chapter, this period of social change shifts 
daily social interactions and affects perceptions of unity and trust. Particularly after a 
prolonged period of mass displacement from their home communities, this social change, 
I argue, also leads to an emergent conflict over land rights and boundaries during 
resettlement. Residents themselves saw land disputes as the most serious types of 
conflicts facing their communities. Because of its potential to set communities on a 
trajectory of either peaceful accommodation of change or violent conflict, it is important 
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to understand land conflict, as well as communities’ capacities to address it. This requires 
starting at the earliest stages of the conflicts, considering disputes that arise between 
neighbors over land during the resettlement process. 
Thus, I contribute to transitional justice literature by developing an understanding 
of emergent conflicts that arise during the transitional period. I question assumptions, 
inherent in some socio-legal transitional justice mechanisms, about what is happening in 
local communities during the transition from war to peace. Specifically, there seems to be 
merit to the sociological critique that there exists a pattern where legal mechanisms create 
formal rationality, but ignore on-the-ground, tangible issues, like distribution of and 
conflict over unequal resources.  
The field of transitional justice—both scholarship and practice—is not really 
looking at land conflict. There has been a longstanding reluctance on the part of post-
conflict operations of the UN and other organizations to engage in land issues (Leckie 
2009), but there is a growing recognition that something needs to be done. There are 
reports and analyses of land disputes in post-conflict societies emerging from 
humanitarian and policy circles (Baranyi and Weitzner 2006; Huggins 2004; Leckie 
2009; Pantuliano 2009). Unfortunately, scholars are strangely quiet on this issue, despite 
the potential of social scientists to make significant contributions to understanding the 
complexities of land conflict.  
While land conflict is the big issue on the ground in post-war communities of 
northern Uganda—and likely in other transitional societies as well—problems such as 
land conflict are often individualized. Instead, the focus during the transitional period is 
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on memorialization, truth-telling, trials, and so on, without recognizing the role that land 
conflict may play in derailing such reconciliation efforts. While these transitional justice 
mechanisms are usually positive and necessary, it is important to devote greater attention 
to local issues in survivors’ everyday lives as they struggle to adapt to the social change 
brought about by the transition. As political scientists argue, local disputes often have far-
reaching consequences and are the root causes that can fuel broader regional or national 
conflicts (Autesserre 2009, 2010; Kalyvas 2006). Daily concerns include potentially 
divisive issues, such as land conflict, which I argue in this paper has significant potential 
to destabilize communities and the entire region, devolving communities back into 
renewed cycles of violence and instability.   
 
Land Conflict 
There is scholarship that considers the wave of land and agricultural reform efforts in 
post-colonial Africa, as nations attempted to reconcile colonial-era land administration 
systems with customary land tenure practices. There have been accompanying studies 
about how land reform can become a source of conflict in local communities or have 
other problematic implications (Boone 2007; Huggins 2004; Konings 2003). There have 
been very few studies, however, that consider how local-level land disputes may be 
linked to larger conflicts, wars, and violence (Autesserre 2008, 2009, 2010; Fearon 2004; 
Rustad and Binningsbø 2012). 
There have been a few studies focused specifically on land conflict in northern 
Uganda, most notably a large scale effort conducted by the World Bank (Deininger and 
  183 
Castagnini 2004; Rugadya 2008). The study finds that land conflicts are escalating, 
threatening post-conflict peace, and are not being adequately handled. I will return to 
specific findings from this work throughout the chapter. The study was designed to 
inform the Government of Uganda’s PRDP programs, which focus on rebuilding northern 
Uganda after the conflict. The data collection, however, occurred before 2008, at which 
point only five percent of the population in Acholi districts had returned home (Rugadya 
2008:6). A later study conducted in 2010 by Mercy Corps focused on the relationship 
between economic development and land conflict. The report explained that land conflict 
is brought about (in part) by poverty and poor economic development, and that land 
conflict, in turn, undermines economic development and investment, in addition to 
threatening peace (MercyCorps 2011). While these efforts contribute important 
descriptions of land conflict in Uganda and make policy-oriented recommendations, my 
study contributes a needed social science perspective on how land conflicts develop, their 
impact on unity and solidarity, how they can potentially escalate to violent conflict, and 
why current dispute resolution mechanisms are ineffective. 
In this chapter, I analyze respondents’ perspectives on land conflict in their 
communities. I find that land is central to their individual and communal lives, and 
therefore disputes over land ownership are hotly contested. Mass displacement and return 
to the land created social conditions ripe for the emergence of land conflict, as 
determining land ownership is a continual process of social interaction and, often, 
contention. Now, disputes are rampant and reflect power dynamics in the communities. I 
find that land conflicts significantly detract from unity, as well as frequently escalate to 
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violence, causing respondents to see land conflict as a new “war within the community.” 
Unfortunately, dispute resolution systems do not demonstrate the capacity to resolve land 
conflicts peacefully, leading to significant concerns about future social stability in the 
region. 
 
Data 
The interview section on non-violence is particularly relevant to this analysis, because it 
focused specifically on how people in the community deal with conflict. The respondents 
were asked:  
 What type of disagreements do you think are the most common in the village? 
Can you give me a recent example? What was done to resolve that disagreement?  
 What conflicts are the most serious in this village? Can you give me a specific 
example? What was done to resolve that conflict? 
 In general, do you think people here deal with conflict in a positive way or in a 
way that causes more harm? How is this different than it was before the war? 
 
The interviewer was provided with probes to follow up with the respondent to fully 
understand their perspective and the example of conflict they described.  
Later in the interview, respondents were asked to describe any NGO, community-
based organizations, aid, or government programs that had been in the village since 
people returned from the camps, and they were also asked to comment on the impact they 
saw from these activities. These are the primary areas of the interview used in this 
analysis, though some respondents did mention land conflict in other areas of the 
interview. For example, when asked to compare the unity of the village before the war to 
now, when asked if they feel close to or trust their neighbors, or when asked about 
differences that exist between people in the community.  
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 It is important to note that no component of the interview explicitly asked 
respondents about land conflict. Rather, this was a topic that respondents brought up 
themselves, in several areas of the interview. As the passages that follow indicate, 
respondents talked at length—unprompted—about land conflict in their lives and their 
communities.  
 
Land in Northern Uganda 
Centrality of Land 
In rural northern Uganda, land is a crucial resource, as livelihoods and survival almost 
completely depend on having land to cultivate. For virtually everyone who is physically 
able to do so, daily activities revolve around caring for crops of peanuts, cassava, maize, 
sesame, and other staple foods. In addition to being essential for the daily survival of 
families, the local economy is based on buying, selling, or trading products of the land. 
In the course of the war and displacement, many people lost everything they had, 
including livestock, building structures, and so on, but they counted on having land 
waiting for them when they returned home, planning to make a fresh start. Everything 
about the rebuilding process was contingent upon having land, which raised the stakes for 
protecting one’s land. Although land is undeniably necessary for daily survival, many 
community residents also told me that in recent years, area Ministers of Parliament have 
been exacerbating the frenzy for land by telling their constituents that land is the only 
thing of value they have left, repeatedly emphasizing that in the post-war era, land is the 
only path to not only rebuilding, but to riches and wealth for survivors. This is another 
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element of reforming economic relationships in the post-war period, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, and monetizing areas of life that were previously governed by non-
monetary social relationships. 
In the interviews, respondents were asked to describe their vision of how their 
community would change in five years’ time. Many respondents painted positive 
pictures, describing how people would have enough to eat and would be able to send their 
children to school. When asked what would be the agent to bring these positive changes, 
many people cited land as the key to their community’s development. With land, they 
would be able to work hard, sell their harvests, and improve their lives. Understanding 
how very central land is in the lives of people in this region, it became quite clear that 
struggles for land are unlikely to be simple matters, easily resolved. Rather, 
disagreements about land ownership have the potential to bring deep tension and spark 
significant conflicts. 
 
Ancestral Land 
Beyond the significance of land for livelihood, owning land in a particular place is a 
powerful marker of belonging. In the research fieldsites, only people who are seen as 
truly “from” the village are permitted to own land. Residents described a clear delineation 
between someone from “outside” and someone who is from the community, meaning 
someone whose ancestors were from the community and who was personally born in the 
community as well. This sense of equating land ownership with community membership 
is so pervasive that it often is not explicitly stated. For example, a typical response when 
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asked if anyone is denied ownership of land in the village is exemplified by one man’s 
response, “No, no one is denied having a piece of land. Provided he comes from here.” 
(Interview #27) As this so concisely shows, owning land in the community is deeply 
symbolic, serving as a marker of identity and belonging. The quote also alludes to the 
fact that clan membership, and thus land, is typically given patrilineally,36 with daughters 
(or even widows) not receiving land in the community where she was born. When she 
marries, it is expected she will go to her husband’s home place, and will become a 
member of that community, thus her “real” land will be there. A women’s leader 
explained, “The sort of land we have here is ancestral land…Therefore if a person is 
coming from out there who has no relation to this community, definitely such a person 
would not be welcome, will not be given land. That one is obvious.” (Interview #2) Land 
disputes, then, have the potential to set up a debate over who belongs and who does not, 
labeling those who cannot or do not own land as outsiders, and then essentially denying 
such people from livelihoods in the village. 
Respondents were asked if they consider the place where they now live to be their 
home. Almost all respondents said they did see their current place as their home. Their 
reasons for this were very often intimately linked to the land they live on. Opobo, a 40-
year-old man, explained his connection to the land: 
This is my actual home because I was born here, I grew up here. My father was 
born here and grew up here and died here, this land has seen a generation of this 
lineage. Therefore I’ve already made a resolution never to move anywhere. If I 
                                                 
36 I did not find cases where the male line was unable to carry on ownership of the land (whether because 
men died in the war or for other reasons). Rather, each man typically has many sons, often with multiple 
women. Even in the event that all the biological sons were deceased, clan membership sees the sons of a 
man’s brother as his sons as well, so I never heard of a case in which there was no male to take the family 
land. 
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die they will bury me here. My children will continue to live here, that’s why I 
say with confidence, there is not any other place but here, this is my actual home. 
I cannot go elsewhere, this is the place I’ll remain in for the rest of my life. 
(Interview #59) 
 
Customary land tenure is the main system of land rights in northern Uganda, 
which means land is not registered with any governmental authority, but rather land 
rights are overseen by clan leaders (Tripp 2004). In practice, this means that determining 
the owner of a piece of land often comes down to weighing histories remembered by 
local leaders and elders. Potentially, any person could provide testimony about land 
demarcations and ownership. Additionally, customary land is typically not for sale. 
According to the institution of cultural chiefs, Ker Kwaro Acholi, it is not to be sold, but 
is to be carefully guarded against any loss.  
In practice, however, there are exceptions, ambiguities, and complexities 
surrounding the land tenure system. A minority of respondents described situations in 
which land in the community may be purchased, though others strongly said this was not 
allowed. A few others conceded that exceptions are sometimes made to allow people who 
have stayed for a number of years or who are of good character to stay in the village, 
though they are not “from” the community and their “real” home is elsewhere. While 
there is a deep emphasis on ancestral land, Uganda’s land policy holds that those who 
have lived undisputed on land for 12 years have a rightful claim to that land. These norms 
and policies, coupled with the mandatory displacement of community members during 
the time of war, made the situation ripe for the development of conflicts over land. 
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Communal to Individual Ownership 
Some respondents talked about how social relationships surrounding land have shifted 
from how they were before the war. One leader in the Catholic Church explained that 
before the war, the concept of individual ownership of land was not dominant. He said 
that people understood land more communally, for example, that “we” stay here, not 
creating quarrels over individual ownership of specific pieces of land. Respondents 
explained that people shared land, worked the land cooperatively, and could move freely 
on the land. A woman in Awach said: 
In the past before the war, people were just living with one another causally and 
with open hearts. But these days, the issue of rivaling over land—“that is my 
ancestor’s land,” “this is the demarcation of that land”—is so serious. Even if you 
live with your neighbor, [there is a] secret feeling that this one is rivaling with 
me…Before, people were just digging land without even claiming that this is my 
piece, they will just share it like that and people were very happy sharing, digging 
together…In fact there was no saying like, this is my land. It was all our 
land…These days, even if you’re from the same womb, that discontentment is 
there. So, these days now, people have to make very clear demarcation, it was not 
in the past. (Interview #79) 
 
They thought of using the land collectively, rather than owning the land individually, as 
they now do. This change was likely because delineating ownership became more 
essential as people moved around more during the war. 
Respondents went on to discuss the related rise in land conflicts, as people 
compete with one another for land. As village residents and leaders described it, before 
the war there were not land conflicts in their communities. Felix Ojok, a long-time 
elected community leader, in charge of resolving many disputes, recalled, 
[Before the war,] people were very united. They had peace with all their 
neighbors. But when this war broke out, really, all kind of suffering started 
cropping in. There was nothing like land wrangles, as I remember, although I was 
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born here, I grew up here, nothing like that. There was no land dispute, people 
used land and they were not killing one another over land like now. People would 
build their homes together and enjoy communal life. (Interview #9) 
 
As a catechist in Anyadwe explained, 
Before we left for the camp, people were living in peace, without any claim of 
land that, this is my land, that is your land—nothing like that was there. But now 
that we returned from the camp, the issue of land is now rampant and is the most 
common and the worst kind of conflict that is being felt in the community. 
(Interview #40) 
 
Of course, there may be a tendency for people to idealize the past, yet I heard this over 
and over again, from residents, and also from well-respected leaders. For them, because 
of the war and displacement, there has been a fundamental change in the social 
relationships surrounding land use and land rights in their communities. 
 
Types and Sources of Land Conflict 
In this section, I first offer an overview of the frequency, seriousness, and types of land 
conflict in the three communities. Next, I discuss how land conflicts emerge as a result of 
the chaotic post-war context. Finally, I analyze how land conflicts are linked to power, 
inequality, and vulnerabilities. 
 
Frequency, Seriousness, and Types 
Respondents explained that land conflict now occurs quite frequently in the village, with 
some claiming such disputes are a daily occurrence. One older man explained, “This 
issue of land is so common that almost every day, or every other day, there is a case here 
and there. Between brothers, or between people of this village and that village, or 
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between this man and that woman—it is just an everyday happening.” (Interview #30) As 
seen in Table 6.1, just over half of the respondents said land conflict was the most 
common type of disagreement in the community (even though they were not asked about 
land directly and not asked to rate it compared to other types of disagreements). 
Respondents described at least 80 unique cases and there were 35 instances in which 
respondents described a land conflict that they were (or are) involved in, which means 
that at least a third of the sample has personally dealt with land conflict in their own lives, 
not just in their broader community.  
Table 6.1. Land Disputes by Fieldsite 
 
                                                 
37 This table is describing key characteristics of the examples of land conflict described by respondents. 
Respondents described these examples in narrative form, with informal prompts from the interviewers. 
Because of this, for a small number of examples, some of these characteristics could not be determined. In 
those cases, the example was not included here; valid percentages are reported. 
38 Escalated to use of physical violence. 
 Lukodi Anyadwe Awach Total 
Land conflicts are most common type of 
disagreement 
30% 55% 67% 51% 
Land conflicts are the most serious type of 
conflict 
33% 39% 43% 38% 
Percentage of described examples37 that had 
escalated 38 
15% 19% 18% 18% 
Percentage of described examples that were 
unresolved 
45% 58% 56% 53% 
Percentage of described examples in which 
the parties were relatives or family members 
38% 36% 23% 32% 
Percentage of described examples that 
involved the respondent 
50% 56% 30% 44% 
  192 
 Respondents in Awach were most likely to say land conflict was the most 
common type of disagreement, and respondents in Lukodi were least likely to say the 
same. Beyond this, however, there are not consistent, clear differences between the three 
communities, which indicates that land conflict is an issue that transcends community-
level variation. Emergent conflicts are likely to have significant effects in a wide range of 
communities, regardless of NGO involvement, size of the community, socio-
demographic characteristics of residents, or other factors. 
Because of the complexity of the customary tenure system and the frequency of 
land disputes, there is significant case-by-case variation in the causes of conflicts, who is 
involved,39 and the level of seriousness of the dispute. By far, most of the situations 
described involved parties who were unrelated to one another, usually neighbors. 
Although this was most common, about a third of the cases were between extended 
relatives or close family members; these were often the conflicts that respondents seemed 
most concerned about, saying they struggled to understand how brothers and sisters could 
fight one another.  
 
Land Conflict Arising from a Messy Situation 
Respondents often attributed land disputes directly or indirectly to the war or resulting 
displacement. First, respondents described cases where the parties do not know the 
demarcations of their land. This may occur simply from being away from home for an 
                                                 
39 In several parts of northern Uganda, major land conflicts are increasingly occurring because of 
governmental or commercial interests in the land, forcing local community residents to relocate. For 
example, see the 2011 report by Oxfam, available at: 
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp151-land-power-rights-acquisitions-220911-en.pdf. In 
the three fieldsites, however, respondents did not describe these types of conflicts. 
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extended period of time, but most often a lack of clarity about boundaries is attributed to 
the fact that many members of the older generation died while people were in the camps. 
These elders were the ones who most clearly knew boundaries of land, and they have 
important roles to play in resolution of land disputes, as I will discuss later. A women’s 
leader talked of problems determining demarcations during the resettlement process: 
The issue came because at first people ran in different directions for their dear 
lives…then after so many years now they come back and also the vegetation is 
changed. Some trees that were not there are now there, and it’s a bit 
confusing…some would say no, the demarcation is here, others say no it is up to 
there, it is here. This kind of thing. And to make matters worse, the elders that 
knew the demarcations so well died while we were taking refuge. By the time we 
returned home, only the younger generation returned and they were not very 
conversant with the actual demarcation. (Interview #31) 
 
Also, during the course of the war and the 10 to 15 year displacement period, as 
families tried to make ends meet year after year, land sometimes did change hands, 
despite the cultural prohibition on selling customary land. In the case of such sales, the 
demarcations were often not made or communicated precisely, resulting in disputes. Felix 
Ojok explained, 
The issue of land now came in because in our state of desperation and poverty, 
people said, let me sell a portion of my land and then maybe I get some food or 
send my child to school. So, the interest in land changed from the land we used to 
cultivate as a community to now, private ownership so that I sell off my portion 
and get what I want. The problem with such sale is that you can sell a portion of 
your land and not being very precise in the demarcation you’ll find that at the end 
of it you’ve sold not only your portion but even the portion of a neighbor and that 
will ignite real chaos and problems. (Interview #9) 
 
As the passage above indicates, the war pushed people into desperate situations, which 
caused them to behave in ways they may not have otherwise. He went on to say: 
When war broke out it first removed all the wealth the people had, all the 
livestock. And the second thing, people got scattered. That good peaceful life, the 
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communal life was just shattered and people now tried to do everything they 
could now in different ways in order to earn their living. That means the unity was 
already broken…War brings poverty and in the state of poverty people can 
resolve to anything. (Interview #9) 
 
He then said that this led to the rise of land disputes among neighbors. Particularly, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, life in the camps brought out competitive or survival 
modes of interaction which then were transferred back to the village: 
A person with whom you have lived together before the war, and together you 
were sharing like brother, like sister, now coming back from the camp, that same 
person has changed completely. It is like a different person has entered the 
appearance of your neighbor and is now telling you, don’t touch that piece of land 
any more. She will begin to put claim that, this was my land, and you have no 
land here. (Interview #32) 
 
Some claimed that the war led to certain problems of livelihood or development, 
which then directly contributed to the rise of land conflicts. For example, the peace and 
security leader in Awach attributed land conflict to a lack of education for the generation 
raised during the war: 
People also got a lot of bad things from the camp, and that is, when people were 
living in the camp people gave birth to very many children. So when they went 
back home it caused a lot of land disputes, because the group of children or 
youth…that are there now did not have time to go to school. And you know once 
a person is not educated then they cannot think of developmental issues. 
(Interview #69) 
 
A few respondents mentioned the population growth that occurred while people were 
displaced. During resettlement, then, they found it difficult to divide up the land to 
accommodate each person’s growing family. 
There were also disputes reported because of competing bases of claims to the 
land; one party may have an ancestral claim to the land, while the other party has been 
living on and cultivating the land for many years. In cases of competing claims to land, 
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people with more power and social capital are likely to prevail. A few respondents 
attributed culpability for such conflicts to the government, explaining that after the war, 
the government told people to go back to their “original” places, meaning their ancestral 
land. This caused a problem because many people were not actually living on their 
ancestral land before the war, so their return sparked conflicts with those who had been 
staying on that piece of land. For example, a person may return and claim that they have 
ancestral land in the area, though perhaps their family had been gone for generations. The 
people who had been living on and farming that piece of land for many years may then be 
forced to move off the land. In cases like this, Ugandan law, as mentioned above, is 
supposed to protect the rights of long-term tenants, but at the local level, conflict 
resolution is more ambiguous. The 1998 Land Act was an attempt to resolve conflicts 
between multiple types of land tenure,40 but practical knowledge and application of land 
law remains extremely low.41 
According to respondents, a related cause of post-war land conflict has been the 
revoking of past agreements regarding sharing land. There were many cases of residents 
revoking agreements previously made by their fathers or grandfathers, which had granted 
use of land to neighbors or friends. Kennedy Oluk described such a situation, 
That neighbor of mine that I am talking about, we had been living together very 
well until this time that we returned from the camp. That is when he started to say 
that that piece of land was donated to my father by his father, and that it is time he 
should now recover the land so that he can share it out to his sons. For that matter, 
my sons should now withdraw or stop cultivating that piece of land. Therefore, 
                                                 
40 The 1998 Land Act delineates four types of land ownership: customary tenure, freehold tenure, mailo 
tenure, and leasehold tenure. 
41 The World Bank study found that 90 percent of people surveyed did not know the substantive contents of 
the Land Act (Rugadya 2008). 
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we have now problems in sharing the little portion of land that I have. (Interview 
#61) 
 
Lapolo Gloria explained that she is confused as to why, in communities where the 
previous generation used to share land easily, there are now such struggles arising 
between residents: 
Now that we have returned from the camp, I don't know what came into the minds 
of the people. Suddenly people who used to get along very well are now cross 
with each other, especially concerning land disputes. One strange thing is that 
people who used to live together in peace and share things, after returning from 
the camp, suddenly they turn against each other and say, you don't have a place 
here. My father gave your father that piece of land only on temporary basis, so 
now it is time you quit. All this kind of confusion; I don't know what is 
happening. (Interview #45) 
 
In the wake of displacement that lasted well over a decade, massive waves of 
resettlement did not occur in a particularly coordinated or organized manner, resulting in 
significant disagreements and confusion over boundaries of homesteads and rights to 
land. As seen in this section, respondents described how this chaotic situation led to land 
disputes because: demarcations were unclear or unknown; a survival mentality decreased 
willingness to share land; poverty and population growth accelerated competition for 
land; and there are multiple, often competing, bases of claims to the same piece of land. 
 
Land Conflict and Power 
While the types of conflicts described in the above section can arguably be attributed to 
the social disorganization created by war and displacement, there were just as many (if 
not more) cases where respondents described intentional or malignant “land grabbing.” In 
these instances, people take advantage of the situation of ambiguity and disorganization. 
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Charles Ocen, a highly-respected cultural chief, explained people’s new awareness of the 
monetary value of land in the post-war period:  
In the past actually people were just living in peace and not taking land as the 
most important asset they had. They were like somebody who is sitting on gold, 
but not knowing the value of gold thinks it’s just one of those tools around. And 
the ignorance was shown by, instead of owning your land, some people were 
saying let us put all our fields together and we work together this year. Next year, 
we will go one place and dig together. All our fields will be aligned next to the 
other. These days, suddenly coming back from the camp, the eyes of people are 
opened and they say, now I want everything for myself. I want the demarcation to 
be very clear. (Interview #41) 
 
Previous research in Uganda found competition over land increasing as rapid population 
growth couples with new non-agricultural demands for land (for a certain class of 
people), poverty and limited non-agricultural employment options (for most other 
people), and introductions of external market opportunities (Deininger and Castagnini 
2004; MercyCorps 2011). Land conflict arises as groups compete for land as a newly 
monetized, highly valuable resource (Deininger and Castagnini 2004). 
Owning land is also an indicator of power, prestige, and respect within the 
community. Many respondents talked about how the biggest difference among 
community members is between those who own big pieces of land and those who own 
smaller parcels. One local council chairman explained the high status of those with large 
amounts of land, and thus wealth, saying, “We have come back from the camp but the 
attitude of the people remains that they always respect the wealthy people, especially 
those who have got bigger pieces of land. They are looked at as like lords.” (Interview 
#38) In this context, the quest for land becomes about more than ensuring the survival of 
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one’s family, but it becomes a pathway to greater profits. In turn, this wealth also gives 
people power to acquire additional land, asserting the strength of their social position. 
Some people do exploit the situation of general disarray in the region and use it as 
an opportunity to grab land or encroach on neighbor’s demarcations. In many cases, 
respondents described land conflicts that seem to map on to other fault lines of difference 
and power in the community. For example, after elections, people belonging to the 
victorious party may chase people from the opposing party away from the land. Land 
conflict can be a way to force certain people out of the community. One woman told of 
being accused of being an evil person or a witch, then finding her land had been sold off 
as a way to try to force her to leave. While respondents most commonly expressed 
concern about land grabs from fellow community members, the World Bank land study 
found significant concern about broader threats. In their study, about half of respondents 
surveyed in Acholi districts felt their land was threatened by the government, the army or 
rich people (Rugadya 2008). These larger external threats are likely very real for 
residents, particularly as large-scale land grabbing is developing throughout the region, 
but people’s more immediate struggles are with power dynamics in their own 
communities. 
In a study of land tenure in post-conflict Rwanda, Rose (2003) found that the 
evolving chaotic land tenure system afforded women unique opportunities to have greater 
access and rights to land. I found, however, that in cases of land grabbing in the 
immediate aftermath of resettlement, people especially take advantage of vulnerable 
residents, such as women, poor people, or young people: 
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It has come to our notice that some people who have money, they come and 
intimidate the poor ones. You know there are some homesteads here whose actual 
leaders have been killed by the rebels. Now you find only children who are still 
very young growing up and some people come and threaten them, or they 
confiscate the land that they are living on. (Interview #9) 
 
One young woman whose parents died in the camps is now dealing with neighbors trying 
to take away the land her family had lived on; she described the distress she feels at the 
idea of moving: 
My father and mother are dead. They died during the war. But before the war we 
used to live here, and we knew that that was our home…all along we thought that 
was our home, that was our land. But when we returned from the camp, seeing 
that our parents are now dead, the neighbors started telling us that it is time we 
leave the land because our father was only given that land on temporal basis. So 
now you can see the dilemma, and we do not know any other place besides this, 
and such thought really upsets me. (Interview #45) 
 
A leader of disabled people in one village talked about the lack of power for families who 
do not have money or an elder to lead them:  
They always say that in so and so’s family they have a dead family. They say so if 
you don’t have money. If you do not have money they say that you have a dead 
family. And the death of a family is in two aspects—especially when you don’t 
have someone who should head people, or someone who should be there to guard 
the land. They will say you have a dead family. You will have not voice. You 
might have stayed in that land for many years but then they will come and tell you 
to move away, and the law will not support you. (Interview #66) 
 
A later section returns to the issue of power inequality, exploring how power functions in 
dispute resolution, swaying the outcomes of the conflicts in favor of those who have 
money and authority. 
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Negative Social Effects of Land Conflict 
While land conflicts arise for a variety of reasons, they are similar in their negative 
effects on the social life in resettled communities. Particularly, land disputes harm unity 
and trust in the villages, sowing divisions which can often escalate into violence, leading 
respondents to perceive land conflict as a war in their communities. 
 
Land Conflict Detracting From Unity 
Land conflicts disrupt daily social lives in the community, because instead of neighbors 
offering support to one another, many people find neighbors unwilling or unable to 
interact freely. Respondents described how, because of land conflicts, neighbors do not 
help one another with problems, they do not greet each other, and they do not eat 
together, all of which are significant problems in these small communities where people 
do feel like they need to depend on one another to get by in their daily lives. Lucy, a 28-
year-old resident, explained how she sees land conflict negatively affecting daily 
interactions between neighbors: 
Now, if you are in loggerheads with a neighbor over land, even the ordinary daily 
life will not flourish well, you will not greet each other, you will not call a friend 
to come and share something, you will not go to such person when you are in 
need now. Each time you feel like going, you ask yourself, but am I going to 
begin, and yet we are also not getting along very well because of that. So it 
actually creates a lot of suspicion and divisions. (Interview #47) 
 
Previous scholarship found problematic social implications of the land use system 
in Africa, arguing that what sometimes appears to be an adaptive and flexible system 
actually is one in which some win and some lose (Peters 2004). Land reform efforts often 
deepen inequality and increase competition over land (Peters and Kambewa 2007), giving 
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rise to land conflicts that increase exclusion, class formation, and social divisions (Peters 
2004). Indeed, respondents in Lukodi, Anyadwe, and Awach frequently described how 
land conflicts contribute to a breakdown of trust and unity, creating tension, division, and 
enmity in the community instead. For example, Lapolo Gloria said, “I know my 
neighbors, but as to the closeness between us, that one is questionable. People are now 
divided. This issue of land has made people to not trust one another intimately. These 
neighbors are very selfish and they think only of their own.” (Interview #45) A middle-
aged woman explained that people cannot trust those who are involved in land disputes, 
as such situations make relationships between the parties impossible: 
Trust is there, although it is poor. What makes this trust rather poor is land 
disputes. It is a common issue in this village. So this has weakened the level of 
trust and confidence in one another in this village…[People who] are not trusted 
are these people who have a land dispute, who are rivaling over land. Such people 
cannot have anything to do with the person they are rivaling with. (Interview #48) 
 
Even when relationships seem to be normal, tensions over land may be 
underlying. Otto James explained that, although his neighbors get along well on the 
surface, there are deeper feelings of discontent or mistrust that come from seeing one 
another as potential rivals over land: 
I have problems with my neighbors. From that time when we left the camp and 
returned here, immediately we started already pulling and claiming that land. 
Although we greet each other, but we know that deep down somebody is looking 
at one another as a rival. Although we are trying and trying to maybe recapture 
that kind of [united] life once again, but it is still a process. (Interview #60) 
 
Joy, a 30-year-old woman who has been involved in a recent land conflict herself, 
concurred: 
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I: Do [land] conflicts always escalate? 
R: No, not necessarily. Not all of them escalate up to a point of fight. But there is 
a silent tension that continues to linger in the mind of the people and the way you 
can see the way they look at each other, it is not comfortable at all. (Interview 
#48) 
 
Even in cases where the conflict is technically resolved, respondents often 
described the tensions that remain. Jeffrey Omona explained his particular case: 
Just recently somebody came and claimed my land, part of my land, and we went 
up to the division headquarters. And from there, he lost the case, because all the 
evidence and all the community members were in my support. So although he lost 
the case, there is no good relationship between his family and my family. They 
are still convinced that that part of the land is theirs, but in truth it is ours. 
(Interview #29) 
 
A community leader confirmed that this is a broader trend in the village, saying, “Even 
though someone is found guilty for taking another person’s land, the other would always 
not allow that the other person won the court. They would always still continue fighting. 
Both of them would always claim that the court did not pass a proper judgment.” 
(Interview #69) Such negative feelings sow division among community members that can 
lead to escalated conflict or violence. 
  
Potential to Escalate 
Some respondents described examples of conflicts that were relatively minor or were 
resolved amicably, with relationships restored between the involved parties. This type of 
conflict is perhaps expected or unavoidable (or even beneficial) in such a context. The 
reason to be concerned about land conflicts in these villages, however, is because of the 
potential escalation of such conflicts. Indeed, many respondents described conflicts that 
resulted in the loss of life, long-term imprisonments, or deep animosity, hatred, and 
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division. In fact, not only was land conflict cited by respondents as the most common 
type of disagreement in the villages, but it was the type of conflict most often labeled (by 
35 people, or 38 percent of respondents) as the most serious conflict in their community. 
A few others said that land conflict had not escalated to a serious level in their area, but it 
has the potential to be quite serious, and it had intensified in neighboring areas. 
Respondents described over a dozen cases of recent land conflicts that had already 
escalated to physical violence, and many more that seem to have real potential to do so, 
as well. 
For example, in one of the villages, many respondents described one particular 
case that had occurred recently and was still unresolved. Although there were significant 
discrepancies in recounting the events, the conflict ultimately resulted in the death of a 
young man. Both parties of the conflict were going out to the piece of land in question; 
some claimed they were going to look at the demarcations, others claimed one party went 
with a plan to ambush the other. One side brought police officers with them. There were 
conflicting accounts of what caused the death, with some claiming the victim was shot by 
stray bullets fired by police officers, others claiming he was stabbed by the opposing 
party, and others claiming he was killed by those of his side, in order to frame the other 
side as guilty. In any case, this is unfortunately not an uncommon example of a land 
dispute escalating to the point of loss of life and also to the point of causing serious 
divisions among people in the community. 
Especially in such cases, where the conflict escalates to the point of causing 
death, the animosities created are long-lasting. Joy, quoted above, commented further: 
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When a case is already so serious that one of the conflicting parties is killed, that 
one is not easy to resolve. It needs time and sincerity because the two families 
will always consider themselves enemies…There is a silent tension that continues 
to linger in the mind of the people and the way you can see the way they look at 
each other, it is not comfortable at all. (Interview #48) 
 
In the example above, the families involved in the conflict had stopped all associations 
with one another. The individuals accused of killing the young man were being held in 
prison. Community leaders told me they do not expect the case will be resolved for 
several years. During that time, the two clans cannot interact with one another. When I 
asked if they were concerned about this and the potential for one side to seek their own 
justice or revenge during these years, an elderly cultural chief told me that there is 
nothing they can do to control the situation, rather they just hope for the best. When a 
situation has already escalated to violence, there is real concern that it will spark a 
continued cycle of violence among opposing sides. 
Respondents explained that people are desperate for land, and so land conflicts 
involve extreme emotions, hatred, and aggression. Additionally, there are widely 
available would-be weapons, such as hoes, spears, and machetes. This creates a 
potentially explosive mix: 
When people are arguing about land, you can see sometimes they pick harmful 
things like spears, axes, and machetes. And they speak with emotion. As I said 
before, the most serious conflict here is something to do with land disputes, and 
when people always argue over land, they argue with a state of extreme emotions, 
and ready to pick up harmful things to fight - and even ready to kill, because I 
think the Acholi people are left after the war with only one valuable, and that is 
their land. They have lost everything, their cattle, their children, their homes. So 
land is the last thing; that is why I think they fight with madness and are ready to 
kill anybody over it. (Interview #54) 
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Richard Oyet described threats of violence over land as a regular occurrence: 
There are also violent threats; some people take a spear, they go to the field where 
somebody’s working, saying I’m going to spear you to death. This is not your 
field; you better pick your hoe and go home, and if you come again you will be a 
dead person. Such threats are there and very rampant. Here, it has become just a 
something almost a daily activity. (Interview #52) 
 
When land conflicts do escalate, they create deep divisions in the community, disrupting 
people’s lives, causing suffering, and making people see one another as enemies in a 
community at war with itself. 
 
Land Conflict as a War 
People’s social interactions are still colored by a mindset of war. For example, a young 
woman in Anyadwe described how greedy people may intimidate someone off a piece of 
land: 
They can even threaten him in many ways. They can say, we can even kill you 
and do away with you and do everything. So sometimes in this state of where 
people are shifted from the camp and are in mood of the war, they can do 
anything. Because although the war is gone, people are not recovered from the 
attitude of war. That is how many families lost their land to people who were 
greedy and full of threats. (Interview #49) 
 
After describing struggles over land in the community, a woman in Awach, Adong 
Evelyn, explained how people see one another as enemies, tolerating one another because 
they have no other option, but how this can erupt into violence: 
I: How are people surviving in the midst of all these differences [over land]? 
R: Yeah, they live but they don’t come very close to one another. They are 
actually looking at one another like enemies do to one another. They are not 
friendly anymore. They are just now tolerating one another, not because there is 
nothing wrong but because there is nowhere to go…So if it is something to do 
with land, when you see your rivals just by passing you say, look at that wicked 
man; he is just bent on my land, and so forth. So you will not have even peace at 
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heart. If I had a spear in my hand at this time, I would have thrown the spear to 
him to finish him. (Interview #78) 
 
Another man, Raphael Atoo, explained that during the war people had a common 
enemy, but now they have returned home and found that energy directed towards land 
conflicts with their neighbors: 
R: There is a lot of division among people these days. When we were running 
away from the rebels, we were just one people, but when we returned home, we 
returned a divided community. Coming back from the camp, there was no 
common enemy now, in the form of the rebels harming people. It was now 
actually a craze for land…I think that was not heard of before the war, but now it 
is a common thing, after this war. It makes this life more miserable. This means 
the war is not ended, but the fashion is changed. 
I: I see what you mean, but can you explain? Why do you say that the war is not 
yet over? 
R: I say the war is not ended because we are still turning against one another, 
continuing the war among ourselves. (Interview #58) 
 
In general, respondents were extremely concerned about the negative effects of land 
conflicts in their villages. For example, Atim Joyce, a rwot okoro in Anyadwe, described 
land conflicts as making neighbors into strangers: 
All these things were not there before the war. Actually, people liked and trusted 
one another intimately. Has all that confidence and trust gone? It is not there 
anymore. What you see are just strangers. Before the war, they were brothers and 
friends, after the war they look at one another as strangers and opponents. The 
whole issue is just this land, land, land. So the issue of land has divided people 
miserably…That is why I said, after this war, trust among people has been 
severely wounded and weakened. (Interview #32) 
 
Raphael Atoo said that, though people see the region as peaceful now, there is actually 
still a war taking place: 
Now, people are rivaling over land—brothers against brothers…You see, people 
are bitterly divided, and we are not enjoying this peace. From outside, people feel 
Acholi-land is peaceful, but when you come on the ground, Acholi-land has taken 
on another type of war, and they are fighting it among themselves. (Interview 
#58) 
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Lapolo Gloria, quoted earlier, whose family had been recently involved in a land dispute 
expressed the effect of such conflicts very poignantly: 
When I compare the life before the war and this life, then I say that this life is the 
most painful life I have ever experienced. While the war of the rebels, the rebels 
terrorizing the people, has ended, another war started up. That is the war within 
the community members. The war of rivals over land. (Interview #45) 
 
This statement powerfully illustrates the potential of such conflicts to tear apart a 
community. To hear a resident who had just survived a long and brutal war now describe 
land conflict in her village as another war—the most painful—is extremely troubling.  
 
Methods to Address Land Conflict 
Because land conflict is such a pervasive and potentially explosive issue, it is essential 
that there are strong systems in place to deal with such disputes. Most respondents 
described multiple levels for resolving land conflicts, in which cases start at a very local 
level, moving to progressively higher and more formal levels if they are particularly 
serious, the parties are unwilling to negotiate, or if any party prefers to bypass the local 
levels. In addition, there is sometimes a bit of a back and forth process between higher 
courts and the local level. Respondents had critiques for all levels of the process, not 
finding any mechanism to be completely able to address the significant challenges land 
conflicts are bringing in their communities. 
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Layers of Dispute Resolution 
Most attempts to resolve land disputes first occur at the local level. For example, the 
disputing parties may first meet at the piece of land in contention, joined by neighboring 
elders and the local chief (the rwot kweri) in charge of farming and land in their particular 
zone. If they are unable to resolve the dispute through mediation at this level, they can 
move up to the elected local leader (the LC-1) for their village, who can also collaborate 
with village elders in an attempt to resolve the dispute. The traditional cultural leadership 
institution, Ker Kwaro Acholi, is also supposed to play a significant role in resolving land 
disputes through investigating the history of the case and leading mediation efforts.  
If the issue is still contested, it can move up to subsequently higher levels of 
elected officials, or either party may bring the issue before the formal court system. In 
cases where the dispute involves a death or other serious bodily harm, the police are 
supposed to be called, the parties suspected of wrongdoing will be taken into custody, 
and a court case will be opened. Even in cases involving the formal state-based court or 
justice system, however, there is still an expectation that there should be local justice 
(involving village leaders, mediation, often compensation, and reconciliation between 
parties) before the conflict can be fully resolved. In fact, several informants told me that 
even if a case is brought before the court, the judge will often ask if the local leaders 
(especially Ker Kwaro) have ruled on the case. If not, they will send the parties back to 
the local authorities. If they have already gone through the local system, the court will 
sometimes defer to whatever decision the local leaders reached. Additionally, in cases 
where there was bodily harm, destruction of property, or other offenses, there needs to be 
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reconciliation using traditional rituals (such as mato oput42) to restore the relationship 
between the parties, even after the party found guilty served his or her prison sentence.  
Yet, despite these multiple layers of strategies available to address land conflicts, 
many remain unresolved. For example, in one case that resulted in death, the suspected 
killer was arrested by the police, but was eventually released. The case remained 
unresolved and the man was staying in the main town, as he had been advised it was not 
safe for him to come back to the village. Several cases cited by respondents are 
languishing in the court system. Even those handled at the village level by local leaders 
seem to take a long time to come to any conclusion, and many examples mentioned by 
respondents were on-going conflicts. As the earlier Table 6.1 showed, of the 80 specific 
cases respondents described, there were 39 which could be classified as unresolved, 
compared to only 34 resolved. 
 
Critiquing Dispute Resolution Systems 
Village residents typically strongly supported the handling of land conflicts at the local 
level, though they did express varying perceptions of how well the local dispute 
resolution was happening in practice. There are three main areas in which they saw the 
local level as more effective than the more formal court systems: 1) its emphasis on a 
restorative process; 2) the relatively less important role of money; and 3) its closeness to 
the community and its history. 
                                                 
42 Mato oput is a practice involving truth-seeking, mediation, and compensation between two parties 
(usually two families), particularly used in cases of death. See, for example, Baines (2007) or Latigo (2008) 
for more information. 
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First, local dispute resolution is based in restorative justice (Braithwaite 2002; 
Menkel-Meadow 2007), aiming to bring the parties back together and repair the damaged 
relationship between them, rather than the retributive approach of the court system, which 
punishes the individuals determined to be at fault. Atim Joyce, who was involved in 
dispute resolution as rwot okoro, described her role, emphasizing mediation to reach a 
compromise: 
We go and mediate and talk peace among them, and if possible, we again renew 
the demarcation so that it is very clear and not very ambiguous. We mediate until 
both sides resolve and say, yes I think both sides are now contented and we can 
proceed. Until both of them reach a compromise. We always work so hard that 
most tensions and rivalries are settled before reaching the police. (Interview #32) 
 
Another resident of Anyadwe carefully detailed the complex negative implications he 
sees when cases are brought to the police rather than handled locally: 
These days when a disagreement begins between two people or between clans, 
they rush immediately to the police…[When conflicts were] solved by the elders 
it was a better method, because they would advise both sides then set the ruling. 
They would not even imprison any, although you may pay a fine. So that leaves 
both of them without any bitterness. But now this one where people rush to the 
police, definitely the police would imprison one of them. And the one who 
suffered in the prison will find it hard in his heart to forgive the other one that 
took the matter to the police, that caused him his suffering…So it leaves a long 
bitterness in the heart of the people. And another thing that people have resorted 
to is, when you defeat me in the court of law I will make my underground 
arrangement to eliminate you, and this one is serious. Therefore I would 
emphasize very much that the first way should be revived, where the elders 
preside and warn the two conflicting parties. It’s a better way of solving the 
conflict. (Interview #60) 
 
 Second, very many respondents were concerned about the role of money in the 
court system, demonstrating a tangible way in which money translates into power in land 
conflicts. Primarily, people with money are able to bribe leaders, court officials, the 
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police, and others. A 32-year-old man explained the pervasiveness of bribery and how it 
provokes more conflict: 
The problem with land issue now is that bribery is involved. So all the levels 
where the case should be channeled through, they will bribe all these officers, 
whether the LCs, going to the police, from the police to the magistrate, to the 
lawyers, they bribe all these; they pay money. So the case becomes complicated. 
Even if at the end of it the magistrate declares that this land belongs to so and so, 
such declaration will only provoke more anger in the heart of those who lost the 
case. Therefore the realistic courts are those in the village, but this [higher, 
formal] court that now is handled by the so-called learned, those are fake courts 
and they create actually more enmity between people. (Interview #53) 
 
People with money are also able to hire lawyers, allowing them to navigate the 
complexities of the court system. Additionally, to the extent that money correlates with 
higher levels of education, they are able to speak with greater authority and confidence in 
the court, where the voices of those less confident in such an institution are silenced. An 
older woman explained: 
R: In the past, everything would be resolved amicably, locally by the rwot kweri 
or the village elders. These days, it is a different story. If a person has some 
money, he will go and buy a lawyer, and usually they get the upper hand of the 
case. 
I: Why is that so? 
R: Because of money. They buy their lawyer, and the lawyer is skillful in 
maneuvering all these things so that actually, the one who is not the owner will be 
looked at in the eyes of the law as the owner. And the actual owner will lose out 
altogether. It is tricky and funny. So most of these people who lose the case, or 
who are in prison, are the poor ones. (Interview #51) 
 
While a few respondents do say that local leaders or elders are susceptible to bribes as 
well, this is much less common, with more people placing trust in local leaders to act at 
least somewhat fairly. 
The third benefit of the local level compared to the higher levels is the degree of 
closeness to the land, the community members, and their shared history. Respondents 
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attributed problematic outcomes to the higher authorities attempts to deal with local 
issues. Felix Ojok, the elected leader in Lukodi, said: 
If it were possible, land cases should be processed within the community and not 
out there in the court hall, away in town.  People who live within the community 
know very precisely that for so many years so and so was cultivating this piece of 
land…But a judge who comes from out there, who sits in the court hall who 
maybe has never stepped on that piece of land will never make good or the correct 
decisions…Sitting somewhere in town he has even no imagination of how that 
piece of land that they’re discussing looks; he has never been there, but now 
passes judgment that the case is against so and so and so and so wins. It’s a total 
fallacy. (Interview #9) 
 
Respondents tended to describe local leaders as much better equipped to adjudicate land 
conflicts, because they are more intimately familiar with the land and the parties 
involved. He went on to say: 
[Local leaders] are the people who know the place, who can speak with certainty.  
Because when we sit in our council as village elders, we can point out that this 
person just wants to intimidate people. We say so and so, we know you, you were 
with us since this time, and you were cultivating this piece and not the other one. 
What made you to go up to there?  We can then say, since we know the truth, we 
will not allow you to come and intimidate people here or this poor family just 
because you have money. We will not allow that. (Interview #9) 
 
Local leaders may also be able to be flexible in their judgments, adjusting the general 
rules to account for context and to ensure all residents are cared for. As an elderly 
cultural elder explained, “If they discover that the man whom is being ordered out of the 
land had stayed for many years on the land, even if he’s not original of the place, some 
consideration is done. A small portion is given him because to send him off completely is 
very inhuman.” (Interview #10) 
While most respondents seemed to laud the merits of the local system, there were 
also strong critiques of the current effectiveness of local dispute resolution systems. 
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Particularly, a significant problem is getting the needed leadership from elders, upon 
whom the whole local system depends. As we also saw in the previous chapter, the 
system of local leadership and elders has deteriorated for several reasons. Many of the 
elders who are needed to advise on the demarcations died during the course of the 
conflict. Several respondents were also concerned that people no longer respect the 
elders, as one older man lamented: 
The older generation passed away, and this new strange generation does not have 
the way of the people at heart. They have things at heart. My daughter, I would 
like to tell you: people have moved away from centering their lives around elders. 
They are now centering their lives around the police, around the law, around the 
court. Even for very slight misunderstandings, the police are called in, or 
somebody is arrested and taken for court prosecution. So it has upset everything. 
(Interview #61) 
 
On the other hand, some respondents commented that the elders themselves are no longer 
very trustworthy, as one school leader said, “If the problem or the case is brought before 
somebody who is not honest, then it causes problem. It causes problem because there are 
some elders who are even not honest now. They are not trusted…At times they deceive 
the young ones, so it may bring more problems.” (Interview #39) Finally, in some cases, 
perhaps qualified elders are available, but they are intimidated from speaking up, as 
expressed by a leader in Awach: 
In most cases, if there is a land wrangle, no elderly person would come out 
to…differentiate the boundary between the land. These elders always shy away 
because they fear the youth. If they talk, then the youth will start pointing at them 
that they are talking nonsense, and that they do not know anything about the 
land…The elders said they feared the youth because the youth would always 
penalize them for any judgment passed. If the elders speak out the truth about 
who should really take the land, they will just think the elder is siding with the 
other person, so the elders will always become the wrong people. That is why the 
elders always fear talking. (Interview #69) 
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Some respondents expressed frustration with the local system, explaining that 
land conflict is a new phenomenon and, thus, local structures are not able to deal with it. 
The local system depends on all parties being willing to negotiate and discuss, and in 
reality this sometimes is not the case in bitter land disputes. Additionally, local leaders 
are, by definition, embedded in the conflicts personally. Because of the complex network 
of interrelationships in these small communities, it is almost unavoidable for a leader to 
be related or connected in some way to at least one party involved in the dispute. Some 
respondents are concerned that those who come forward as witnesses or leaders in cases 
do not tell the truth, but are influenced by money instead. 
These passages illustrated significant complexity in the post-war local dispute 
resolution system. Although most people still hold the local system as the more effective 
way to deal with land conflicts, there are definitely divisions, mistrust, and problems 
within this system as well. Without a solid mechanism that they can trust to resolve the 
conflicts in the community, many residents felt overwhelmed by the problems created by 
land disputes. 
 
(Lack of) Attention to the Issue 
Despite the significant potential of land conflicts to spark tensions and disunity, as well 
as the demonstrated difficulty in resolving post-war land issues, there has been 
shockingly little attention to this issue from NGOs or government initiatives. Their 
programs promote rebuilding and development efforts, usually centered around 
agricultural support, educational initiatives, or psycho-social programs for traumatized 
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individuals. Transitional justice efforts, as stated in the beginning of the chapter, tend to 
focus on truth-finding, reintegrating former abductees, trials, memorialization, and 
reconciliation rituals. 
 I did talk with several NGO representatives in Gulu who described their 
organizations’ programs to address land conflict, particularly locally-based organizations, 
like Concerned Parents’ Association, the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative, and 
Human Rights Focus. However, in the village interviews, respondents listed all the 
organizations that had been active in their communities since resettlement, and virtually 
nobody mentioned a program designed to help residents deal with land conflict. A 
handful of respondents (about five people) mentioned programs to help people learn to 
resolve conflicts non-violently in general. Similarly, although land conflict demonstrates 
clear potential to derail peacebuilding and reconciliation processes, transitional justice 
efforts (both in terms of programs on the ground and academic literature) are not attentive 
to the issue.  
Perhaps this is an example of instrumental rationality at work, in which 
organizations and government agencies are more interested in demonstrating quantifiable 
“success” with more manageable programs, like rebuilding schools, opening water 
sources, or conducting workshops for local leaders, rather than tackling the extremely 
thorny issue of land disputes. Based on my observations and interviews, I argue that this 
is an area that necessitates more focused attention, because what happens in these social 
interactions will have significant repercussions for the future, either undermining or 
facilitating the transition to post-conflict stability. As this analysis of land conflict 
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suggests, it is dangerous to make assumptions about local social interactions in post-war 
communities. As the case of land conflict in northern Uganda demonstrates, such 
everyday interactions between survivors can very well develop into new battles, 
originating from within local communities, but with the capacity to ignite broader 
regional animosity, tensions, and violence (Autesserre 2010). 
 
Discussion 
This chapter presented one particularly potent barrier to unity in post-war communities. 
Land conflicts are divisive because of the centrality of land, not only for the physical 
survival of families in an agricultural society but also for their social identity. Ancestral 
land is a marker of belonging, a way of distinguishing outsiders, and is an essential 
symbolic element of identity. In the post-war context, however, complications have 
emerged. Land is newly monetized and heralded as the “only thing of value” remaining 
to help people rebuild. Land is a marker of power and high social position. Customary 
land tenure is increasingly difficult to determine, as it relies on elders’ memories of local 
histories, and such leadership is facing significant challenges. Additionally, there has 
been a shift away from perceiving land as for communal use and declining practices of 
communal agricultural work, and instead an increasing concern with individual 
ownership. All of these factors converge to make disputes over land particularly 
meaningful and contested. 
Respondents reported that land disputes are extremely common in their 
communities, with over a third describing cases that involved them personally. Over half 
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of the described cases were unresolved and close to 20 percent of the examples given 
were cases that had escalated to physical violence. This issue transcends community-level 
differences and is a significant challenge for residents of all three communities. Disputes 
over land arose from the chaos and complexity of the return process, particularly as 
people struggled to determine precise demarcations without strong leadership from 
elders. More troubling, however, is the emergence of unequal power dynamics as cases of 
“land grabbing” highlight intentions to exploit more vulnerable community residents, 
particularly the poor and young people. Respondents were extremely concerned about 
how land conflicts detract from unity, making people unwilling to support or even 
interact with one another. Even in relationships that seem relatively calm, there are 
underlying tensions. After conflicts ignite, amicable relationships between the parties 
become impossible, and they may escalate to violence and create long-term animosity 
and divisions. Ultimately, respondents described land conflicts as a type of war in the 
community, invoking deep emotions and perceptions of their neighbors as their enemies. 
Unfortunately, there is no mechanism thoroughly equipped or trusted by 
respondents to address land conflicts. While a plural legal system may provide greater 
alternatives to negotiate dispute resolution, there is some evidence that plural legal 
systems can actually destabilize or weaken both levels (Benjamin 2008). In this case, 
respondents highly favored the local system, appreciating the emphasis on restorative 
processes (rather than retributive, right and wrong judgments of courts), the relatively 
smaller influence of money (rather than the power of bribes and hiring lawyers in the 
court system), and the closeness of the local resolution mechanisms to the people and 
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histories of the community. However, in practice, even the local system is struggling to 
address land conflict, as a new and particularly complex phenomenon that even a 
perfectly-functioning system would have difficulty handling. 
Returning again to my model of the transition from fragile coexistence to stability 
(Figure 6.1), I insert emergent conflicts as a potential block of the transitional process. 
The transition from war to peace is a period of enormous social change, as people had 
adapted their relationships, daily routines, and social institutions to decades of living in 
displaced persons’ camps, under threats of violence, and negotiating situations of 
insecurity (Finnström 2008). As discussed in the previous chapter, the post-war period 
left a crisis of leadership, a gap in the socialization of young adults, increasing inequality, 
monetization of the local economy, and an explosion of NGO interventions. Such 
changes contributed to the intensification of disagreements over land use and boundaries. 
In the case of northern Uganda, land conflict is the most serious emergent conflict, 
developing as communities cope with the shifting social conditions that come with these 
broad social changes. 
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Figure 6.1. Emergent Conflicts Can Block the Transition 
 
 
Emergent conflicts have the power to disrupt the entire transition and cycle 
communities into renewed violence and instability. If social institutions do not develop 
the capacity to deal with this emergent conflict, the situation will continue to polarize and 
intensify, leading to violent conflict (Miall 2007). Instead, there needs to be concerted 
efforts to transform the conflict and accommodate the social changes, leading to peaceful 
adaptation to the new social context (Miall 2007). My findings are consistent with 
previous studies that suggest local land disputes may escalate into or contribute to 
widespread violence or war. For example, Autesserre (2009, 2010) argued that local 
disputes and power struggles over land have been the root of the decades-long conflict in 
the DRC. Rustad and Binningsbø (2012) found that conflicts motivated by concerns over 
natural resource distribution—such as land—are more likely to reoccur. And, in an 
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analysis of the factors that prolong civil wars, Fearon (2004) found that land conflict 
between groups played a key role.  
In the case of Uganda, social capacity to address land conflict is currently very 
low. Despite land conflict emerging as a result of the war and displacement, transitional 
justice programs do not address the issue, likely seeing it as under the purview of 
development or rebuilding efforts. Development programs, whether from the government 
or NGOs, hesitate to address the complex issue. Some local CBOs claim to be addressing 
the issue, but I did not find evidence of their efforts in the local communities. Local 
dispute resolution systems are stunted by the war and ill-equipped to address this new 
problem. The court system is largely seen as irrelevant to local communities and too 
vulnerable to manipulation by powerful individuals.  
 What, then, can help communities adapt to social change constructively and 
address the real threat of land conflict? Certainly, CBO programs that teach people 
methods of solving disputes non-violently are an important first step, particularly in the 
post-war context where young people have been socialized to turn to violence to resolve 
problems and advance their interests. Decreasing the likelihood of people turning to 
violence as a viable alternative in their daily social interactions would be a valuable 
contribution to developing the social capacity to deal with land conflict. Of course, more 
structural capacity-building is necessary, as well. Particularly, local dispute resolution 
systems need to be supported and equipped to adapt to the unique challenges of land 
conflict. This is likely to be the area where transitional justice or development programs 
can leverage their resources most wisely. Local dispute resolution mechanisms have 
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significant credibility among the population, but need strengthening in the post-war 
context. Although respondents were quite critical and skeptical of the state-based court 
system to resolve land disputes, legal reforms and reforms to land administration 
agencies are warranted, specifically with the goal of making such systems less easily 
manipulated by people with power and more equitable in their protections of vulnerable 
individuals. 
 Additionally, this is an area ripe for more attention from social scientists and other 
scholars of conflict, peacebuilding, and transitional justice. Detailed analyses of changes 
in social leadership structures during and after war is essential, as my study was only able 
to touch on this important issue. The crisis of leadership in the post-war context has far 
reaching implications, as seen here and in the previous chapter. Additionally, an 
organizational analysis of how NGOs determine areas of focus and shape the content of 
their interventions would be illuminating and have powerful practical implications. 
Finally, most centrally, there is a dire need for work focused on the processes by which 
local level disputes escalate to violence and how these conflicts are the social roots of 
broader violence and warfare. In general, research about the development of regional and 
national conflict focuses on top-down explanations of political maneuvering, elite 
manipulation, media inciting violence, battles over large-scale natural resources, the 
dehumanization of entire ethnic groups, and so on. This chapter, however, suggests 
another element: a bottom-up story of micro-level tensions and power struggles over land 
(Autesserre 2010). This grassroots process of conflict development has rarely been 
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recognized and even more rarely studied systematically or deeply; while my study is one 
contribution to understanding this process, much more future research is needed. 
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Chapter Seven 
Transitional Justice in Context: Perceptions of the ICC 
 
Tong gweno pe kok doko loka. 
A cock doesn’t crow beyond its border. 
 
 
This chapter contributes an understanding of how people in recently resettled post-war 
villages in northern Uganda encounter and respond to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) as an international transitional justice mechanism. I discuss local knowledge about 
the ICC in the three fieldsites, including one that received significant attention from ICC 
outreach initiatives. This chapter explores survivors’ knowledge of the ICC, how people 
in affected communities evaluate the work of the ICC, and what impact they think it has 
in their lives. Previous work on globalization and law suggests that the ICC, as an 
international institution, carries universalized global principles of justice, accountability, 
and human rights and that, under the right conditions, these will be incorporated into 
diverse local contexts. The ICC itself similarly expects that increased education about 
and knowledge of its work will lead to high levels of support and a harmony of interests 
between the ICC and local populations. On the contrary, I found that when people know 
more about the ICC, they are more likely to be critical and have negative perceptions of 
its impact. While previous work has focused on cases where global principles are 
successfully translated into a local vernacular, I identified how elements of social context 
can complicate the process of translating the ICC’s global principles and discourse to the 
local level. 
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 In this chapter, I first discuss the ICC’s involvement in the Ugandan case and its 
outreach efforts in the region. Next, I situate my work within previous research on 
universalized discourses and institutional logics of courts. Next, I introduce variance in 
exposure to the ICC among the three fieldsites. I then explore the ICC’s own claims 
about the success of its outreach efforts. In discussing findings from the interview data, I 
first present respondents’ knowledge about the ICC. I complicate assumptions about how 
knowledge leads to increased support by introducing a model that accounts for how local 
social context affects ICC discourse. Next, I lay out how respondents perceive the impact 
of the ICC in their lives, discussing both positive and negative impacts and their 
connections to elements of the post-war context.  
I found that knowledge about the ICC remains low, even after outreach activities, 
and that knowledge is not distributed evenly throughout the population. I also found that 
there is substantial nuance in how people understand the ICC’s impact, and that outreach 
activities may prompt debate or deliberation that ultimately leads to negative perceptions 
of the ICC’s role in Uganda. Particularly, respondents were critical of the ICC because 
they sensed its involvement had perpetuated the suffering of innocent people and because 
they perceived the ICC as incompatible with their deeply-held values of forgiveness and 
reconciliation. I found that, for most people, the ICC does not resonate with their lived 
experiences or their attempts to make sense of their collective lives after war.  
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The ICC in Northern Uganda 
The International Criminal Court  
For many, the International Criminal Court represents the culmination of decades of work 
to combat impunity for mass atrocities and human rights abuses. Building on the 
foundation laid by war crimes trials and international tribunals in the 20th century, the 
ICC is the first permanent, global criminal court with jurisdiction to prosecute genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. The ICC entered into 
force in 2002 and by 2013 had 122 states parties. “Situations” have been officially 
opened in eight countries, with 18 cases, and as the ICC celebrated its 10th anniversary, it 
reached its first verdict in the case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, found guilty of war crimes 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
 Beyond its significance in advancing international criminal accountability, the 
ICC is innovative for developing mechanisms that include the victims of the crimes in its 
activities. People who have been victims of crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction can 
request the opening of an investigation or testify as witnesses in proceedings 
(International Criminal Court 2009). Convicted persons can be ordered to pay individual 
or collective reparations, and the ICC also has established a Trust Fund for Victims, 
through which victims receive reparations or projects are initiated in victims’ 
communities (International Criminal Court 2009). In addition to these ways victims can 
be involved, the ICC has outreach programs in at least five countries, all in Africa.   
Outreach programs include a variety of initiatives, including outreach to affected 
communities, local schools and universities, legal professionals, and the media 
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(International Criminal Court 2010b). According to the webpage for the ICC’s outreach 
program: 
Outreach is a process of establishing sustainable, two-way communication 
between the Court and communities affected by the situations that are subject to 
investigations or proceedings, and to promote understanding and support of the 
judicial process at various stages as well as the different roles of the organs of the 
ICC. Outreach aims to clarify misperceptions and misunderstandings and to 
enable affected communities to follow trials.43 (emphasis mine) 
 
The official objectives of the outreach program emphasize the reciprocal process of 
providing information to communities and at the same time responding to their concerns. 
One objective is specifically to increase understanding in affected communities in order 
to increase support: “To promote greater understanding of the Court’s role…with a view 
to increasing support among the population…” (International Criminal Court 2006:5). 
The central presupposition of ICC outreach is that by facilitating the flow of 
information both ways between the ICC and the affected population, support for the 
Court will increase among the local population. It assumes that if people knew more and 
the ICC was responsive to their concerns, then a harmony of interests around shared 
notions and practices of justice would emerge. I constructed Figure 7.1 to illustrate this, 
based on descriptions of outreach goals and objectives from the ICC’s outreach website 
and reports. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
43 See http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/outreach/Pages/outreach.aspx, 
accessed February 13, 2013.  
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Figure 7.1. Presuppositions in the ICC Outreach Process 
 
A staff member of the Outreach Unit explained to me that the main goal of the 
outreach is to “engage the affected communities,” bringing the ICC “close” to people in 
Uganda and make the Court “relevant” to affected communities.44 As the following 
analysis reveals, however, this model is not happening. Instead, Ugandans have 
thoughtful critiques about the involvement of the ICC in northern Uganda, which have 
resulted in a community-level discourse that in many ways contradicts the ICC’s 
discourse about accountability and justice. My data reveal that the process of 
“translating” the global discourse of the ICC to the local level is not occurring 
effectively, and I introduce a model of how elements of the local social context interact 
with or complicate the ICC’s model. 
                                                 
44 ICC Outreach staff member, personal interview, December 12, 2012. 
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The ICC Involvement in Northern Uganda  
In 2003, President Museveni referred the situation with the LRA in Uganda to the ICC 
and in 2004 the Chief Prosecutor opened an investigation. The following year, by the side 
of President Museveni, the Prosecutor unsealed the ICC’s first-ever arrest warrants for 
crimes against humanity and war crimes against Joseph Kony and four other top LRA 
commanders. Then from 2006 to 2008, Southern Sudan mediated peace negotiations 
between the LRA and the government of Uganda in Juba. Although the negotiations 
seemed promising, even leading to the creation of a “Permanent Ceasefire” and an 
“Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation,” Kony failed to sign the final 
agreement, demanding that the ICC warrants be lifted. Negotiations stalled indefinitely, 
giving way to military interventions against the LRA, tragically resulting in more loss of 
life. To date, there have been no arrests.  
The involvement of the ICC in Uganda sparked substantial debate about the 
appropriateness of the intervention and its potential political consequences.45 Some 
perceived the ICC as problematically siding with the government of Uganda, citing the 
joint appearances of President Museveni and the Chief Prosecutor, the fact that the ICC is 
not prosecuting abuses allegedly committed by the government’s UPDF, and the 
Ugandan government’s potential political gains from ICC involvement. The second 
major critique is that the ICC arrest warrants undermined the peace process and 
contradict the Amnesty Act, thus prolonging the conflict (Baines 2007; Clarke 2009). In 
                                                 
45 This debate was particularly vibrant in the mid-2000s, as the arrest warrants were released and as the 
Juba peace talks were underway. For a few examples, see Allen (2006), or Branch (2007), Southwick 
(2005).  
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2012, international interest in apprehending Kony and bringing him before the ICC was 
revitalized with the internet video sensation ‘Kony 2012’ released by Invisible 
Children,46 the deployment of 100 U.S. forces to Uganda (BBC News 2011), and the 
creation of an African Union force of 5,000 troops on a mission to capture Kony (Kron 
2012). 
The ICC has an Outreach Unit that has been active in Uganda since 2006, though 
its activities have dwindled in recent years and there is now only one staff person in the 
country. Its 2010 annual report described a wide array of activities, including large-scale 
community outreach. From 1 October 2009 to 1 October 2010, the Outreach Unit 
reported that 22,894 people had participated in 165 interactive sessions in Uganda; 60 of 
these were specifically village town-hall meetings (International Criminal Court 2010b). 
In addition to this direct community outreach, the ICC Outreach conducted interactive 
radio programs that were broadcast weekly on local stations, hosting debates and 
responding to questions. Radio is by far the most accessible media to rural residents (over 
newspaper, television, or internet) and the Outreach Unit estimated that these programs 
potentially reached 10 million people in northern Uganda in 2010 (International Criminal 
Court 2010b:16). 
 
“Universalized” Discourses and Principles 
World polity theory (Boli and Thomas 1997, 1999; Meyer et al. 1997) helps situate the 
ICC as an institution and make sense of its global significance. According to this 
                                                 
46 The primary strategy promoted in the video and through its associated advocacy campaign is the use of 
military force to apprehend Kony and bring him to trial before the ICC. 
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perspective, since the mid-nineteenth century, there has been a rise of a world 
institutional and cultural order with universal models that shape states and individuals. 
World polity theory suggests that these universalized principles or global culture will 
come to be integrated into a wide range of social contexts and the global trend will lean 
towards similarity across nation states, as these principles become taken for granted. In 
this system, IGOs and INGOs are key carriers that promote universalized principles and 
discourses. The ICC is one such global actor advocating ideals that are increasingly seen 
as universal: principles of justice, human rights, individualism, progress, and so on. 
Clarke (2009) argues that the ICC is an agent that produces “justice talk,” or the idea that 
the international order operates according to a superior set of external norms that will be 
spread to local contexts. 
 Some scholars, however, have problematized this process of the transmission of 
global culture to diverse local contexts. Boyle (2002) notes that principles 
institutionalized among global actors can sometimes run counter to local institutionalized 
practices. Although female genital cutting is uniformly opposed by global actors, for 
example, failure to circumcise a daughter was perceived as child neglect until recently in 
some communities (Boyle 2002). Merry (2006) highlights the need to translate the 
principles carried by global actors into an “everyday vernacular” that is meaningful in 
particular local contexts, a process Levitt and Merry term “vernacularization” (Levitt and 
Merry 2009). They argue that, to be effective, human rights law and other global ideals 
must be reframed in local terms by translators, such as local activists and elites. I argue 
that in the case of the ICC in Uganda there has not been effective vernacularization of the 
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global discourse to the local level. Unlike previous work which focuses on explaining the 
successful translation of global principles (Levitt and Merry 2009; Merry 2006), my task 
is to explain a process in which vernacularization or translation is absent or fails to 
impact local perceptions, particularly relying on insights from cultural sociology.  
 Not only  is it necessary to translate international discourses to the local level, but 
to meet its outreach objectives the ICC also needs to translate the legal logic of the 
criminal court to the lifeworlds of people affected by the court. There is a body of work 
investigating the translation of the institutional logic of courts looking at the trials and 
tribunals of the post-World War II era. For example, Devin Pendas (2006) explores the 
limits or boundaries of the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, finding it was not able to 
adequately give an account of the Holocaust as a “total social event,” instead focusing on 
“ordinary” crimes committed by individual perpetrators. For this reason, Pendas argues 
that the trial was an example of a legal narrative that “fails socially” because it did not 
organize the messiness of the situation into a coherent story. Similarly, Tomaz Jardim 
(2012), analyzing an American military trial at Dachau, shows how a trial (though 
effective at distributing punishment) can fail to contribute to establishing democracy or a 
sense of the historical context of the crimes. He argues that this disconnect between a trial 
and the broader population can actually shift people’s view from seeing the accused as 
perpetrators to seeing them as victims of an unfair or vengeful system (Jardim 2012). 
Insights from such studies are helpful in understanding in what ways the logic of the ICC 
as a legal institution resonates with the population in northern Uganda, and in what ways 
it may be fundamentally disconnected. 
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 Considering the case of ICC involvement in northern Uganda, this chapter 
addresses three interrelated questions. First, how successfully has knowledge about the 
ICC disseminated to the local level? Second, does increased knowledge translate into 
increased support? And, finally, what facilitates or hinders this process? 
 
Comparing Communities: Data and Methods 
In this section, I first discuss the interview items used in this analysis. Next, I discuss the 
rationale behind comparing the communities of Lukodi, Anyadwe, and Awach. I also 
present the ICC’s claims about the success of outreach in the region, including specific 
success in the community of Lukodi.  
 
Interview Questions 
Within the interviews, a few specific questions were primarily used for this analysis. 
First, respondents were asked if they knew about the ICC. If they responded positively, 
they were asked additional questions: What is the ICC? Where have you gotten 
information about the ICC? What do you think is the impact of the ICC? Because the 
interview questions served as a flexible guide for a conversation between the interviewer 
and respondent, follow up or probing questions were typically asked, as well. For 
example, if a respondent indicated they knew nothing about the ICC or had not even 
heard of it, the interviewer would follow up to ensure they were certain about this. The 
interviewer often probed the respondent to consider the ICC’s impact generally, as well 
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as in their particular village or their own life. Additionally, the interviewer sometimes 
asked respondents to consider both positive and negative effects of the ICC. 
 
Field Sites 
Lukodi stands out for its high level of contact with the ICC. In 2004, the LRA raided 
Lukodi and massacred over 60 people. In the wake of this tragedy, bodies were buried by 
community members. A day after the burial, forensic investigators and government 
representatives arrived to exhume and examine the bodies, as well as to take photographs 
and statements from survivors. Community residents assisted with the exhumation and 
reburial process, though they were not informed about the purpose of the investigation. 
On several occasions, investigators from the Office of the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC 
and from the Ugandan police came to Lukodi to gather information about the massacre, 
to build a case against the leaders of the LRA (Justice and Reconciliation Project 2011). 
In addition, Lukodi has had significant interaction with ICC outreach activities, 
particularly in 2010, the year before I conducted interviews. Of the 21 towns and villages 
in the Acholi sub-region where the ICC reported carrying out Community Outreach 
Programme activities in 2010, four of them were located within Lukodi village 
(International Criminal Court 2010b:10).47 In May 2010, a high level delegation from the 
ICC, including the ICC President, Judge Sang-Hyun Song, visited Lukodi for an 
interactive outreach session with over 670 local residents, including many women, youth, 
and local leaders (International Criminal Court 2010d). A few months later, in July 2010, 
                                                 
47 The ICC reports outreach activities were carried out in Lukodi sub-ward, as well as Lalweny, Lagoticol 
[Lagot Kicol], and Loyobo, which are zones or tek kweri within Lukodi village.  
  234 
the ICC held another event in Lukodi, in celebration of the Day of International Criminal 
Justice. This event included at least 180 community members, and again the ICC noted 
the particular participation of women. The event was interactive, including an ICC 
presentation, speeches, dance and play performances by community members, and a 
question and answer session. ICC reporting about the event notes that local authorities 
and leaders praised the ICC for coming closer to residents, appreciated that the ICC had 
not forgotten them and said the ICC’s engagement had “made them understand the 
relevance of justice served for societies in transition” (International Criminal Court 
2010c). Additionally, the area’s secondary school was one of four schools in Gulu district 
where the ICC conducted an outreach session and radio talk show (International Criminal 
Court 2010a). According to the ICC Outreach Unit coordinator, Outreach personnel had 
gone to Lukodi more than 10 times, and they consider that the outreach work has been 
very successful in Lukodi.48  
The other two field sites, Anyadwe and Awach, had exposure to the ICC that was 
more typical for the region. Radio is the major form of communication in the villages, 
and there are regular radio programs broadcast by and about the ICC, including call-in 
shows where listeners can ask questions about the Court and offer their perspectives. 
People also learn about the ICC from newspaper articles and television programs. 
According to my interview with the ICC outreach staff member, Outreach personnel had 
also gone to both Anyadwe and Awach about two times, but conducted smaller 
gatherings with only community leaders, rather than large community events. 
                                                 
48 ICC Outreach staff member, personal interview, December 12, 2012. 
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Because of these differences, comparing how residents of Lukodi perceive the 
ICC to the perceptions of residents in otherwise quite similar neighboring communities is 
particularly fruitful. Lukodi is a place where the ICC Outreach Unit made a concerted 
effort to reach the local population and inform them about the ICC and its work. Because 
the orientation of such outreach is to increase residents’ support for the ICC, I would 
expect not only the knowledge about the ICC but also support for the ICC to be higher in 
Lukodi than in the other two nearby villages. However, findings suggest a greater 
multiplicity of ideas about the ICC within the communities. 
 
The ICC’s Claims of Outreach Effectiveness 
According to the ICC’s 201049 outreach report, the outreach activities (which included 
those conducted in Lukodi) had been quite successful in implementing the model 
presented in the preceding pages. Through outreach, the ICC claims members of the 
affected communities have increased their knowledge about and support for the ICC. 
Figure 7.2, copied directly from the outreach report (International Criminal Court 2010b), 
depicts responses to questions asked of individuals who had directly participated in 
outreach programs in Uganda.50 Particularly interesting is the finding that 98 percent of 
respondents were happy with the presence of the ICC in Uganda. 
 
 
                                                 
49 The interviews for this project were conducted in 2011, so the 2010 outreach activities are most 
appropriate for this research. Additionally, 2009 and 2010 were the height of ICC outreach activities and 
the 2010 report is the most recent outreach report available online as of July 2013.  
50 Although the exact methods or number of respondents are not reported in the publication, it implies that 
at least 14,000 people responded to these questions after participating in outreach events. 
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Figure 7.2. Opinions about the ICC from 2010 ICC Outreach Report 
 
 Commenting specifically on an outreach event in Lukodi, the report says, “Local 
council authorities, women and youth leaders of Lukodi village highlighted the 
importance of the work done so far by the Court through outreach activities, as in their 
view, this constant engagement with affected communities has made them understand the 
relevance of justice served for societies in transition” (International Criminal Court 
2010b, emphasis mine). According to the ICC materials, outreach activities have been 
successful in increasing knowledge about the Court, support for its work, and perceptions 
that it is meaningful and significant in people’s lives. From this, I expected greater 
knowledge about the ICC among interview respondents to be associated with higher 
levels of support. One would also expect both knowledge and support to be noticeably 
higher in Lukodi, where the ICC had been more active in its outreach efforts. 
 While the ICC materials paint an optimistic picture of outreach, my data suggest 
the materials may be one-dimensional and there is likely more to the story. Indeed, I 
found that neither one of the directional arrows in the feedback loop, depicted in Figure 
7.1, was working very well. As discussed below, there are significant pockets of the 
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population with no knowledge of the ICC, people do not really feel they are participants 
in the process, and the ICC does not really have a way to integrate feedback from the 
population. Furthermore, even in cases where people are well informed about the ICC 
and have participated in outreach events and workshops, the majority did not buy into the 
idea that justice comes from prosecutions or that the ICC is a good idea for their 
communities.  
Clearly, there are significant discrepancies between the Court’s findings and how 
I found respondents to perceive the ICC. Part of this, certainly, could be described by the 
nature of the data collection, using open-ended questions, a conversational interview 
style, developing rapport with the respondent, and conducting the interview in their 
home. Additionally, I observed many residents of the region to be quite deferential to the 
perceived authority of international organizations and their representatives, which 
perhaps affected responses to the ICC’s evaluative questions. The ICC has done outreach 
in Lukodi, and made claims about the success of the model there, yet I found that 
community members did not display strong support for the ICC’s approach. The central 
task of this analysis is to explore this issue, unpacking why familiarity did not breed a 
deeper perception of the Court as salient in respondents’ lives. 
 
Awareness and Knowledge about the ICC 
There was considerable variation in respondents’ knowledge about the ICC, ranging from 
those who had very little knowledge at all, those with vague knowledge, those with 
knowledge that is discordant with the ICC’s understanding of its work, and those who 
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have knowledge that is consistent with the ICC’s understanding of itself. As will be 
discussed in this section, there was some evidence of higher levels of knowledge about 
the ICC in Lukodi, although there were still large pockets of the population that were not 
knowledgeable about the Court.  
 Even after probing from the interviewer, nearly a quarter of respondents reported 
they knew nothing about the ICC, except having heard the acronym, which is the way the 
ICC is commonly referenced in the media and in the villages. They had heard people talk 
about the ICC, but were unable to explain what it was, at even a basic level. Several 
respondents asked the interviewer to explain the ICC to them. Such respondents had 
heard of the ICC, but their understanding of it was very vague, such as the case of this 
elected government leader in Anyadwe: 
I heard of ICC, but I am not very conversant with it; I am not very 
familiar. I am a leader of the people here, but they have not taken time to 
sensitize us…we just hear people mention it over the radio…Whatever it 
is for, whatever it does, what is the role of ICC, all those questions remain 
to me unanswered. (Interview #38) 
 
Some respondents ventured ideas, but were not confident in their knowledge. For 
example, a young woman in Lukodi thought perhaps the ICC involved Uganda’s political 
leaders: “Maybe it is something to do with Kizza [Besigye] and Museveni? Did I say it 
correctly? [laughs] I don’t know. I’m not very sure what it is.” (Interview #11) 
 In each village, particularly women and those with low education (which are 
overlapping categories) were not conversant with the ICC. In Lukodi, this included 
women who had attended the ICC outreach events and participated in the drama and 
singing for the events, but were not really sure what the event had been substantively 
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about. This is consistent with previous findings from Central African Republic that there 
are “information poor” pockets of the population without knowledge about the ICC, 
particularly among women and those with lower levels of education (Vinck and Pham 
2010).  
 As Table 7.1 indicates, there were respondents with knowledge about the ICC that 
was incongruous or discordant with the ICC’s claims. This incongruent knowledge 
ranged from seeing the ICC as connected to Uganda’s Amnesty Act, involving Uganda’s 
political leaders, working with local-level crimes or national court cases,51 pardoning 
people, arresting people, helping those in need, offering counseling, or other functions. 
For example, a 35 year old man in Ajulu saw the ICC as connected to the national 
Amnesty Act: 
I heard about it [the ICC] at a time when some people who were abducted 
returned back and were pardoned. I was told that those who were in the 
bush were constantly being encouraged to come out from the bush and 
surrender to the government, but most of them could not believe the 
invitation, that it was a trick to lure them, a trap. ICC I think came in to 
declare with certainty, to declare that they would not be harmed. 
(Interview #55) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51 For example, one respondent thought the national trial of LRA commander Thomas Kwoyelo was related 
to the ICC. Kwoyelo went before the International War Crimes Division of the Uganda High Court in 2011. 
Ultimately, he was found to be entitled to amnesty; Kwoyelo remains in detention (AllAfrica.com 2012).  
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Table 7.1. Respondents with Lower Knowledge of the ICC 
 No knowledge 
Discordant, 
incomplete, 
or vague 
knowledge 
All 
categories of 
lower 
knowledge 
Village Residents    
     Lukodi  20% 45% 65% 
     Anyadwe  35% 50% 85% 
     Awach  30% 30% 60% 
Village Leaders    
     Lukodi  10% 20% 30% 
     Anyadwe  0% 45% 45% 
     Awach  20% 30% 50% 
Gender    
     Women 36% 44% 79% 
     Men 12% 35% 46% 
Education    
     Low  50% 30% 80% 
     Primary  17% 51% 68% 
     High  7% 28% 34% 
Age    
     Young 24% 35% 59% 
     Middle  21% 44% 64% 
     Elder  22% 33% 56% 
 
As the table above shows, Lukodi and Awach showed similar levels of residents without 
much knowledge of the ICC or its role. Anyadwe stood out with a larger number of 
residents not knowing about the ICC. Leaders in Lukodi were more likely to be 
knowledgeable about the ICC, suggesting the outreach may have been successful in this 
regard. These examples demonstrate that even with concerted regional outreach efforts, 
many people in local villages did not feel they had a strong understanding of the ICC. 
This is true even in Lukodi, a community that has had an exceptionally high level of 
exposure to the ICC. 
 There were also, of course, many respondents who understood the ICC in a way 
that aligned more closely with the ICC’s intentions or self-perceptions, with Lukodi not 
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differing substantially from the other two villages. There was variation among 
respondents in the level of detail they knew about the ICC, with Lukodi respondents 
among those with the most detailed knowledge.  
 The most basic point about the ICC understood by respondents was that the ICC 
is designed to prosecute particularly egregious or large-scale crimes. Orach, a 39 year old 
man in Awach, gave a typical response of this sort: 
R: I came to know that this court addresses only very serious crimes. 
I: Can you give examples? 
R: Something to do with killing people in big numbers, they address such 
people when the nation itself may fail, when a particular nation itself may 
not address such a case. Something to do with causing the loss of human 
life in big numbers and other form of abuses against humanity. (Interview 
#84) 
 
Relatedly, most of these respondents explained that Kony (and other top LRA leaders) 
committed such crimes and the ICC wants to hold them responsible. Respondents often 
mentioned that the court is international in nature, though this point is not usually 
expanded upon in significant detail. Some respondents began to blend their descriptions 
into critique, such as describing the politics surround the ICC involvement in Uganda or 
expressing frustration with the fact that the ICC does not have its own force to arrest 
suspects.  
 We asked respondents where they had received information about the ICC and by 
far the most common response was that they had heard about it from the radio or other 
types of media, often citing specific radio programs. A few said they heard about the ICC 
from talking to other people in the community, such as at the market or trading center. A 
minority of respondents reported hearing about the ICC in workshops put on by people 
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who came from organizations outside their village.52 In Lukodi, several respondents 
mentioned the ICC outreach activities, some vaguely, but some demonstrated that they 
really engaged with the event, such as a 21 year old man who said, “[The ICC President] 
came up to Lukodi here. He had a workshop for sensitization of the masses. I was also 
there, I participated. I was one of those who asked many, many questions.” (Interview 
#23) Felix, the locally-elected government leader in Lukodi, also spoke of a more in-
depth visit or investigation from the ICC: 
A representative of the ICC came here up to Lukodi village, the president 
of ICC himself came up to Lukodi…he came up to here and was briefing 
us…he sensitized us on the role of ICC and he said that’s why they have 
come here, they’ve learned of the massacre that was committed in this 
village. He said they had come here to confirm the massacre that took 
place and he said their role is to prosecute a person who has conducted this 
massacre…So, he went on and gave detailed explanations about ICC and 
he also gave us at the end of it a time to ask questions. So, it was not a one 
day activity. They came here and spent some time. We would take them 
from one village to another, this village tomorrow that village the other 
day, the next village…and they were sensitizing people. They believe that 
when the audience was small they would assimilate better. (Interview #9) 
  
In the other communities, a few people mentioned workshops held by other 
groups, such as Save the Children, Concerned Parents’ Association, or religious 
organizations. In Awach, a protestant reverend explained:  
We were getting [knowledge of the ICC] as religious leaders from the 
diocese. They were sensitizing us, they were teaching us, training us, on 
ICC so that we come back and train the community on ICC…We were 
getting most of it from the diocese, but then also others from the NGOs 
who were moving, training people on ICC. And then, especially with 
religious leaders, they were telling us so that we go and we tell the people 
                                                 
52 These respondents had received information about the ICC from workshops more often than other 
communities in Gulu District, due in large part to ICC events in Lukodi. In 2010, just 3 percent of the 
overall population in the Acholi sub-region had heard about the ICC from a workshop or meeting (Pham 
and Vinck 2010).  
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within the community what ICC was and what it would do to those who 
committed big offenses. (Interview #68) 
 
These responses show that, although the majority of the respondents reported learning 
about the ICC from the radio, there also have been significant efforts by the ICC and 
other groups to promote knowledge about the ICC in the region. 
 As this section illustrated, for many, the outreach process of disseminating 
information about the ICC was not successful. There still are significant pockets of the 
population without a thorough understanding of what the ICC is or what its role has been 
in Uganda. The remaining sections focus on respondents’ assessments of the impact of 
the ICC in the region, their communities, and their own lives. Generally, respondents who 
reported no knowledge of the ICC did not offer comments on its perceived impacts, and 
their responses are not included in the following discussion. For respondents with partial 
knowledge of the ICC, most did share perceptions of its impact; these responses are 
included below, along with responses from those with more thorough understandings of 
the Court. 
 
Positive Impacts of the ICC 
Some respondents did describe positive consequences of the ICC’s involvement in 
Uganda. I discuss these briefly before turning to the more common critiques of the ICC. 
When respondents mentioned positive aspects of the ICC, they generally had three main 
perceptions: 1) the ICC warrants drove Kony and the LRA into neighboring countries, 
which brought peace to northern Uganda, allowing people to return home; 2) the ICC 
brings needed punishment for crimes and justice for victims; and 3) the ICC can have a 
  244 
deterrent effect, making those who are committing or would commit atrocities reconsider 
their actions because they fear prosecution.  
 First, some people perceived that pressure from the ICC was perhaps part of the 
reason Kony left Uganda. With the LRA no longer an immediate threat, residents were 
able to leave the IDP camps and return to their homes, which not surprisingly had a 
substantial positive impact in respondents’ daily lives. Surprisingly, however, this 
perspective was expressed only infrequently. Perhaps this was due to a recognition that 
just because Kony left Uganda, the suffering he causes has not come to an end, as 
expressed by the security officer in Awach, who said, “To me, I find that ICC has helped 
because it made Kony to run away. He ran away and hid because he knew that he would 
be arrested. Because he ran away, although he transferred his problems to other people, I 
am glad that he is not here anymore.” (Interview #69) 
 Secondly, some respondents felt that the ICC could bring necessary punishment 
for horrendous crimes and justice for the victims of those crimes. George Okulu, the 
Awach religious leader who attended workshop trainings about the ICC, mentioned in the 
previous section, explained how the ICC provides a sense of justice for victims: 
The ICC helped because it gives the criminal fear. If a criminal is left 
unbothered, then the criminal will become big-headed because he will 
think that nothing can totally be done to him, even though he commits the 
biggest offenses. It also consoles people, that we have someone who can 
stand in for us. We have someone who is there to console us in case of 
problems; he always stands in for us in case there is a problem, so that the 
criminal does not go unpunished…They will appreciate that even though 
these people committed very bad crimes, there is someone who is there to 
punish them. This will also give happiness to people who underwent very 
big problems, because they get consoled that the criminals will be 
punished. (Interview #68) 
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Some of the respondents who spoke most at length on the benefits of punishment, 
accountability, and justice also seemed to be those who had participated in workshops or 
outreach events put on by the ICC or NGOs. For at least a few respondents, the ICC’s 
outreach efforts seemed to have had the outcome the ICC had hoped to achieve.  
The third theme, that the ICC has a deterrence effect and might prevent future 
crimes, was often discussed hand-in-hand with the idea that Kony and other alleged 
criminals ought to be punished. This was the most frequently discussed positive impact of 
the ICC, particularly in Ajulu and Awach. Omara Ernest, a 35 year old man in Ajulu, 
expressed this perspective: 
ICC is good in the sense that it can bring some kind of fear to people who 
could just take the law in their hands and terrorize people as far as they 
can. But this can, I think, bring some sense of fear that, should I do this I 
will not escape from the international court. They will bring me to book. If 
you know that the whole world is now targeting you then you will at least 
be humble. You would maybe not continue with violations of human 
rights. That is the advantage; it deters people who can exploit or 
dehumanize fellow human beings. (Interview #57) 
 
 
Lack of Impact of the ICC 
Although some respondents talked positively of the impact of the ICC, many of these 
discussions were couched in terms of the “potential” impact of the ICC. In reality, many 
respondents said that the ICC has not had any impact in the lives of the people of 
northern Uganda. Some expressed that they are still waiting to see if there will be an 
impact, but many were more disillusioned and said that they now see the ICC as 
ineffective and incapable of bringing positive effects. Charles Ocen, the cultural leader in 
Anyadwe, explained: 
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Actually people still listen to ICC as something distant, something that is 
not practical. It is like a fairy tale because no leader has been tried in this 
country. So until it is done they will say it is like a beautiful story which 
can never become true. For example, Kony himself has committed 
numerous atrocities, but he is still a free man, so they sometimes doubt the 
competency of ICC. (Interview #41) 
 
Several respondents similarly described the ICC as a “song,” “fairytale,” “dream,” 
“beautiful story,” or “wishful thinking,” meaning that they see potential benefits, but 
have no confidence it will ever realize such benefits. Much of this critique stemmed from 
a frustration with the fact that the ICC has no power to arrest, leading to proclamations 
that the ICC is “useless,” a “barking dog without teeth,” or a “waste of time.” Otto James 
explained that, this can make the ICC seem like a “joke” to people in Uganda: 
I have not seen anything. And people actually are still wondering how ICC 
can be of use. Is it really useful? So there is a song that has been 
composed about ICC that, how can ICC be useful and relevant? It can 
maybe charge you with an offense, but also will not be able to bring you to 
court and nothing is done, so it becomes like a joke…So to me, ICC is 
hopeless; it cannot do anything because it can say, we are going to arrest 
so and so, we are going to prosecute so and so, but they can never 
physically go there and arrest such a person. (Interview #60) 
 
In Lukodi, particularly, a few residents took this perceived lack of implementation 
or results more personally, as their community had had direct engagement with the ICC. 
Geoffrey Omona expressed his frustration with the lack of follow through after ICC 
investigations: 
Well, since the time [ICC representatives] came and talked to us of what 
their role is, we have not yet seen, practically, what they do. That team of 
ICC, when they came, they actually interviewed us. They were making an 
investigation of what actually took place during the war. I can recall that 
they said that they had come to have firsthand information from the 
community. The case is already before them, and they are going to do 
something about it. They wanted to know those people who lost their 
lives, the properties damaged or spoiled or lost during the war, things like 
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that. But that is so far what I know. They have not yet come back to do or 
express something tangible. (Interview #29) 
 
 
Knowledge Leads to Support? 
Beyond the perception that the ICC has no impact in survivors’ lives, many respondents 
also discussed negative impacts of the ICC in northern Uganda. In a 2010 survey, Pham 
and Vinck (2010) found just 10 percent of respondents who had heard of the ICC thought 
the ICC had hindered the situation in northern Uganda (Pham and Vinck 2010:43). In my 
analysis, however, respondents discussed negative implications of the ICC much more 
commonly. Perhaps this was due to the open-ended and conversational nature of an in-
depth interview, where respondents could more freely discuss a complex mix of positive 
and negative views of the Court.  
As we have seen, some people certainly did have positive perceptions of the 
ICC’s impact. However, when respondents talked about the impact of the ICC in their 
lives or in their communities, many displayed considerable depth, recognizing the 
complexity of the impact of this international institution in their lives. Most did not talk 
of it in entirely positive or negative terms, but rather discussed some combination of 
perspectives. 
The expectation of the ICC outreach is that increasing the local population’s 
knowledge of the ICC will lead to greater support for the Court. Contrary to this 
assumption, however, respondents with more knowledge of the ICC were not necessarily 
more supportive in their assessment. In actuality, a more in-depth understanding of the 
form and function of the Court was more often associated with a more critical perception 
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of the impact of the institution. Table 7.2 compares respondents with discordant, 
incomplete, or vague knowledge about the ICC to respondents who demonstrated more 
knowledge.53 As shown below, about half of those with some knowledge of the ICC54 
mentioned at least one positive impact of the Court, while about 38 percent mentioned a 
negative impact, and 58 percent discussed how the ICC does not impact their lives. The 
point of interest here, however, was that those who know more about the ICC were more 
likely to see negative impacts of its involvement. About 56 percent of those who were 
knowledgeable about the ICC saw negative impacts, compared to just 20 percent of those 
who were less knowledgeable.  
Table 7.2. Knowledge of the ICC Associated with Critical Perspectives 
 
Positive Impact 
n=38 
Negative Impact 
n=29 
No Impact/Neutral 
n=44 
Discordant, incomplete, 
or vague knowledge of 
the ICC 
n=35 
46% 20% 60% 
Knowledgeable about 
the ICC 
n=41 
51% 56% 56% 
 
This suggests that although respondents were receiving information about the 
ICC, the resultant community discourse did not lead people to the conclusions that the 
ICC would have hoped. Even when people were well informed and had participated in 
outreach, they still did not necessarily find the ICC to be relevant to or helpful in their 
lives.  
 
                                                 
53 The percentages in the rows of Table 7.2 do not add up to one hundred percent because some respondents 
discussed a mixture of impacts of the Court, some positive, some negative, and some neutral. 
54 Respondents with no reported knowledge of the ICC are not included in this table. 
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Integrating Social Context 
I developed a model (Figure 7.3) that serves as a starting point to think about how 
discourse about the ICC (as presented by the ICC and its outreach initiatives) is filtered 
through the local social context before it emerges as community-level discourse. The 
model helps to organize respondents’ critiques of the ICC and identify the sources of 
their skepticism; it serves as the organizing framework for the rest of the chapter. 
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Figure 7.3. Social Context Filters Universalized ICC Discourse to the Local Level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 As discussed in the previous section, although there were pockets of the 
population without knowledge of the ICC, some people had received information from 
outreach initiatives in the region. However, respondents’ and other key informants’ 
descriptions of outreach events, as well as descriptions in ICC reports, paint outreach 
events as more “sensitization” efforts than interactive educational dialogues. This is a 
Ineffective Vernacularization 
 
Mismatched cultural schemas 
Not classifying the situation as a “dispute” 
Diverse social locations 
Absence of effective translators 
Local Knowledge & Discourse about the ICC 
 
There are multiple layers of guilt for what happened 
Prosecutions are not necessarily just 
A legal solution is not the best fit for the situation 
The ICC’s involvement has mixed or no impact 
Problematic Institutional Fit 
 
Post-war proliferation of international orgs 
Experiences with local courts 
Contradiction with Amnesty Act 
Global Discourse 
 
There are a few “most responsible” 
Justice comes from prosecutions 
This is a situation in which legal remedy works 
The ICC’s involvement has positive impacts 
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broader trend, as NGO and government programs in the region often engaged in 
campaigns to “sensitize” the population, a term which, from my observations, implies a 
certain degree of powerlessness on the part of the people being sensitized, as objects of 
sensitization, rather than agents engaged in an educational or active learning process. 
Often this seemed to result in a more cursory acceptance of the material, rather than a 
deeper engagement or understanding. For example, in general people expressed 
frustration with their lack of understanding of why the ICC functioned as it did (even if 
they understood what it did). I did not find evidence of people feeling they had any 
agency in the communication process with the ICC or any ability to influence the course 
of the ICC actions. This suggests the feedback loop in the ICC outreach process (as 
shown earlier, in Figure 7.1) is more realistically a one-way street. To be fair, it seems 
unlikely that there would be a reasonable way for an international institution like the ICC 
to meaningfully integrate feedback about its operations from local communities around 
the world; however, this reciprocal process was specified in the objectives of the outreach 
program. 
 Rather than the harmony of interests that was the anticipated outcome in the 
earlier model of the ICC’s presuppositions, this model (Figure 7.3) shows a more 
contradictory understanding emerging from local communities. I argue that this is a result 
of an ineffective process of vernacularization and the ICC’s problematic institutional fit 
in this particular context. The remaining analysis unpacks respondents’ major critiques of 
the Court and fits them into this new framework. My purpose throughout this analysis is 
to represent the range of perspectives of interview respondents and other fieldwork 
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informants as accurately as possible. Although I recognize that theirs is just one particular 
view of the ICC, I argue that local narratives about transitional justice are especially 
important because they emerge from people who experienced the violence personally and 
now are working for peace in their daily lives. 
 
Challenges to Vernacularization 
For global ideas, such as human rights or combating impunity, to gain traction and 
saliency in local contexts, they need to be modified to fit the ideological and social 
specificities of a particular place (Levitt and Merry 2009). The core of the ideas remains 
unchanged, but their form, organization, packaging, interpretation, or language shifts. In 
the case of the ICC in northern Uganda, this process has not happened effectively, 
resulting in poor resonance of the global discourse. 
 
Lack of Translators 
Translators are key actors in the vernacularization process, serving as essential links that 
connect the global sites (here, the ICC in The Hague) with the local sites (rural villages in 
Uganda). Their core task is to take the global package of ideas and their associated 
practices and to make them relevant, understandable, and acceptable to people in local 
communities (Levitt and Merry 2009). These actors are elites in the local context, often 
NGO workers, activists, or lawyers. Global values do not flow effortlessly to the local 
level; instead, the process is characterized by points of friction. Translators need to 
reframe human rights ideas in local terms, which often requires abandoning the particular 
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language and terms used in global discourses (Levitt and Merry 2009). In this case, there 
were a few local leaders in each community who were quite knowledgeable about the 
ICC and its work, whether from interactions with ICC outreach, INGO programs, or 
particularly active engagement with the media. In most of the cases, however, these 
individuals developed insightful critiques of the Court, rather than emerging as key 
advocates for the ICC, willing to invest personally in the translation or vernacularization 
process. 
 Although it is difficult to comment definitively on the lack of a particular 
phenomenon, I am not aware of key organizations or individuals acting as local 
translators of the ICC’s discourse. The outreach program itself is one such effort, but 
their materials generally do not dramatically reframe their ideas and practices in local 
terms. Instead, they have a particular framework that is mobilized similarly in a wide 
range of local contexts. In the absence of a group of key locally-based but globally-
connected elites who serve as both key translators and advocates, my analysis of 
interview and observational data reveals three issues that impede the local translation of 
the ICC’s ideas and practices. 
 
Diverse Social Locations 
As discussed in an earlier section, certain types of respondents were much less likely to 
be conversant with issues surrounding the ICC. Particularly, women and those with lower 
levels of education reported less knowledge of the ICC and its work. Almost all 
respondents who reported having no formal education were women. Education is 
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extremely highly valued by most people in Uganda, representing a pathway out of “the 
village” and a way to secure the future of their families. Those who do not have formal 
education likely do not speak English and cannot read or write. For all of these reasons, 
there is often stigma associated with having no education, their voices may be taken less 
seriously in public gatherings, they are often afforded less respect, and, in turn, they are 
less confident to express their opinions or concerns. This presents considerable barriers to 
the reception of information about the ICC, particularly in the case of outreach events 
conducted as large community gatherings, the dissemination of information in the news 
media, and comprehension of terms typically communicated in English. 
In the interview sample, local community leaders were more knowledgeable 
about the ICC. Leaders were substantially different from respondents in the resident 
sample in many ways, such as being more likely to be male, having higher levels of 
education, and having sources of income aside from their farming activities. Additionally, 
leaders often had higher levels of contact with NGO and government programs, serving 
as key liaisons between such organizations and local residents. As such, these leaders 
could potentially serve as second-string translators or advocates (Levitt and Merry 2009). 
They would be ideally equipped to translate ideas about the ICC to people in their 
community. However, in order to do so, they would need not only more in-depth 
participatory education about the ICC (especially as several leaders expressed frustration 
that they had not received more focused information), but also need a higher level of 
“buy in” to the ICC discourse. As the data reveal, those with the most knowledge about 
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the ICC—often, local leaders—are also often the most highly critical, indicating deeper 
barriers to vernacularization. 
 
A Situation Not Seen as a Legal Dispute  
In order for legal court proceedings to be seen as appropriate, people must come to 
understand particular social situations as “disputes” requiring legal remedy (Felstiner, 
Abel, and Sarat 1980). However, in the case of northern Uganda, victims do not 
necessarily see the situation as a dispute (particularly not going through the blaming and 
claiming stages of dispute emergence) and so the use of a litigious frame to deal with the 
situation does not really make sense to them. As the recounting of the local historical 
narrative in Chapter Three revealed, respondents tended to see the situation more broadly 
than as a legal dispute, and so a trial then is not a useful way to deal with the past, from 
their perspectives. This is similar to the findings of Jardim (2012) and Pendas (2006), 
discussed earlier, that post-WWII trials were not able to develop strong, coherent social 
narratives of the violent past, beyond a story of the individual guilt of particular leaders 
and sadistic individuals. 
When people in northern Uganda described the conflict, they told a much more 
comprehensive and nuanced narrative than the politicized and decontextualized story of 
the Government of Uganda fighting to protect the country against the irrational and 
dangerous LRA. Rather, they placed the contemporary conflict in a long historical 
context of abuses and victimizations at the hand of many different groups and 
individuals. Although they recognized the significant wrongdoings of Kony and the LRA, 
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people often perceived them as emerging out of a troubled situation, in response to past 
abuses by the Government and others. Additionally, they placed some contemporary 
blame for their suffering on the Government and the army, as well as on the LRA. In 
general, the way they collectively remembered the war did not serve to reinforce the 
legitimacy of this particular legal response (Savelsberg and King 2007). 
 
Mismatched Cultural Schemas 
The most significant obstacle to vernacularization, however, was a fundamental 
mismatch in the cultural schemas used by the ICC and those of people in rural Uganda. 
Schemas are sets of informal and often subconscious rules that govern various aspects of 
social life (Sewell 1992). People use cultural schemas to make sense of or experience 
various aspects of their lives, including laws or legal institutions (Ewick and Silbey 1998; 
Silbey 2005). For example, the formal Western-style adversarial trial is the cultural 
schema used by the ICC, whereas for many respondents in northern Uganda, such trials 
are not a relevant or meaningful schema for dispute resolution. As cultural schemas are 
applied in specific situations, they are combined with resources, assets, or capacities, 
allowing people to either maintain stability or create social change. Within the formal 
court system, resources like education, money, articulateness, and experience with 
bureaucracy allow people to work effectively within the legal framework. Because most 
people in northern Uganda do not have the resources needed to accomplish their 
objectives through a court system, it is not a cultural schema that is pragmatically useful 
in their attempts to deal with the post-war situation either. 
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Extending this point, the second most common critique was that the ICC 
contradicts values of forgiveness and reconciliation, which respondents cited as central to 
Acholi culture and conflict resolution. This critique was particularly prevalent in Lukodi, 
and actually was not raised at all in Awach. Moro Cosmas, a 20 year old man in Lukodi, 
expressed his desire to reconcile and receive those indicted by the ICC back into the 
community: 
[If the LRA leaders are convicted], they may spend so many years in the 
prison that they will not find time to come and live normal life with the 
people here. Instead, if they were given a chance like the amnesty, they 
would come and we reconcile in the traditional way, they would be 
received back in the community. (Interview #22) 
 
Particularly, respondents pointed out that the ICC goes against the principles of amnesty 
and mercy. Another young man in Lukodi, Oyet Kenneth, spoke in more detail about the 
cultural roots of the concept of forgiveness: 
You know in our culture here in Acholiland, we believe so much in 
forgiveness. That is why when the amnesty act was proposed it found 
ready ground among our people, what the amnesty commission was 
proposing was nothing new, it was only confirmation of what was already 
there, done for generations and generations. So what I am saying is that 
there is always room for forgiveness. But now, with this ICC, I have the 
impression that once a case is placed in their court, there is no going back 
on it…With ICC, once a case is already presented before them, like the 
case of Kony that has already been presented to them, even if the elders of 
Acholi and all those who Kony has wronged wanted very much that he 
should be forgiven and return home here, I was told that ICC would object 
and say no, we don't want impunity, so he cannot get away. For them, they 
emphasize justice. Overemphasis on justice does not give room to 
forgiveness and amnesty. So that is the part of ICC that I cannot 
understand. (Interview #23) 
 
He brought up an important concept, the “overemphasis on justice,” which seemed to be 
salient to respondents who may, ideally, like to see justice, but not at the expense of all 
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else. A few respondents even likened the ICC to revenge. Several respondents expressed 
frustration that once a case is before the ICC, it cannot be withdrawn, even if the victims 
request it be, which led to the critique that the ICC is distant and does not listen to people 
on the ground. In the words of a Lukodi man: 
Another bad thing with the ICC is that I have learned that once you 
already present a case before that court you can never withdraw it. If you 
say with somebody that now I want to come and resolve this thing locally, 
from home, the ICC will not allow. So this one is very strange…So if the 
one who has been wronged says no, we reconsider and want to solve this 
matter once and for all, and now, who is ICC to come and say, “No, no 
more going back.” It is like a revenge, and it doesn't go well with our 
culture, which gives room for reconciliation. (Interview #21) 
 
Another Lukodi man discussed how a murder would be resolved in the village, and 
claimed the ICC does not listen to the local conflict resolution style: 
To me, ICC doesn’t listen.  It’s like somebody without an ear. He can say 
his mind but not listen to the views of the other. Because for us here the 
most important thing is forgiving the past and reconciling. And to me, on 
this issue, ICC doesn’t understand anything. If I say my son killed the son 
of so and so but I do not want the son of so and so to be killed also…for us 
we see the other way of reversing the whole thing and making the person 
see his fault and ask for mercy and be reaccepted in the family. Very 
rarely does ICC give ear to the views of the elders.  If the elders were to 
speak, they would demand one thing—that we want to reconcile and be 
reunited—while the ICC will emphasize that no one can do something and 
get away with it, so they call it impunity.  But to us, we say reconciliation 
now makes sense. If the person who suffered at the hand of that person 
wants reconciliation, but you, the third party, you stand more firmly, are 
you helping this situation? (Interview #27) 
 
From these respondents’ descriptions, restorative and more participatory approaches to 
transitional justice (Avruch and Vejarano 2001; Braithwaite 2002; Gibson 2004; 
Honeyman et al. 2004; Menkel-Meadow 2007) are likely to resonate more deeply in this 
context. I provided several quotations to illustrate this point, because many respondents 
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seemed to have deeply thought about this issue and it was central to their critique of the 
ICC.  
These issues present fundamental challenges to the vernacularization process of 
global ICC discourse in northern Uganda. Mismatched cultural schemas, combined with 
complexities of social locations and nuanced perceptions of guilt for the wrongs 
committed, creates a situation where effective agents of vernacularization would be most 
necessary. Although there are knowledgeable individuals who could serve as translators, 
these people have not become local advocates in support of the ICC. Without them, the 
ICC outreach efforts do not appear able to address these significant barriers to 
vernacularization. 
 
Institutional Context of the ICC 
In addition to an ineffective vernacularization process, the ICC is positioned in a 
challenging institutional context in northern Uganda. Because of its positioning relative 
to other post-war international organizations, the local court system, and the national 
Amnesty Act, respondents were hesitant to regard the ICC as making positive 
contributions in their lives. 
 
Post-War Proliferation of IGOs and INGOs 
In a region that has seen significant involvement of international organizations over the 
past 20 years, people have developed a cultural toolkit (Swidler 1986) in response to this 
unique context. They now use these habits, skills, and styles to make sense of 
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international organizations’ involvement in their lives and shape how they interact with 
these outside forces. Respondents often placed the ICC in the same category as other 
INGOs and IGOs working in the region. Generally, they perceived such organizations as 
not really integrated meaningfully into their daily lives, but rather as faceless 
organizations with their own agendas that are difficult for people in the village to 
understand. They do not really see such organizations as able to change or flex to fit local 
situations, so the best option is to figure out how to access the tangible benefits an 
international organization can offer (as discussed in Chapter Five), without necessarily 
buying into an organization’s deeper mission or objectives.  
World polity theory might suggest that the presence of international organizations 
would increase support for the ICC, as people become introduced to discourses of human 
rights, justice, and individual accountability from multiple sources. In this case, however, 
there is an over-saturation of international organizations in the region, to the point that 
people cannot (or are not interested in) actually tune in to the messages or missions of 
each—or any—of the organizations. People widely perceive international organizations 
or institutions to be from “outside” and, thus, such organizations do not really understand 
how life is for people in the villages. 
This is related to the most common critique respondents had of the ICC. They 
explained that the ICC involvement has kept Kony fighting, even making him more 
aggressive, and that has caused more suffering or has prolonged victims’ suffering, also 
making people fear that the LRA will return to Uganda. A 36 year old man in Lukodi, 
Alfred, elaborated on these concerns: 
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Yes, I heard of ICC and that their job is to arrest and prosecute criminals. 
But I wonder if doing things like that would upset again the peace that is 
already prevailing here. I hear they talk of arresting and prosecuting Kony 
along with all his officers but if, for example, Kony managed to avoid 
them and come back to Uganda after hearing that he’s being threatened 
with prosecution, can he not turn his havoc, his anger on the innocent 
populace here? Naturally you can also imagine that you have already been 
condemned, you are already labeled somebody very bad, and when you 
meet people do you think you would still treat them humanely? Not so. 
Therefore, unless this ICC has got real control, they will only make Kony 
a more dangerous human being.  I hear that this ICC, they are just judicial 
and they are not military, they don’t have their armed forces, and who will 
first arrest Kony to take to them? I feel that the ICC sits out there, and they 
don’t see the repercussions that can come up. (Interview #26) 
 
This critique aligns with the transitional justice debate on peace or justice (Roht-Arriaza 
and Mariezcurrena 2006; Teitel 2000), and suggests that, if forced to choose, people in 
northern Uganda may favor the side of peace. 
According to respondents, a related point was that the inability of the ICC to 
apprehend the indicted leaders and bring them to trial can actually embolden others to 
commit similar abuses, as they believe the ICC will not actually have power to hold them 
accountable. As Charles Ocen, the elderly cultural leader from Anyadwe, quoted earlier, 
explained: 
Kony makes the image of ICC to appear to be a weak institution. How can 
an international court involved with many nations not be able to arrest just 
one man with a few hundred soldiers around him? This one is 
unbelievable. Because if Kony can get away with it, other people may say, 
if Kony can do it and just continue to enjoy life, why not others? If this 
note would reach ICC, let this line be read by them: unless they begin to 
become practical on the ground, they would remain an irrelevant 
institution and not very helpful even to the people who suffer. Because if 
somebody can commit some harms against humanity and remain 
unpunished, others will become encouraged and say, I can also do it, so 
and so did it. Nothing was done to him; I can also do it and get away with 
it. (Interview #41) 
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In their views, the ICC is actually prolonging suffering and fear, but the institution—like 
many international organizations working in the region—is too far away to realize the 
unintended negative impact in people’s lives or to recognize that they are not actually 
addressing the real needs of people in local communities.  
 
Experiences with Local Courts 
In these communities, as is hinted in several of the quotes above and described in 
Chapters Two and Six, a pluralistic legal system is used to resolve local conflicts. There 
is the formal state-based court and prison system and a community-based system of 
mediation and compensation, involving accounting for damage done and focusing on 
restoring relationships. Many people favor the local system (although, some elements of 
the system were damaged by the war and displacement) and have had negative 
experiences with the more formal court system. 
As discussed in greater depth in the previous chapter, respondents saw the court 
system as out of touch with local situations and histories, inflexible in coming to creative 
solutions to disputes, inconsistent in judgments, slow and unresponsive, and (important 
here) favoring those with money, influence, and education. The framework of pursuing 
justice through a court did not resonate with most respondents’ understandings of justice 
and accountability for wrongs (as discussed above) and they did not have many positive 
examples of local courts working well, so they in turn did not have much confidence in 
this type of social institution. For most people in these communities, they did not 
experience the formal state-based legal system as a useful tool to help resolve their 
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problems (Ewick and Silbey 1998). Furthermore, they often thought that involving the 
court actually made a situation worse and it was best to try to resolve conflicts through 
involving the community. I argue that these experiences with local courts shaped 
respondents’ understandings and perceptions of the ICC. Respondents did not perceive 
that the ICC’s conception of justice fit with their own understandings and they did not 
perceive it as an effective way to deal with the war’s effects. Instead, many respondents 
expressed a preference for more restorative and community-based styles of justice 
(Huyse and Salter 2008). 
 
Contradiction of the Amnesty Act 
In 2000, national legislation put in place a blanket amnesty to pardon any combatants or 
other members of rebel forces who would give up their weapons and renounce their 
participation in such movements. This has been the primary transitional justice 
mechanism used to deal with the aftermath of the war in northern Uganda. Since 2000, 
over 26,000 people have been granted amnesty, including an estimated 13,000 LRA 
militants. After receiving amnesty, some people are recruited into the national army. 
Many, however, return to their home communities.  
 Transitional justice scholarship and common sense both suggest that this 
reintegration process would be contentious and likely to spark conflict within 
communities, particularly because a common tactic the LRA used to secure loyalty of 
abductees and diminish their desire to escape was to have abductees commit atrocities in 
their home communities. Despite this, I found extremely widespread and enthusiastic 
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support for amnesty among respondents, who talked supportively about “our children” 
coming home and explained that they are living normally in the community.55 As Otto 
James in Anyadwe explained,  
So [amnesty] was between the rebels and the government, but for the people at 
home they had no problem with their children that were abducted. For them, 
returning home was what they expected…What the government called a rebel, the 
community calls our son or daughter. So we say it was the government that 
granted amnesty and not the community. The community had already granted 
their amnesty the same day the child was abducted. (Interview #60) 
 
Nearly every respondent personally knew someone who had received amnesty, 
sometimes one of their family members or themselves, and they were able to comment on 
the specifics of those individuals’ situations. They described how being officially 
pardoned diminished tensions that otherwise would have existed and how people take 
care not to remind returnees of what happened “in the bush.” They also expressed a 
willingness to live beside even top LRA leaders, and accept them into the community. As 
described in an earlier section, many talked about amnesty’s deep resonance with their 
understanding of their social and spiritual worlds. They described amnesty as justice, 
which is in direct contradiction to transitional justice scholarship that sees amnesty (most 
harshly) as the antithesis of justice, or (more pragmatically) at the center of a  trade-off to 
achieve peace. 
The ICC arrest warrants directly contradicted this locally salient transitional 
justice mechanism. Uganda’s blanket amnesty included anyone willing to give up their 
                                                 
55 This is not to say that people are not aware of some problems of reintegration, particularly as returnees 
struggle with trauma from their past experiences. They are generally accepted into the community, 
however, with all the challenges that living together brings. For example, many returnees spent their 
childhoods and formative years in an abnormal social environment, making them a part of the generation of 
youth that was not socialized into peaceful or “normal” village life. As discussed in Chapter Five, this is a 
significant long-term challenge in resettled communities. In this way, returnees face problems, but they are 
similar to those being experienced more broadly in the region. 
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arms, and the leaders wanted by the ICC were not an exception. As peace negotiations 
were on-going in 2006 and 2007, it was not clear or specified how this contradiction 
would be resolved. In 2013, however, the part of the legislation that extended the blanket 
pardon expired and was not renewed. To receive amnesty, an applicant now needs to 
undergo a judicial review, which in principle resolves the question of what would happen 
if an individual wanted by the ICC were apprehended.  
At the time of the interviews for this project, however, the amnesty was still in 
full effect, causing substantial perplexity among respondents about the ICC involvement. 
A local government leader in Anyadwe emphatically discussed residents’ confusion about 
how to integrate their understandings of amnesty and the ICC: 
Now listen. I would like you to listen to this one very well; it is very 
important. The people in the village feel that ICC is a contradiction of 
amnesty. Why? If amnesty is talking about forgiveness, let the past go, let 
the wrong done in the past not be remembered. ICC is just coming back to 
reverse the whole thing…on one hand you are talking of mercy, on the 
other hand you say justice. So that is why the people say, if you are going 
to confuse us, away with ICC. We don’t want ICC, because it is like 
saying we pretend under the amnesty—we say we are very merciful, and 
then when we put the court of ICC we say no, justice must prevail. Now 
that is what we don’t understand. So you understand now if we say that 
ICC should be abolished altogether and thrown away. What amnesty is 
doing is very good, that we talk. And we see the result of talk, when our 
elders…and cultural chiefs and…religious leaders and our politicians 
walked and talked with the rebels, there was some kind of peace. It is only 
through talk that peace can come. But when you insist on justice—arrest 
him, try him, do this—where are we going to end?s...[W]hen we go by 
ICC it means our suffering will not end. We are going to continue, because 
with ICC, an eye is for an eye, and we realize that that one will not take us 
anywhere. (Interview #38) 
 
The concepts and values of amnesty fit well with the cultural schemas used by local 
residents, and the Amnesty Act was essentially a formal codification of their deeply held 
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beliefs about how to handle the situation in the region. Problematically, the ICC was 
inserted into this institutional context without resolving the contradiction it presented 
with amnesty. 
 
Conclusion 
With the 20th century rise of human rights as a global values package (Levitt and Merry 
2009), the ICC represents a particular culmination of shared ideas about rule of law, 
democracy, accountability, and justice. For world polity theorists, the ICC is also a global 
agent through which universalized discourses, ideas, and practices may be diffused into 
local contexts. For this to be done effectively, however, a process of translation or 
vernacularization is necessary, to make the core values understandable and relevant to 
people far removed from the global center. The ICC’s outreach program represents one 
such attempt. According to the outreach program, a two-way process of communication 
between affected communities and the ICC will result in not only increased knowledge, 
but also greater support for the ICC and its work. 
I found, however, that outreach is not necessarily accomplishing either goal. 
Instead, it was essentially a one-way process of sensitization that still resulted in large 
pockets of information poor segments of the population. Additionally, respondents with 
more knowledge of the ICC were more likely to have critical perspectives of the 
institution and its involvement; even where respondents were well informed and had 
participated in outreach events, they still did not necessarily see the ICC positively. Even 
after concentrated outreach initiatives, the resultant community discourse about the ICC 
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did not represent a harmony of interests with the global discourse of the Court, but 
instead was characterized by significant critiques and negative perceptions.  
Perhaps the outreach events created more community discussion about the ICC, 
so more people may have heard of it, but this discussion led to a variety of opinions, 
critiques, and more nuanced discourses. I found evidence of this happening. In Lukodi, 
for example, some people who knew more about the ICC or had had personal contact 
with ICC outreach spoke at greater length about the shortcomings of the ICC. In Awach, 
there were fewer people who spoke in-depth at all about ICC impacts, and instead were 
more likely to describe a one-dimensional picture of impacts as either positive or 
negative, rather than a complex mixture of both. These findings suggest that outreach 
events may have had the opposite effect than the ICC expected. The global discourse of 
the ICC, rather than diffusing successfully in this particular context, was transformed into 
a local discourse that is critical of the ICC and its ideals. 
The model I developed (Figure 7.3) explained that one reason this occurred was 
because of an ineffective process of vernacularization. First, there was a noticeable 
absence of active and successful translators or advocates. Without such translators, it was 
extremely difficult to overcome the challenges presented to vernacularization. Significant 
segments of the population, particularly women and people without formal education, 
faced additional barriers to coming in contact with and understanding ICC discourse. 
People thought of the situation in the region more broadly than as a dispute or individual 
crimes that could be appropriately addressed in a court of law. Perhaps most importantly, 
however, there was a fundamental mismatch between the cultural schema relied on by the 
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ICC and that of people in rural Uganda, which emphasizes forgiveness, reconciliation, 
and the communal nature of guilt and victimhood. Taken together, particularly without 
engaged local advocates for the ICC, these factors contributed to an ineffective and 
incomplete process of translating the core ideas and values of the ICC. 
 Additionally, community discourse was not what the ICC wanted or expected 
because of poor institutional positioning. Even if global discourse is effectively 
vernacularized, it is unlikely to diffuse to the local level if it does not fit well within the 
institutional landscape. In the three fieldsites, the ICC was not well received because of 
people’s previous institutional experiences with post-war international organizations 
disconnected from local realities, local courts unable to resolve community disputes 
fairly, and the Amnesty Act that stood in direct contradiction to the ICC. All of these 
factors together led to the emergence of a uniquely local community-level discourse 
about the ICC and its involvement in northern Uganda. 
 This chapter examined how ordinary people experienced a formal transitional 
justice mechanism. In addition to furthering an understanding of the perceived impact of 
the ICC in local communities, I developed a model to account for how the specific local 
context impacts the success of the transitional justice mechanism.  
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Figure 7.4. Transitional Justice Initiatives Adapt to Context 
 
 
 
As seen in Figure 7.4, transitional justice is promoted by formal mechanisms, like the 
ICC. In order to be effective in furthering a sustainable transition from coexistence to a 
deeper peace and stability, however, such mechanisms need to undergo an effective 
process of vernacularization, as well as strategically negotiate their institutional position 
in the local context. This chapter illustrates that, even in the case of perhaps the most 
“removed” transitional justice mechanism, it is still necessary to adapt such mechanisms 
to fit the social, cultural, institutional, and political particularities of each post-war 
setting. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
 
This concluding discussion proceeds in two parts. First, I focus on the case at hand, 
northern Uganda, developing a cohesive picture of how the diverse findings of this 
dissertation fit together. Second, I expand the scope and discuss the broader scholarly 
contributions of this work to other post-war contexts. Next, I discuss policy implications 
or recommendations that emerge from this project. I conclude with the key limitations of 
the research and ideas for future study. 
 
Central Findings 
Relying on data from 11 months of participant observation, 20 interviews with regional 
professionals and leaders, and 91 interviews with residents and local leaders in three 
resettled villages, I developed a deep and multi-dimensional picture of local-level social 
reconstruction in northern Uganda. 
 I argued that residents in the three fieldsites are facing a crisis of unity. Most 
respondents perceived that unity had been severely weakened, and I argued this is 
particularly because of the rise of a new type of “artificial” unity and shifting the location 
of unity to small groups. Three key social changes have shifted the types of interactions 
that occur in local communities. The first was a generational shift or disconnect, caused 
both by the declining authority of local leadership and the gap in socialization of a 
generation of young people raised in the camps. Second, economic arrangements shifted 
during the war, with a perceived rise in poverty and inequality, and with the increasing 
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monetization of daily life. Finally, NGOs have become new, powerful actors in post-war 
villages, introducing highly valued resources into the communities and thus having 
significant power to shape social relationships and behavior.  
On a daily basis, people interact with one another in ways that are new to the 
post-war context. First, people were less frequently engaged in communal practices based 
on their cultural traditions, such as storytelling, dancing, or rituals to cleanse and 
reconcile past wrongs. Second, group work practices had shifted dramatically away from 
large-scale community events, and in many cases even smaller work groups were no 
longer functioning. Third, people relied heavily on their membership in formalized small 
groups, which provide a significant source of social support for members. 
 Importantly, people who were involved in these small groups were more 
frequently positive about unity and solidarity, while the third of residents who were not 
group members felt more isolated and unsupported. Compared to the other two 
communities, Lukodi stood out both for its high levels of trust and for residents’ active 
engagement in small-scale communal work, suggesting a key link between working 
together on a daily basis and trust. Taken together, my findings illustrated how social life 
had been fundamentally reorganized in post-war communities. While informal social 
interactions have great potential to facilitate unity, interdependence, trust, and solidarity, 
the post-war social changes in local communities also present barriers to stability. 
 Not only are there barriers to unity in everyday life, but there are also key 
catalysts of conflict that present more severe challenges to stability. In northern Uganda, 
land conflict is an especially potent barrier to social reconstruction, one that emerged as 
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residents grappled with a period of massive social change. Land conflicts are not only 
about a struggle for a valuable and newly monetized resource, but are fundamentally 
about defining belonging in the community. During resettlement, the process of 
negotiating land boundaries was even more symbolically important, revealing a deep 
struggle to define community membership and relationships. In the post-war context, new 
vulnerabilities and inequalities developed, privileging some residents at the potential 
expense of others. Disputes over land can be resolved with local community mediation 
mechanisms or in the formal court system, though each layer is fraught with problems 
that limit effectiveness. Because land conflicts are so symbolically and materially 
important, but lack dependable methods of dispute resolution, animosity festers between 
disputing parties, often even after technical resolutions of the case at hand. Residents 
perceived land disputes as deep barriers to unity and claimed that they detract from trust 
and daily interactions. Most concerning, there were numerous recent examples of land 
disputes escalating to physical violence and creating deep divisions between families or 
clans. The abundance and seriousness of land conflict revealed the significant inability of 
social institutions to adapt to and accommodate the social changes facing resettled 
communities during the transitional period. 
 Finally, I found significant barriers to the diffusion of global transitional justice 
values and practices. Specifically, when there is ineffective vernacularization and poor 
institutional fit, the global discourse will not resonate at the local level, and instead 
results in a unique community discourse that can be quite critical of the global approach. 
The ICC is a global institution that acts as a carrier of global discourse and practice, and 
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its outreach program is an explicit effort to translate its discourse to affected 
communities, with a goal to increase both their understanding and their support for the 
Court. With an exceptionally high level of exposure to outreach activities, Lukodi 
provided a natural experiment of sorts to evaluate the translation process.  
Knowledge about the ICC was higher in Lukodi, with several residents 
demonstrating a deep understanding of the ICC. However, across the fieldsites, I found 
that those with higher levels of knowledge were more critical of the ICC. The ICC 
promotes values of justice, accountability, human rights, and rule of law, leading to a 
discourse which sees: a few individuals can be held most responsible; justice comes from 
prosecutions; legal remedy is an effective solution; and the Court’s involvement is a 
positive contribution to a transition. In direct contradiction, however, many survivors 
perceived multiple layers of guilt, prosecutions as incompatible with justice, legal 
solutions as inadequate, and complex problems with the ICC’s involvement.  
 From my data, two primary reasons emerged to explain this case of blocked 
diffusion and clarify how social context filters the global discourse of the ICC. First, 
there had been an ineffective process of vernacularization. Perhaps most fundamentally, 
the discourse simply had not reached significant pockets of the population, particularly 
women and those with low levels of formal education. For those who had been exposed 
to the ideas and norms of the ICC, respondents often did not find them to be resonate 
because of fundamentally mismatched cultural schemas and their broader conceptions of 
the history of the conflict. These challenges could perhaps be overcome if there were 
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effective advocates at the local level, but I found that those who understood the ICC and 
could potentially fill this roll were critical of the Court and its involvement.  
Secondly, the global discourse of the ICC had not diffused effectively to the local 
level because it did not fit will with the local institutional landscape. The ICC’s 
involvement was in direct contradiction to the Amnesty Act, which was seen as deeply 
compatible with local understandings of justice and reconciliation. The post-war period 
had also seen an influx of international organizations, and responses to the ICC were 
colored by people’s established ways of interacting with other international 
organizations, as far-removed from local realities and as instrumentally useful only as a 
means to access resources. Perceptions of the ICC were likewise affected by people’s 
generally negative experiences with Ugandan courts. Locally, courts were not seen as an 
effective method to address grievances, with narrow conceptions of justice and 
vulnerabilities to manipulation by those with the greatest resources. For these reasons, I 
argued that the global discourse of the ICC had not been effectively adapted to the local 
context, and instead resulted in a local discourse that was discordant with that of the ICC. 
 
Conceptualizing Post-War Reconstruction in Northern Uganda 
Taken together, these findings helped map how the transitional process is occurring in 
northern Uganda. As expected, I found communities in northern Uganda to be 
somewhere between coexistence and social stability, not yet exhibiting the key 
characteristics of post-war stability: community, interdependence, social justice, and non-
violence (Longman et al. 2004). First, a sense of community was not yet strongly 
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developed, but rather was seen in important ways as artificial or only occurring in smaller 
pockets of the population. Second, interdependence was generally low, with most people 
not actively relying on their neighbors in their everyday lives. Third, in contrast, social 
justice was quite strong, according to respondents. Although this element was not fully 
developed in this dissertation, residents of resettled communities described rules that are 
consistently enforced throughout the village and did not have a strong sense that anyone 
was receiving extra opportunities or unequally limited opportunities. Finally, perhaps the 
most concerning element was the propensity to solve problems with violence. Particularly 
as non-violent dispute resolution mechanisms were not highly functioning, in some cases 
residents turned to violence to accomplish their goals. The central task of this research 
was to explain what contributes to the positive development of these four characteristics 
and also what detracts from or blocks their realization. 
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Figure 8.1. Model of Post-War Social Reconstruction 
 
 
My findings clarified how transitional justice institutions, such as the ICC, 
contribute to local-level social reconstruction. In order to realize their potential positive 
impacts on the development of future stability, they need to resonate with survivors’ 
understandings of the world, the period of conflict or violence, and the appropriate ways 
to deal with the past. Specifically, local translators and advocates are necessary to guide 
the process of vernacularization. Beyond this process, however, the transitional justice 
mechanisms need to fit well in the institutional context of other organizations, justice 
systems, and legislation that also affect survivors’ lives. As the case of Uganda illustrates, 
without effective vernacularization and institutional positioning, transitional justice 
mechanisms may remain largely irrelevant to local social reconstruction, and may 
actually be perceived as an impediment to the transition. 
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 Beyond the reach of formal transitional justice mechanisms, however, this case 
has shown the importance of daily interactions in the transitional process. There is great 
potential for informal mechanisms to facilitate the development of social stability. 
Specifically, the intentional revival and valuation of practices based in the historical 
cultures of northern Uganda, the regular practice of communal agricultural work, and the 
active functioning of local leadership structures and dispute resolution systems can all 
promote a deep stability through daily interactions. At the same time, fragmentation of 
communities into rigidly defined small groups, rapid shifts in economic relationships, and 
gaps in socialization of young people are each barriers to stability that emerge from daily 
interactions. NGO programs play a special role in survivors’ daily life, either contributing 
in a positive way, or exacerbating the local barriers and divisions.  
 Finally, I argued that during this period of massive social change, key conflicts 
emerge that have the power to completely block the transition and devolve communities 
into renewed cycles of violence and instability. In this case, land conflict was a major 
barrier. Serious disputes over land have developed as a product of the transition itself, but 
are not currently being addressed effectively by either formal transitional justice 
mechanisms or the more informal strategies available at the community-level.  
 
Central Contributions 
My research fleshes out the specific mechanisms of the post-war transition as it is 
occurring in northern Uganda. The general model, however, is applicable to a range of 
other transitional contexts and furthers academic knowledge about this important topic. 
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The Transitional Model 
Although in some ways specific findings would likely be different, the transitional model 
applies to other post-war settings. As illustrated by the case of northern Uganda, 
communities do not move directly from war to deep peace, but rather there is a period of 
fragile coexistence, where survivors are renegotiating their communal life. From this 
fragile coexistence, violence may reemerge. The positive alternative is the development 
of lasting peace and social stability. I utilized the measures of stability developed by 
Longman et al. (2004), developing interview questions that effectively operationalized 
the measures, demonstrating the general applicability of these measures. Taken together, 
they provide a well-rounded way to conceptualize and measure the endpoint in the 
process. The specific ways these characteristics manifest will vary with context (for 
example, the type of interdependence will be different in an urban neighborhood than in a 
rural community, or the conceptions of social justice will vary according to culture), but 
these four attributes are a useful way to measure stability in any context. 
 The development of post-war social stability can be facilitated by transitional 
justice mechanisms, such as trials, memorialization, or amnesty. These institutional 
responses are designed to deal with the past and promote a peaceful future; to the extent 
they are resonate in a local context, they can be quite effective in promoting local 
stability. These formal mechanisms nearly always originate from outside the affected 
community, and so to be effective they must be both vernacularized to be deeply resonate 
with local experiences and they must be strategically positioned relative to other 
institutions. For any transitional justice initiative, I argue that these two characteristics are 
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necessary in order for the mechanism to make a meaningful contribution to the local 
transitional process. Much of the transitional justice literature focuses on the strengths 
and weaknesses associated with each specific mechanism, recognizing their 
complementarity. For example, trials provide a sense of justice, reparations can help to 
directly address past harms, memorializations offer acknowledgment and help develop 
collective memory, and reconciliation programs focus on diminishing divisions that can 
lead to conflict. By now, the contributions associated with each mechanism are well 
known. This model, however, integrates an explicit recognition that these are merely 
potential contributions, and transitional justice mechanisms will not necessarily be able to 
accomplish these objectives in each context. In every post-war setting, transitional justice 
mechanisms must have effective vernacularization and institutional positioning in order 
to make contributions of any value to the transition. 
 Beyond formal transitional justice mechanisms, the model accounts for local level 
processes and the potential of local interactions to contribute to the development of 
stability. In any transitional context, ordinary social relationships and interactions 
between survivors are an essential consideration. A key contribution of this research is to 
map out how daily interactions matter and take local agency during the transition 
seriously. In the case of northern Uganda, I identified specific informal mechanisms that 
contributed to the development of stability, as well as barriers to stability that emerged 
from daily interactions. For any transitional context, a similar model applies, providing a 
useful starting point to identify both mechanisms and barriers. Local specificities will 
matter, of course, and informal mechanisms will operate differently according to context, 
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but social groups, leadership structures, dispute resolution systems, economic 
relationships, and socialization patterns are the types of interactions that are likely to have 
substantial impacts. Additionally, not only do local interactions affect the transition in 
their own right, but they provide key context to understand the success, or lack thereof, of 
formal institutions. The ways people interact in their daily lives and the types of social 
relationships that are present in local communities can have a significant impact on 
transitional justice initiatives.  
 Finally, this model offers a new recognition of the role of emergent conflicts as 
catalysts that can spark renewed violence and instability. Transitional justice mechanisms 
and the informal mechanisms that arise from local interactions need to address emergent 
conflicts directly. Typically, transitional justice approaches address problems emerging 
from the period of war and violence. Emergent conflicts, on the other hand, develop as a 
result of the social changes brought by the transitional period itself, and, as such, may be 
overlooked in efforts to deal with the war-time issues and their direct consequences. In 
other transitional contexts, land conflict may not be as divisive as it is in northern 
Uganda, but perhaps there are other issues that become particularly salient in the 
transitional period. This model explicitly accounts for the potential of emergent conflicts 
to completely derail or block the development of long-term stability, and depicts the need 
for transitional mechanisms to address emergent conflicts. 
 For the case of northern Uganda, I illustrated how this model could be used as a 
tool to analyze the degree of social stability, the impactfulness of transitional justice 
institutions, the mechanisms and barriers that develop in local communities, and potential 
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blockages to the transitional process. Broad enough to be adapted to a wide range of 
social contexts and types of transitions, this model is a primary contribution of the 
research. 
 
Integrating Conversations 
Beyond developing a broadly applicable model of social reconstruction after violent 
conflict, this project also integrates previously separate lines of inquiry, providing new 
insights into the processes of social integration, the social roots of violence, and global 
diffusion. As a substantive area, post-conflict and peacebuilding research is often on the 
margins of sociology; when it is addressed at all, it is often from a development 
perspective or with a socio-legal approach. Most often, however, post-conflict 
scholarship comes from outside of sociology, such as psychological studies of post-war 
trauma, political scientists’ development of macro-level explanatory factors, or studies 
produced by professionals working in post-conflict settings. Through this research, 
however, I demonstrated the value added by a sociological perspective. Sociology 
contributes the tools and insights to develop nuanced analyses of complex social 
processes and causality. Recognizing the constructed nature of social life, sociological 
theories and concepts help understand culture, inequality, power, identity, boundaries, 
and group interaction. Additionally, a sociological perspective illuminates nuance in the 
ways people experience the world, recognizing that perceptions become real in their 
consequences. This work blends these sociological contributions into the substantive field 
of peace and conflict studies. 
  282 
 This project analyzes the nuanced social effects of war, widespread violence, and 
displacement. Considering war and the post-war period as times of all-encompassing 
social change, I explain how such deep and long-term change dramatically shifts the 
nature of social relationships, integration, and interactions. There is an abundance of 
sociological work on types of social solidarity, what contributes to unity, and the 
development of collective identity. Sociologists study solidarity in the presence of social 
differences or divisions, but there is not a well-developed body of work about the 
construction of social solidarity after deep damage to the very foundation of community 
life. By considering processes of social reconstruction and integration after widespread 
violent conflict, I bring new insights to this field, such as how the development of unity 
can be seen as artificial or instrumental. 
On the other hand, I also contribute a needed analysis of what contributes or leads 
to violence and war. Much research in this area takes a macro perspective, focusing on 
states or powerful institutions, considering how factors such as political maneuvering, 
international relationships, or regional resource flows can lead to widespread violence. 
Here, I consider the social roots of violence, as a complementary and necessary 
perspective. Particularly, local-level struggles over power, belonging, and resources are 
essential factors in understanding what leads to widespread violence and, potentially, war 
(Autesserre 2009, 2010; Wimmer et al. 2009; Wimmer 2008). Solidarity can also lead to 
intense conflict, and I contribute a case of how clan and ancestral ties can result in 
hostility to outsiders and act as precursors to violent conflict. Understanding these micro-
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processes furthers an understanding similar processes at higher levels, such as how 
nationalism or ethnic group solidarity contributes to violent conflict.  
Analyzing how post-war contexts can beget additional violence is also an 
essential contribution of this project. In a chaotic post-war setting, I have shown how 
individuals making pragmatic or reasonable decisions under the circumstances can 
actually lead to instability and conflict. This is particularly salient in cases in which 
people have had direct exposure to and participation in violence, with this proximity to 
violence also contributing to the social roots of future violence. Additionally, I offer an 
analysis of how local perceptions of past violence and war have significant consequences. 
The social and cultural processes of remembering and framing the past can have causal 
importance in determining the likelihood of violent solutions emerging for current and 
future disagreements. 
Finally, in an era of rapid globalization and the rise of a world culture (Boli and 
Thomas 1999; Meyer et al. 1997), I provide an analysis of how and why the diffusion of 
global ideals does not happen in some local contexts. Past work has considered cases of 
successful diffusion, as global discourses are carried to new contexts by international 
organizations and then modified to fit the local context through processes and agents of 
vernacularization (Levitt and Merry 2009; Merry 2006). My project identifies how the 
vernacularization process can be blocked, particularly in the absence of translators and 
advocates. I make a new contribution, however, by explicitly integrating the role of the 
carrier organization’s institutional fit in the local environment. Both vernacularization 
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and strategic institutional positioning, I argue, are necessary conditions for the effective 
local diffusion of global discourse. 
 
Policy Implications and Recommendations 
From this analysis, several key points of leverage or recommendations emerge as likely 
to aid the development of post-war stability.  
First, NGOs and government agencies need to prioritize programs that address 
and mitigate the negative effects of the post-war social changes that lead to decreased 
unity. In Uganda, these changes are, specifically, the crisis of leadership, a gap in 
socialization, prevalent NGO interventions, and increasing poverty, inequality, and 
monetization. For example, youth-focused programs could assist with job creation, skills 
training, and support for farming, but also develop cultural or heritage programs designed 
to promote inter-generational dialogue and help fill the gap in the war-time generation’s 
knowledge of traditional practices and skills. Programs to empower and support the most 
local-level leaders could also be particularly effective. The area rodi, the men and women 
elected by their neighbors to oversee farming operations, are responsible for guiding key 
aspects of social life and being the first level of defense in dispute resolution. As long-
term members of the area they serve, they are elected on the basis of their character. 
Although they do not have official power in the political or economic system, their 
leadership has transformative potential, and programs to support these people in their 
(volunteer) service would likely have significant impacts. Programs should promote daily 
social interactions that contribute to unity, such as traditional cultural practices and 
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communal work in Uganda, which is nearly unanimously positively regarded and cited as 
the very definition of unity. While some programmatic strategies may look effective in 
theory, if they do not directly promote positive interactions every day in local 
communities, they are not likely to be effective in the long run. In fact, too often 
programs are implemented that actually have negative consequences (usually unintended) 
for daily interactions, such as increasing jealousy or competition. Overall, such 
interventions cannot be designed as one-size-fits-all solutions, but rather need to be 
developed after careful analysis of the particularities of local needs and in consultation 
with local experts and leaders. 
 Second, agencies, advocates, and other professionals involved in post-conflict 
rebuilding should be particularly sensitive to the development of exclusionary dynamics 
in transitional communities. In northern Uganda, as well as other post-war contexts, NGO 
and government programs give support to small groups, rather than to individuals. In 
theory, this is a positive and necessary development, as groups are better able to be held 
accountable and to guard against the misuse of resources. However, NGOs and 
government agencies should reconsider their policies of giving assistance and resources 
to small groups. They need to carefully analyze the consequences of such policies for 
village unity and division. It would be beneficial to explore alternative models of support, 
perhaps funneling programs through village leadership structures. However, caution here 
is also required, as, in the post-war context, local leaders are less trusted and also, in 
some cases, not particularly trustworthy. As above, consider supporting groups of elected 
leaders, such as the LCI, rodi kweri, and rodi okoro, who are then able to carefully 
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adjudicate the distribution of resources in a way that minimizes exclusionary dynamics 
and competition among groups. This also serves to reinforce the authority of local 
leaders. Additionally, mechanisms or systems of social support at the village level need 
to be strengthened. With the rise of small groups, the group has become the location of 
social support, meaning that those who are not members live more precariously without a 
reliable social safety net. Certainly, some small groups are effectively promoting a strong 
type of unity among members, which ought to prompt thinking about how the most 
positive social features of small groups could be expanded to the entire village, to provide 
a social support system for all residents. 
 Third, addressing economic or resource-based problems certainly needs to 
continue to be a top priority. Currently, many development programs, in post-war 
contexts and otherwise, focus on economic empowerment through skills training, support 
for agricultural activities, and microfinance. In implementing such programs, however, 
there needs to be greater sensitivity to the social dynamics as described above, being 
mindful of what contributes to long-term stability and what types of programs—even in 
their unintended consequences—may be detrimental. Specifically, such programs ought 
to not be focused single-mindedly on empowering individuals or families and helping 
them out of poverty. Instead, a broader conception of economic relationships in a 
community is necessary; as seen in this research, economic inequality can significantly 
strain social relationships, weaken trust, and decrease interdependence. Practitioners 
should also be sensitive to changes in the economic system—such as monetization of the 
local economy in northern Uganda—and how such changes can shift the nature of social 
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relationships and organization. Additionally, as an issue related to a (newly monetized) 
economic resource, addressing land conflict absolutely needs to be a top priority in 
northern Uganda and likely in other transitional contexts as well. To sustainably address 
land conflict, dispute resolution mechanisms must be supported and rebuilt in the post-
war era. Recognizing that a massive resettlement creates a particularly contentious and 
unique situation, a task force or commission of experts focused solely on land issues is 
necessary, bringing together leaders from a variety of perspectives and institutions. 
Finally, my findings about survivors’ perspectives of the impact of the ICC lead 
to several critiques relevant for policy makers and practitioners engaged in transitional 
justice initiatives. The ICC has explicit objectives to increase understanding of the Court 
among local populations and to create a reciprocal exchange where the Court is able to 
respond to the concerns and expectations of local communities.56 Evidence from these 
interviews suggests the ICC is not achieving these objectives in northern Uganda. 
Respondents have articulated a wide range of concerns about the ICC, which the ICC 
should take into account in its future actions in this region and in other cases. 
Particularly, the ICC should be extremely sensitive to the local and national context in 
deciding how to proceed with an investigation, being continually mindful of potential 
repercussions for affected communities. The Court should also seriously consider how to 
address concerns that the ICC contradicts culture, values, or other transitional justice 
mechanisms, wrestling with the real possibility that ICC prosecutions may not be what 
                                                 
56 Some may argue about whether or not the goal of the ICC, or similar international institutions, is or 
should be to please local populations. In some ways, such institutions may ultimately be trying to create 
change at a different level (promoting international justice norms). In this case, however, the ICC 
unambiguously states objectives to engage in a reciprocal exchange with local populations (International 
Criminal Court 2006).  
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the victims of the crimes actually desire. Outreach cannot be a one-way street, with the 
ICC imparting knowledge to local communities, whose only function is to absorb and 
regurgitate information. Rather, it should be a reciprocal process of communication, with 
the ICC open to the possibility of critique from the population and with the ability to 
make real changes as a result of bottom-up feedback. If a primary purpose of such an 
institution is to seek justice for the victims of crimes, it is essential that the voices of such 
people are considered with great weight. 
 
Limitations and Future Study 
There are several key limitations to this research. First, and most noticeably, this project 
would likely have developed differently if conducted by a researcher who was not an 
“outsider” in Uganda. Particularly, if conducted by a researcher fluent in the local 
language and of the same race, the ethnographic component could have become more 
prominent in the data collection and final analysis. This would have allowed more 
nuanced direct observations of daily life and social interactions. Interviews, of course, 
produce an analysisof not what actually happens, but of what people report or perceive 
about their lives and their communities. To some degree, I was able to triangulate the 
interview data with my observations from spending time in the communities. I did not, 
however, live in the fieldsites and thus was not present for all aspects of village life. 
There were also some elements of life that were more difficult for me to directly observe, 
because of my socio-demographic characteristics and positionality. For example, 
although I spent a lot of time with women in the villages cooking, taking care of babies, 
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and so on, I was often limited in the depth of my conversations, as many women did not 
speak English well. In my perspective, this is likely the most significant limitation of this 
research. Along each step in the process, I attempted to remain cognizant of this 
challenge and mitigate its effects, such as by working with Ugandan research assistants to 
conduct the interviews. Certainly, however, this colored the types of questions I asked, 
my data collection methods, the ways people interacted with me, and the direction of my 
analysis. 
 A second primary limitation is that this research presents one snapshot in time. 
The questions I address are, fundamentally, about process, as a transition occurs 
throughout a long period of time, and social stability certainly does not develop in an 
instant. The ways that daily interactions facilitate or hinder the development of unity is 
likely to shift as the years pass and life in the camps is no longer a recent experience. 
People will develop new ways to memorialize what happened in the past. Perceptions of 
the ICC may change if and when a case is brought to trial. The government may develop 
a comprehensive program to address land conflict and dispute resolution. Perhaps a 
deeper stability does not develop until there has been a generational change, with children 
who have been once again raised in their home communities. Communal work and 
traditional leadership structures may fade even farther from prominence, or they may be 
recognized as valuable to communal life and become infused with new energy. NGOs 
will likely decrease in both number and import. Ultimately, the region may develop on a 
trajectory of long-term stability, or may experience a new outbreak of violence and 
conflict. As a picture of post-war village life in 2011 and 2012, my research cannot speak 
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with complete confidence to the future of the processes I describe. A longitudinal 
analysis would be a particularly promising direction of future research, revisiting Lukodi, 
Anyadwe, and Awach as residents continue to grapple year after year with social life in 
the wake of war. 
 There are also limitations that emerge from my case selection and suggest fruitful 
potential avenues for future research. For example, I specifically considered rural 
villages. Compared to larger urban areas, villages tend to be tighter knit, more isolated 
from surrounding communities, more highly dependent on agriculture, more 
homogeneous, and likely to have a shared history among residents. Looking at post-war 
rebuilding in urban locales would likely find relationships characterized by different 
types of unity, interdependence, and conflict. I also analyzed the ICC’s resonance in a 
context where the Court has not been able to take legal action against accused 
perpetrators. It is important to develop cases of comparison, considering the diffusion 
process in countries where there have been trials and/or verdicts in cases. Another 
important type of comparison would be with countries that experienced different types of 
atrocities or trauma. In northern Uganda, people experienced an extremely extended 
period of war and internal displacement. The conflict also has not had a distinct endpoint, 
with the LRA still in operation and no regime change. The reconstruction process would 
likely progress differently in cases with different characteristics of the conflict, such as: 
shorter periods of violence, no displacement, resulting in regime change, with the 
government playing a more visible role in the violence, or between more clearly defined 
ethnic or religious groups in a heterogeneous society. Considering a particular case study 
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allows depth and nuance, but it necessarily involves choices about which case will be 
considered, and which will not. My research is limited by the unique characteristics of the 
conflict, region, and villages I selected, and suggests the need for future study of other 
types of situations. 
There are certainly other significant limitations to this research, and I do not claim 
to render the authoritative or complete picture of the entirety of post-war social life. What 
I have done, however, is my best to portray the people of northern Uganda in a way that 
reflects their depth, grace, and resilience in the face of enormous obstacles. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Public Officials Interviews 
I conducted approximately 20 interviews with various professionals working in and 
around Gulu District. The interviews did not have a set format, but varied according to 
the type of organization and what I was hoping to learn about. For most of the below 
organizations, I interviewed the director or the person directly responsible for 
administering programs in local communities. The NGOs listed include international 
organizations, locally-founded organizations (usually with foreign funding), and hybrid 
local-international collaborative organizations. 
 
Sector Organization 
NGO War Child Canada 
NGO American Refugee Committee (ARC) 
NGO Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP), multiple interviews 
NGO Concerned Parents’ Association (CPA) 
NGO Timo Kica, multiple interviews 
NGO Human Rights Focus (HURIFO) 
Religious Caritas, Gulu Archdiocese, multiple interviews 
Religious Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative (ARLPI) 
Religious Gulu Archdiocese, multiple interviews 
Government  Uganda Museum 
Government Environmental Health Office 
Government Parish Chief 
Academic Institute of Peace and Strategic Studies (IPSS), Gulu University, multiple 
interviews 
IGO Outreach Programme, International Criminal Court (ICC) 
Traditional Ker Kwaro Acholi, multiple interviews 
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Appendix B: Data and Methods Supplement 
Descriptions of Research Assistants & Community Guides 
Using recommendations from colleagues at Gulu University, I interviewed five potential 
researchers. I hired three people initially: Nancy Lamunu, Susan Ajok, and Kenneth 
Oyet. Mid-way through data collection, Kenneth was not able to continue and so I hired a 
fourth, Alfred Olegmungu. In the post-war context, these multilingual, educated 
individuals had found an abundance of highly paid work, but at the time of my data 
collection were finding fewer opportunities available as many programs were fading out. 
They were generally available to me throughout the duration of the interview process, 
although occasionally took other part time work, needed to devote time to their 
schooling, or were called away for family obligations. 
Nancy Lamunu is outgoing, assertive, and effervescent. She has traveled within 
Africa and Europe, is active in the Catholic Church, and spent time in the U.S. in 2011-
2012. She is definitely a “cultural broker,” walking a line between western and Ugandan 
cultures. She has a post-graduate certificate from the Institute for Peace and Strategic 
Studies (IPSS) at Gulu University. Kenneth Oyet studied public administration, 
administrative law, and qualitative research at Gulu University and Makerere University. 
He is currently a student in conflict transformation at Gulu University. He has extensive 
connections within the LRA and is finishing his master’s research on forgiveness, 
utilizing interviews with top LRA commanders. He has worked as a teacher, in 
community-based conflict rehabilitation, and as a community peace educator. Kenneth is 
thoughtful and insightful, easily launching into deep academic and philosophical 
discussions, speaking carefully and deliberately. Susan Ajok earned a bachelor’s degree 
in social science from Makerere University in Kampala. She was a social worker in 
issues of gender-based violence and assisted with several large-scale research projects in 
the region. Susan is caring, wise, honest, generous, and positive. She works hard to care 
for her young daughter and to advance her career. In 2011, she started the master’s 
program in conflict transformation at IPSS, where she is particularly interested in gender 
issues and HIV/AIDS. Alfred Olegmungu is a conscientious worker, always considerate 
and respectful, and an expert at “keeping time” (a rarity in Uganda). He has a real 
awareness of and passion for history and traditional culture. Alfred is from a neighboring 
area, so his dialect is slightly different. At first, I thought this may be a weakness to him 
as an interviewer, but his sensitivity, respectfulness, and grasp of the purpose of the 
interviews proved to outweigh this potential challenge.  
The project translator, John Bosco Komakech, also conducted a few interviews 
during a scheduling crunch. John Bosco is an older man who lives in Gulu with his wife, 
children, and grandchildren. He is a catechist and leader in the Catholic Church, in 
addition to being an accomplished Acholi language teacher. Bosco is well known and 
highly respected in Gulu and in surrounding villages. 
Vincent Oyet was my community guide in Lukodi. Vincent is extremely highly 
respected in Lukodi and people look to him as a leader and an excellent community 
mobilizer. He is in his early 30s and teaches at Lukodi Primary School. He also farms his 
land and cares for his wife and six children. He is intuitive, sensitive, intelligent, 
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thoughtful, and creative. He has had quite extensive exposure to NGOs and government 
programs, and he is often called to attend workshops or participate in programs as a 
community representative. Vincent served as one of my main informants throughout all 
elements of the project. Alfred Kaloso was my guide in Anyadwe. Alfred owns a drug 
shop or pharmacy in the trading centre and farms his land near the centre, living with his 
wife on his family’s compound. He is around 30 years old and is well-liked among his 
peers. He has a quiet, thoughtful, and respectful demeanor, offering insightful 
suggestions throughout the project. Finally, George Otto was my guide in Awach. George 
is young (in his early 20s) and extremely energetic. He works in his brother’s shop in the 
trading centre, farms his garden, organizes the village football team, and just is starting 
his studies in education at Gulu University on the weekends. George smiles and jokes 
easily, has a comfortable and respectful demeanor with all, and is excellent at creatively 
solving problems and mobilizing people. 
 
Sampling Issues in Village Interviews 
There were some challenges in locating respondents. We found some people at home and 
available for the interview on the first visit. For many, we came back once. For a few, we 
had to visit more than that to find them. Sometimes, we had to wait several days, for 
example, when residents were away at a funeral, in town, in the hospital, or working in 
gardens far away. A few leaders were particularly difficult to track down, with multiple 
failed scheduling attempts before finally managing to complete the interviews. There was 
one uncooperative potential respondent in Anyadwe, demanding alcohol if we wanted his 
cooperation; ultimately his son was selected (through the random selection process) for 
the interview. In Anyadwe, there were three compounds where we excluded an elderly 
person from the interview selection process because that the person was either too frail 
(not able to get out of bed) or not of sound mind, so they were not included in the 
selection. There was one compound where we were supposed to select a male respondent, 
but found that the only man was habitually drunk, not able to be interviewed, so we 
interviewed his wife. (Interestingly, when we first went to the compound, the woman told 
us that the man was busy digging in the field and would not be home until evening. This 
is unusual, as most people are home from the field much earlier. Later, my community 
guides told me that the man was always drunk, even in the morning.) 
 
Gender of Interviewers 
I originally thought it might be beneficial for the respondent and interviewer to be the 
same gender. However, the research assistants advised that this was unnecessary. After 
observing the interview process and reviewing transcripts, I agreed that the gender of the 
interviewer and respondent did not seem to impact the interview content. Rather, it 
seemed that a handful of women (and a few men) struggled to express themselves and 
respond to questions in-depth with any interviewer, not necessarily dependent on the 
interviewer’s gender. This seemed to be related to low levels of education, self-
confidence, or (for the women) a cultural norm that women not express themselves. In an 
effort to address this problem, we emphasized to respondents that there are no right or 
wrong answers to the questions, but that the interview was more of a conversation about 
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what they had experienced or how they see things. We also made small talk before and 
during the interview, in an effort to relax the respondent and make them feel like it was 
an informal visit. The interviewer also used probes during the interview to try to elicit 
more complete responses. Even with these efforts, some respondents were simply more 
reserved than others in their responses. 
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Appendix C: Interview Guide 
The following questions were used for the resident interviews. Interviews with 
community leaders followed the same format, but varied slightly in their wording, often 
asking leaders to comment more generally on life in the community, as opposed to the 
wording of the resident interview questions more focused on their individual experiences. 
The leader interviews also included two questions about their leadership capacity in the 
community: 
 
- Can you tell me about [institution respondent is involved in] and what role it plays 
in the community? In what ways do you think it is important? How is its role 
different now than it was before the war? 
- Do you personally consider yourself a leader in this community? In what ways? 
How did you come to be in this position? How is this different than it was before 
the war? 
 
PART 1: Personal narrative and warm up questions 
The first questions are about your background in [name of village]. 
 
1. Can you tell me about how long you and your family have lived here in [name of 
community]? 
- PROBES: Did you live here before the war? Did your family? Did you stay at an 
IDP camp or satellite camp? IF SO: Which one? When did you stay there? IF 
NOT: Where did you stay? When did you start moving back to this village? When 
did you start staying here full-time? 
2. Do you personally remember life here (in this village) before the war?  
3. Do you think that life here now is better, worse, or about the same as it was before the 
war? Why do you feel this way? 
 
PART 2: Community 
This section is about how close people here feel to one another. 
 
1. How well do you know your neighbors? Do you feel close to your neighbors? What 
does it mean to be a good neighbor? Explain what you mean. 
2. What does “trust” mean to you? In general, can most people in this village be trusted?  
- PROBES: Can you give me an example of trust in this village? What types of 
people or groups of people do not trust each other? What types of people do you 
think can’t be trusted? Why? 
3. Can you tell me about the last time residents here came together to work on a project 
that benefitted others in the village? 
4. How long are you planning to stay in this village? Why?  
5. Do you consider this village to be your “home”? Why? 
6. What do you think it means for a community to be united? Do you think this village is 
a united community? How is this different than it was before the war? 
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PART 3: Interdependence 
This section is about the interactions between people here. 
 
1. Do you belong to any groups? Tell me about those groups. (Groups could be either 
formally organized groups, or just groups of people who get together regularly to do an 
activity or talk about things.)  
- PROBES: Why did the group form? Who is a part of the group? What brings the 
members together? What is exchanged? What are the goals? What personal 
characteristics are valued among members? 
2. Can you describe your activities on a typical day?  
3. Can you tell me about (all of) your social interactions in the past three days? 
- PROBES: Who have you interacted with? Why did you interact with them (for 
example, to buy food at the market)? Did you enjoy the interaction? 
4. Tell me about the last time you needed someone to help you. 
- PROBES: Who helped you? Why do you think they helped you? What did they 
help you with? 
5. Can you tell me about any types of people you don’t feel comfortable interacting with? 
- PROBES: Why don’t you like interacting with them? Do others in the community 
feel the same way? Who are the most isolated people in the community and why 
do you think they are?  
6. How do you get information about what’s happening in the village?  
7. How do people in this village rely on one another? Do people rely on one another a lot 
or not very much? How is this different than it was before the war? 
 
PART 4: Social justice 
This section is about diversity and differences between people. 
 
1. Can you tell me about some rules that are important for life here in the village? (Rules 
can be either official rules or just expected ways of doing things.) Which is the most 
important rule to follow? Why?  
2. Is that rule always followed? What happens if it is not followed? 
- PROBES: Is there anyone in the village who doesn’t have to follow this rule? Are 
there any situations where people don’t have to follow the rule? Is this okay? 
Why? 
3. Are there any types of people who are given extra or special opportunities here? What 
do you think about this? 
4. Are there any types of people who are not given the same opportunities in the village 
as other people? What do you think about this? 
- PROBES: Are there some types of people who are not allowed to own land and 
build a home here? Are there some types of people who are not allowed to send 
their kids to school here? Are there some types of people who are not allowed to 
run for elected office, like LCI? 
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5. What type of person would you like your children to marry? Are there any types of 
people in the village that you would not want your children to marry? Why? 
6. In every community, there are differences between people, in things like wealth (the 
assets they own, like land or a home), income, status, ancestry, religious beliefs, political 
beliefs, age, or gender. How much do these differences matter to people in [village 
name]? Which differences are the most important? How is this different than it was 
before the war? 
- PROBES: Do these differences cause problems? How do people from these 
groups interact? Do you think everyone gets the same amount of respect or gets 
fair treatment in the village?  
 
PART 5: Non-violence 
This section is about how people here deal with conflict. 
 
1. What type of disagreements do you think are the most common in the village? Can you 
give me a recent example? What was done to resolve that disagreement?  
- PROBES: What was the disagreement about? Who was the disagreement 
between? What strategies were used to solve it? Who provided leadership? What 
usually works well? What doesn’t work well? 
2. What conflicts are the most serious in this village? Can you give me a specific 
example? What was done to resolve that conflict? 
- PROBES: What was the conflict about? Who was the conflict between? What 
strategies were used to solve it? Who provided leadership? What usually works 
well? What doesn’t work well? 
3. In general, do you think people here deal with conflict in a positive way or in a way 
that causes more harm? How is this different than it was before the war? 
 
PART 6: Formal justice and reconciliation mechanisms 
This last section is about the impact of rebuilding efforts in this community. 
 
1. Have you heard about healing, reconciliation, or cleansing ceremonies done in this 
area, related to the conflict? IF YES: Have you attended any? Can you tell me about 
them?  
2. What do you think is the impact of these ceremonies?  
- PROBES: What do you think is helpful? Do you think they have negative effects 
or need improvement? What effect do you think these ceremonies have on your 
life? On this village? 
3. Have you heard about the Amnesty Act? IF YES: Do you know of anyone who has 
returned home and received amnesty, or have you yourself? Tell me about their/your 
situation.  
- PROBES: What effect did receiving amnesty have on their/your relationships in 
the community?  
4. What do you think is the impact of the Amnesty Act?  
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- PROBES: What do you think is helpful? Do you think they have negative effects 
or need improvement? What effect do you think the Amnesty Act has on your 
life? On this village? 
5. Do you know about the International Criminal Court? IF YES: What is the ICC? 
Where have you gotten information about the ICC?  
6. What do you think is the impact of the ICC?  
- PROBES: What do you think is helpful? Do you think it has negative effects or 
needs improvement? What effect do you think the ICC has on your life? On this 
village?  
7. Can you tell me about any NGO, CBO, or aid programs there have been in the village 
since people returned from the camps? 
8. What do you think is the impact of these programs?  
- PROBES: What do you think is helpful? Do you think they have negative effects 
or need improvement? What effect do you think these programs have on your 
life? On this village? 
9. Can you tell me about any Government programs there have been in the village since 
people returned from the camps? 
10. What do you think is the impact of these programs?  
- PROBES: What do you think is helpful? Do you think they have negative effects 
or need improvements? What effect do you think the Government programs have 
on your life? On this village? 
 
PART 7: Wrap up and demographics 
These are concluding questions. 
 
1. How do you think the village will change in the next 5 years? What will cause these 
changes? 
2. Gender (recorded by interviewer): 
3. How old are you? 
4. What work do you do? How is this different than before the war? 
5. How would you describe your religious or spiritual beliefs? Do you attend a church or 
other place of worship? Which one? How often do you attend? 
6. Are you married? How many children do you have? 
7. How many people live with you in this compound? How do you know these people or 
how are you related?  
8. What is your ethnic background? What languages do you speak? 
9. What is your highest level of formal education? Do you have any other education or 
training? 
 
Interview Fieldnotes 
 
Interview date and time: 
Respondent name: 
Interviewer name: 
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Describe the process of recruiting, scheduling, and consent: 
Describe the physical setting and any other people around (the compound, the interview 
space): 
Describe the respondent’s physical appearance: 
Describe the respondent’s mannerisms, actions, tone of voice, etc.: 
Describe if you felt there was good rapport and the respondent was comfortable with the 
process: 
Describe any interruptions to the interview: 
Describe anything else you feel is important to understand this interview: 
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Appendix D: List of Respondents 
Lukodi Respondents 
Sample # Name57 Gender Age Education58 
Leader 
Religious 1 Evelyn Auma F 30 S4 
Rwot Okoro 2 Abalo Filda F 52 P6 
Survivors 3 Alice Amoyo F 60 none 
Women 4 Akello Rose F 76 none 
Rwot Moo 5 Steven Okumu M 31 P7 
Youth 6 Omara David M 33 diploma 
Rwot Kweri 7 Dalton Peko M 47 P7 
School 8 Joseph Akara M 52 degree (MA) 
Elected gov’t. 9 Felix Ojok M 55 S2 
Atekere 10 Lapyem Paul M 78 P6 
Resident 
11 Yolanda Laker F under 35 P2 
12 Atono Sharon F under 35 none 
13 Hannah Acii F under 35 none 
14 Grace Akoko F 20 P2 
15 Acomo Melody F 21 P6 
16 Mary Acam F 23 diploma 
17 Sarah Lamumu F 42 P3 
18 Juska Aciro F 43 P6 
19 Francis Alur F 49 P6 
20 Helen Atim F 56 P7 
21 Martin Aboce M under 35 P7 
22 Moro Cosmas M 20 S2 
23 Oyet Kenneth M 21 S2 
24 Raymond Oyeta M 28 P5 
25 Michael Okec M 35 P6 
26 Alfred Kapere M 36 P7 
27 Obur Franklin M 37 ? 
28 Juliano Komakech M 42 S2 
29 Geoffrey Omona M 43 S2 
30 Walter Ocira M 52 S1 
                                                 
57 The respondent names listed in the tables below and throughout the text are pseudonyms. 
58 In Uganda, there are seven years of primary school (P1-P7), four years of lower secondary school (S1-
S4), and two years of upper secondary school (S5-S6). Generally, a certificate requires two years of 
schooling (this is common for primary teachers or technical schools), a diploma is higher than a certificate 
(generally 2-3 years of schooling), and a degree takes 3-5 years in a university. Some people pursue a 
certificate or diploma instead of secondary school. 
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Anyadwe Respondents 
Sample # Name Gender Age Education 
Leader 
Women 31 Mariam Lawino F 32 S3 
Rwot Okoro 32 Atim Joyce F 45 P3 
Rwot Okoro 33 Santa Jennifer F 49 P7 
Youth 34 Daniel Lalobo M 27 P7 
Health 35 Patrick Orach M 29 S6 
Rwot Kweri 36 David Okech M 45 P6 
Business 37 Bosco Kidega M 46 P7 
Elected gov’t. 38 Oyaka Peter M 50 P7 
School 39 Frank Acellam M 52 degree (BA) 
Religious 40 David Komakec M 58 P7 
Rwot Moo 41 Charles Ocen M 79 P3 
Resident 
42 Akello Lilly F 22 S1 
43 Judith Akot F 22 S3 
44 Betty Labong F 24 P6 
45 Lapolo Gloria F 25 S3 
46 Stellah Acan F 27 P6 
47 Lucy Anena F 28 none 
48 Lakop Joy F 30 P5 
49 Akot Margaret F 30 P6 
50 Susan Akello F 32 P2 
51 Jennifer Abalo F 56 P5 
52 Richard Oyet M 30 P6 
53 John Gum M 32 P7 
54 Edward Banya M 32 P7 
55 Odiya George M 35 P6 
56 Olweny Wilson M 35 P7 
57 Omara Ernest M 35 P6 
58 Raphael Atoo M 36 P3 
59 Opobo Michael M 40 P5 
60 Otto James M 45 P7 
61 Kennedy Oluk M 56 S6 
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Awach Respondents 
Sample # Name Gender Age Education 
Leader 
Business 62 Milicent Lapobo F 39 P7 
Rwot Okoro 63 Grace Atti F 65 none 
Youth 64 Fredrick Odida M 26 S6 
Elected gov’t. 65 Odongo Kenneth M 43 S3 
Disabled 66 Alex Ojara M 48 P7 
School 67 Richard Oyat M 51 degree 
Religious 68 George Okulu M 52 P7 
Security 69 Michael Okot M 57 S4 
Rwot Kweri 70 Okello Wilson M 63 S4 
Atekere 71 Fredrick Olanya M 70 P7 
Resident 
72 Lawino Ashley F 21 P6 
73 Betty Akwero F 24 P5 
74 Akec Nancy F 32 P2 
75 Margaret Ajok F 38 none 
76 Justine Lakop F 40 P6 
77 Christine Auma F 43 none 
78 Adong Evelyn F 46 P2 
79 Rachel Ataro F 48 none 
80 Helen Acan F 58 certificate 
81 Adula Bethlehem F 75 none 
82 Olobo George M 24 S6 
83 Roland Kidega M 31 S4   
84 Orach Thomas M 39 P5 
85 Okeny Dan M 42 none 
86 Wilson Olur M 42 diploma 
87 Ocaya William M 47 P6 
88 Charles Kilama M 52 S1 
89 Edwin Opiro M 60 certificate 
90 James Owino M 65 diploma 
91 Otto Jeremy M 76 P6 
 
 
 
 
